Abstract
This paper revisits a challenge for contextualist approaches to paradoxes such as the Liar paradox and Russell’s paradox. Contextualists argue that these paradoxes are to be resolved by appeal to context dependence. This can offer some nice and effective ways to avoid paradox. But there is a problem. Context dependence is, at least to begin with, a phenomenon in natural language. Is there really such context dependence as the solutions to paradoxes require, and is it really just a familiar linguistic phenomenon at work? Not so clearly. In earlier work, I argued that the required form of context dependence does not look like our most familiar instances of context dependence in natural language. I called this extraordinary context dependence. In this paper, I shall explore, somewhat tentatively, a way that we can see the context dependence needed to address paradoxes as not so extraordinary. Doing so will also allow us to connect thinking about the context dependence of quantifier domains with some interesting ideas about the distinctive semantic properties of certain quantifiers.
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Notes
Though of course, Williamson is arguing against the kind of position I am offering here. Another classic response is from Boolos (1999).
In addition to the papers already mentioned, other good sources on this debate include the papers in the volume edited by Rayo and Uzquiano (2006), McGee (2000), and extended works by Ferrier (2018) and Studd (2019). Among many other more recent papers, see Florio and Shapiro (2014), Linnebo (2013), Linnebo and Rayo (2012), and Uzquiano (2015).
A thorough critique of the contextualist approach is offered by Gauker (2006).
See Peters and Westerståhl (2006) for an extensive overview. The classic papers in semantics are a trio of Barwise and Cooper (1981), Higginbotham and May (1981), and Keenan and Stavi (1986), and work of van Benthem (1986). The logical underpinnings of this theory were explored by Lindström (1966) and Mostowski (1957).
The generalized quantifier literature distinguishes type \(\langle 1\rangle\), quantifiers, which are sets of sets, from type \(\langle 1, 1 \rangle\) quantifiers, which are relations between sets. I shall for the most part suppress this.
For local results see van Benthem (1986) and Keenan and Stavi (1986). For overviews on the many global results about generalized quantifiers see the surveys of Peters and Westerståhl (2006) and Westerståhl (1989). A few noteworthy papers include Hella et al. (1996), Hella et al. (1997), and Westerståhl (1985b).
There was a lively debate over whether domain restrictors are represented in the syntax of sentences. I have sided with the view that they are, but it is not really important here. King and Stanley (2004), Stanley (2000) and Stanley and Gendler Szabó (2000) are among those that said they are. Bach (2000), Carston (2002), and Recanati (2004) said they are not.
A little more precisely, we have already observed from Westerståhl’s arguments that M is not the source of ordinary context dependence for quantifier domains.
Especially for Landman and Link, there are some background issues of whether we should be talking about sets, mereological pluralities, or groups. I am ignoring these subtle issues for now.
There are a number of substantial issues about how to implement these ideas fully. As I mentioned with both, presuppositions can be a substantial part of determiner meaning. We also want to explain the various potentials for scope that different determiners show. To capture such data, Szabolcsi (1997) uses a DRT-style framework, while Beghelli and Stowell (1997) use a highly articulated syntax, where there is a DistP functional head that contributes the universal force of distribution. As Szabolcsi mentions, we can also make use of choice functions.
See the references in note 16 above.
As mentioned above, Beghelli and Stowell (1997) discuss a great deal of the subtle behavior of every.
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Acknowledgements
This paper grew over many years. A first attempt was presented a workshop on absolute generality at the Institut Jean Nicod in September 2009. I tried again some years later, at a workshop on truth, contextualism, and paradox at The Ohio State University in March 2017. Finally, the paper reached its more or less current form at a workshop on semantic paradox, context, and generality at the University of Salzburg in June 2019. I got a great deal of valuable feedback from all those attempts. Special thanks are due to Jc Beall, Paul Egré, Salvatore Florio, Chris Gauker, Eric Guindon, Øystein Linnebo, Julien Murzi, David Nicholas, Agustín Rayo, Lorenzo Rossi, Stewart Shapiro, James Studd, Gabriel Uzquiano, and an anonymous referee.
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Glanzberg, M. Unrestricted quantification and extraordinary context dependence?. Philos Stud 180, 1491–1512 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01746-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01746-6