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Precis of Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests

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Fig. 1

Notes

  1. Denyer (1983) gives a fine discussion of conventionalist accounts of justice that were known and argued over in Plato’s Athens.

  2. Barry (1989, 1995) has done the most to make this general theory of justice known by this name.

  3. Binmore was perhaps the first to demonstrate this equivalence (1998, pp. 397–399).

  4. Gintis et al. (2005) and Ensminger and Henrich (2014) give fine collections of research on the strong reciprocity hypothesis.

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  1. Department of Political Economy and Moral Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

    Peter Vanderschraaf

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Vanderschraaf, P. Precis of Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests. Philos Stud 178, 1701–1705 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01498-9

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