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On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”

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Notes

  1. “Normal” for the opposite of formal is terminology from James Van Cleve.

  2. Caveat: if all we have access to are Mary’s actual credence functions, then the ur-prior for her will not be unique. But if we know how she would have reacted to every possible course of evidence, then her ur-prior will be unique. See Comesaña (2020a), Chap. 3 for more on this.

  3. This is formulated in terms of the conditionalization rule, but analogous points apply if we consider instead Jeffrey-conditionalization.

  4. See Comesaña (2020b) for an argument that the correct solution to the puzzle presented by Weisberg (2009, 2015) is to deny rigidity.

  5. Ram Neta pointed out to me that my worry regarding REACT does not really depend on the existence of fundamental epistemic principles.

  6. See Comesaña (2013).

  7. Thanks to Rhys Borchert, Tim Kearl, Ram Neta, and Carolina Sartorio for comments on previous drafts of this note. And thanks above all to Scott himself for very helpful exchanges that made the note considerably better.

References

  • Comesaña, J. (2013). On a Puzzle about Withholding. The Philosophical Quarterly, 63(251), 374–376.

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  • Comesaña, J. (2020a). Being rational and being right. Oxford University Press.

  • Comesaña, J. (2020b). Rigidity, Symmetry, and defeasibility. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), 54–70.

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  • Weisberg, J. (2009). Commutativity or holism? A dilemma for conditionalizers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60, 793–812.

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  • Weisberg, J. (2015). Updating, undermining, and independence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(1), 121–159.

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  1. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States

    Juan Comesaña

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Correspondence to Juan Comesaña.

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Comesaña, J. On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”. Philos Stud 180, 3205–3213 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01931-9

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