Abstract
In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent–child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child’s being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent’s being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory.
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Notes
See also Confucius’s Analects: “Might we not say that filial piety and respect for elders constitute the root of humaneness (ren)?” (Confucius 2003, 1.2.).
Ivanhoe acknowledges that he owes this conception of virtue to Nussbaum (1993).
Of course, there are better and worse ways to be someone’s parent. A good parent would be loving, caring, considerate etc., while a bad one would be overbearing, indifferent, abusive, etc. However, since I focus on filial piety in this paper, parental virtue or vice will be discussed briefly only in relation to the discussion of filial piety.
For example, Julia Annas claims that virtues are “dispositions worthy of a distinct kind of admiration, which inspire us to aspire to them as ideals” (Annas 2011, 6).
Of course, on the assumption that their commitment does not violate general moral requirement for others. But this would be a requirement for any admirable person’s story. One may admit the possibility of admirable immorality, but that possibility does not undermine my point here.
In fact, for those who are committed to the thesis of the unity of virtue—i.e., the thesis that if you have one virtue you have all the others—any categorization or individuation of virtue would have no metaphysical grounds. While I remain neutral with respect to the thesis of the unity of virtue, I would like to emphasize that introducing the category of relational virtue has a meaningful theoretical advantage.
Laurence Blum makes a similar point about friendship: “What we do for our friends is very particular to our relationship to them, both in the sense of being particular to friendship as a type of friendship, and in being particular to a particular relationship with a particular person” (Blum 1980, 56).
David Solomon also hints the possibility of a virtue with exclusive object: “A virtue must be somewhat general, but this generality need not entail that the virtue be impersonal, much less dispassionate, nor need it preclude exclusivity with regard to its object” (Solomon 2005, 87; emphasis added).
This is why I use gender-neutral terms such as ‘parent–child relationships’ or ‘filial piety’ as opposed to ‘father–son relationships’ or ‘daughterhood.’
Lawrence Blum makes a similar point about friendship: “In friendship one desires and acts for the good of the friend, not simply because he is another human being but precisely because he is one’s friend.” (Blum 1980, 44).
The Confucian tradition also emphasizes the moral importance of having a special or partial—as opposed to general or impartial—attitude toward one’s intimates. For example, Mencius claims that the exemplary person (junzi) is humane (ren) toward the people but does not treat them as kin (qin) (Mencius 2011, 7A45). Here ren refers general virtue toward people and qin refers to special affection.
Note that, by contrast, if she were a tricks-soccer player, whose internal aim is performing exquisite soccer tricks for entertainment, her individual skills would be sufficient for achieving that aim.
For example, Confucius suggests that “uprightness” lies in the child’s covering up her parent’s wrongdoing (Confucius 2003, 13.18), while Xunzi suggests that a filial child may go against her parents’ orders if that is the way to protect them from committing themselves to danger, disgrace, or something beastly (Xunzi 2014, Ch. 29). For a recent reflection on this issue, see Li (2008).
For a detailed discussion on this distinction, see Um (2019).
In a similar vein, Richards claims that the measure of the gratitude we owe them, should not be the sacrifice your parent actually makes for you, but “the sacrifices he would make for your sake if he were called upon to make” (Richards 2010, 232; emphasis added). However, my view is different from his because, while this counterfactual consideration in my view is to evidence the parent’s parental virtue, in his view, it is to indicate the place the child has in her parents’ affections.
Mark R. Wicclair mentions (although he does not discuss in depth) the possibility of these sorts of duties (or obligations): “For example, although I did not have polio as a child, since my mother would have been willing to make substantial sacrifices to help me if I did, it might be claimed that I should be willing to make substantial sacrifices for her if she were to develop Alzheimer's. If there are such obligations, they cannot plausibly be construed as duties (of gratitude) that are generated by (actual) past parental sacrifices, and they are therefore beyond the scope of this paper” (Wicclair 1990, 188, note 24).
See Christopher Wellman (1999) for a view that gratitude in general is better understood as a virtue rather than as a source of duties or obligations.
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Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful for the helpful comments to Gopal Sreenivasan, Owen Flanagan, David B. Wong, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Hannah Bondurant, Wooram Lee, Songyao Ren, Joshua (Gus) Skorburg, Andrew Smith, and Wenqing Zhao, as well as the anonymous referee and the editor of Philosophical Studies. I would also like to thank the audience at 2018 Korean Society for Philosophy East-West, 2018 Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy, 2017 UIUC Graduate Philosophy Conference, and 2017 Duke Work in Progress (WIP) Seminar for their comments and discussions.
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Um, S. What is a relational virtue?. Philos Stud 178, 95–111 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01422-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01422-1