Abstract
This paper will examine a novel argument in favour of entity grounding over fact-only grounding. The idea of this argument, roughly speaking, is that the proponents of fact-only grounding cannot provide a unified account of grounds of identity, whereas the proponents of entity grounding can. In this paper, I will give a response to this argument. Specifically, I will argue that the problem which this argument raises to the proponents of fact-only grounding is also a problem with which the proponents of entity grounding are faced. Therefore, this argument fails to show that entity grounding is superior to fact-only grounding. Moreover, I will suggest that the failure of this argument points to a general lesson about the issue of grounds of identity facts.
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Notes
In the rest of this paper, I will abbreviate the phrase ‘fact-only grounding’ to ‘fact grounding’ for the sake of simplicity.
This is Schaffer’s (2010) version of priority monism.
For a version of priority monism of this sort, see Cameron (2010).
In fact, Deng told me in a private conversation that he thought that the assumption that non-fact entities can ground was indispensable to his argument.
One exception is Sider (2011), Sect. 8.6, where he argues that entity grounders ‘cannot answer the question of what makes a be F by listing the entity (or entities) that ground the proposition that a is F.’ Sider (2011), p.163. Since the aim of this paper is not to argue against entity grounding, and Sider himself also notes that there are at least two possible ways out of the problem, I will leave this problem aside in the rest of this paper.
There are two ways of regimenting fact grounding talk: (a) the operator conception of grounding endorsed by, for example, Fine (2012) according to which the grounding operator connects true propositions, or ‘representational’ or ‘conceptual’ facts in Correia’s (2010) words, and (b) the predicate conception of grounding endorsed by, for example, Rosen (2010) according to which the grounding predicate stands for a relation that relates ‘worldly’ facts. Presumably, Wilhelm’s argument presupposes the predicate conception of grounding and the conception of facts as worldly because the argument requires, as we will see shortly, the reification of facts, which is what the proponents of the operator conception of grounding need not be committed to. See Fine (2012), p. 47, and Bliss and Trogdon (2016), Sect. 3 for some relevant discussions. In the rest of this paper, I will grant the predicate conception of grounding and the conception of facts as worldly merely because (i) it is these conceptions of grounding and fact which Wilhelm’s argument targets, and (ii) the aim of this paper is to respond to this argument. I thank an anonymous referee for a question about this. I thank an anonymous referee and Farbod Akhlaghi for raising this issue.
In this paper, I use square brackets to denote facts. For instance, [x = x] stands for the fact that x is identical to x.
Here, the existence of x is regimented as Ex where E is the predicate ‘exists’. Wilhelm provides some compelling reason why the proponents of this principle should use a predicate rather than a quantifier to express the existence facts in question. See Wilhelm (2020), pp.501–2.
Likewise, [E[Ef]] is the fact that [Ef] exists, [E[E[Ef]]] the fact that [E[Ef]] exists, and so on.
It is now clear why Wilhelm’s argument, as noted above, requires the reification of facts. For it presupposes the following principle: if there is some fact f that serves as a grounding relatum, then there exists an existence fact about it, namely [Ef], which is something that can ground and can be grounded.
Or more precisely, I have no disagreement with him given the predicate conception of (fact) grounding. For the proponents of operator conception of (fact) grounding, who need not be committed to (worldly) facts, do not have to accept the principle mentioned in the previous footnote and thereby need not accept (3). I thank Alex Roberts for the helpful discussion.
Wilhelm is aware of the problem that fact grounders may find the idea of fundamental entities suspicious as fundamentality is usually taken to be ungroundedness. Since fact grounders insist that only facts can serve as grounds, they may also think that ungroundedness is a property which only facts can have. Based on this consideration, Wilhelm suggests that the fundamentality of entities may be understood as follows: an entity x is fundamental if and only if x is a constituent of some ungrounded fact. See Wilhelm (2020), p. 503.
He writes “Entity grounders subscribe to just one account of the ultimate grounds of identities… one which bottoms out in the entity whose identity is asserted.” Wilhelm (2020), p. 503.
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting me to address the questions regarding unity and disjunctiveness here.
See Wilhelm (2020), p. 504.
See Wilhelm (2020), p. 504, for this example.
We will come back to this distinction in Section IV.
See Wilhelm (2020), p. 505.
Wilhelm (2020), pp. 505–6.
Here, ‘ground’ means entity ground.
In a footnote on page 503, Wilhelm notes that the disjunctiveness problem (with fact grounding) can be formulated in terms of the notion of ‘more fundamental grounds’ instead of the notion of ultimate ground. He writes in that footnote: “Fact-only grounders are committed to disjunctiveness among the more fundamental grounds of identity facts, for basically the same reasons that they are committed to disjunctiveness among the ultimate grounds of identity facts.” I am not sure what sort of disjunctiveness he has in mind here and why he finds the disjunctiveness, if any, as unacceptable as the disjunctiveness occurring in the case of ultimate grounds. However, if he is right, then presumably there is also a way to formulate the disjunctiveness problem with entity grounding in terms of the notion of more fundamental grounds. Also, Wilhelm remarks that the more-fundamental-ground formulation is better. He writes: “For that formulation does not assume that the fact f in f=f is fundamental, or that the non-fact entity i in i=i is fundamental. So that formulation reveals that the disjunctiveness of fact-only grounding is quite widespread.” See Wilhelm (2020), p. 503. Be that as it may, what I argue for here is that the disjunctiveness may be even more widespread than Wilhelm thinks, as it occurs not only in the cases of fact grounds of identity facts but also in the cases of entity grounds of identity facts.
As mentioned in Section II, it is also possible for one to go in a different direction, arguing that metaphysicians should not pursue a unified account of identity but a disunified one. Nevertheless, as noted above, I will leave this possibility aside in this paper.
This principle was introduced by Sider (2011).
It is noteworthy that this result fits in with Wilhelm’s definition of (non-)fundamental entities, according to which non-fundamental entities are never constituents of any ungrounded facts.
In this case, φ(x) is just x itself.
Therefore, priority monism may offer a solution to the disjunctiveness problem raised earlier in Sections II and III. Nevertheless, as both fact grounders and entity grounders can accept their preferred versions of priority monism, fact grounders and entity grounders are still in good company. No side is superior to the other in terms of the goal of giving a UAUG. I thank Hsuan-Chih Lin for the discussion.
To be sure, they do not require that one must be a priority monist. For one may hold that this ungrounded thing in question only grounds all identity facts, and other grounded things are grounded in some different ungrounded things.
Following Fine’s (2012) usage, I take immediate grounds to be grounds which need not be seen to be mediated. For instance, the conjunction (A ∧ (B ∧ C)) is immediately grounded in A but mediately grounded in B and C through (A ∧ (B ∧ C))’s being immediately grounded in (B ∧ C) and (B ∧ C)’s being immediately in B and C. See Fine (2012), pp. 50–1.
References
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank an audience at the Oriel Philosophy Group, especially Farbod Akhlaghi, Alex Roberts, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, two anonymous referees of this journal, Bing-Cheng Huang, Hsuan-Chih Lin, and Howard Mok for their suggestions, which have greatly improved the content of this paper.
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Lo, TC. In defense of fact-only grounding. Philos Stud 179, 2891–2899 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01806-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01806-5