Abstract
Evolutionary debunkers claim that evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena lead to sceptical conclusions. The aim of this paper is to show that even if we grant debunkers the speculative claims that evolution provides the best explanation of moral phenomena and that there are no other moral phenomena for which moral facts/properties are indispensable, the sceptical conclusions debunkers seek to establish still do not follow. The problem for debunkers is to link the empirical explanatory claim to the normative conclusion that moral beliefs are unjustified. The paper argues that debunkers face a dilemma, and that neither of the two options available to them supports the sceptical (normative) conclusions for which they aim. Consequently, it is claimed, the dialectical force of evolutionary debunking arguments is, at best, exceedingly weak.
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Notes
See, e.g., Ridge (2019).
For an early and influential argument in ethics that bears some similarities to the strong programme see Harman (1977).
Some debunkers aim for (metaphysical) anti-realism rather than (just) moral scepticism. But their route from evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena to anti-realism goes through some form of moral scepticism. See, e.g., Vavova (2014).
Street’s final target is anti-realism rather than moral scepticism, but her way to anti-realism is via the claim that the triad (a) evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena, (b) realism, and (c) optimism (i.e., the negation of moral scepticism), are incompatible. Street makes this explicit in her (2015). Street accepts (a) and (c) and so rejects (b). But Street, too, is committed to the claim that the combination of (a) and (b) entails scepticism. See also Vavova (2014), Sect. 5.
To be clear, Shafer-Landau argues that debunking arguments are unsuccessful, but for different reasons from those advanced in this paper.
Indeed, Richard Joyce’s view in Joyce (2001) was that due to evolutionary explanations of moral practices “we can conclude not merely that moral judgments are unjustified, but that they are probably false.” (168).
Assuming that P(J) + P(~ J) = 1 [where P(J) stands for the probability that J is true], we trivially get the result that P(J) ≪ 0.5 → P(~ J) ≫ 0.5.
Any specific moral judgment to the effect that a certain act is morally right/wrong, trivially entails that there exists an action that is morally right/wrong. However, that we are justified in believing the negation of a specific moral judgment, P, does not entail that we are justified in believing the negation of the existential claim that follows from P. I.e., if we believe that there exists an act that is morally right because it is a consequence of believing of a specific act that it is morally right, and then we discover that we are justified in believing that it is not the case that the specific act in question is morally right, we may lose our justification for the existential claim, but we will not gain justification for the negation of the existential claim. Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking me to clarify this point.
The point is not that one is guaranteed to obtain a comprehensive, workable moral view which preserves the truth of any specific set of moral beliefs, but rather that if we start with beliefs that, prior to rational reflection, are (epistemically) likely to be true, then the justification of those beliefs that survive the process of rational reflection will increase. For our purposes here, it matters not which moral beliefs will survive the process of rational reflection and which beliefs will have to be modified or abandoned altogether. More on this issue in Sect. 2 below.
Using Pollock’s (1986) distinction between ‘rebutting defeaters’ and ‘undercutting defeaters’, we can say that these are examples of rebutting defeaters. Viewing evolutionary considerations as rebutting defeaters for our moral beliefs leads to the version of the argument considered in this section. In Sect. 3—the second horn— we will consider a version of EDA according to which evolutionary considerations are undercutting defeaters for our moral beliefs.
This is not the only option available to Error Theorists. Some opt to restate the fundamental commitment of Error Theory as the claim that all positive moral claims are false (see e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), esp. pp. 34–36, and Pigden (2007), esp. pp. 451–452). Such views do not object to the move from ‘not morally right/permissible (wrong)’ to ‘morally wrong (permissible)’. So for our purposes here, we can put this option to the side because our task is not to find the best formulation of Error Theory, but rather to see whether debunkers can avoid the unintended non-sceptical conclusions of their argument. Another option that has been suggested is that moral claims are neither true nor false (see, e.g., Joyce (2001) pp. 6–9). But if debunkers help themselves to this option, their evolutionary debunking argument for moral scepticism becomes redundant.
Suppose, by analogy, that someone said this: ‘X is not a female fox. But neither is it a non-vixen; There are no female-fox/non-vixen properties and facts and consequently nothing has a female-fox/non-vixen status’. It seems to me that rather than showing that it is not analytic that ‘vixen’ is a ‘female fox’, it shows that the speaker is using ‘female fox’ and ‘vixen’ in a non-standard way. It seems to me that one possible response might be this: ‘well, if you insist on defining ‘female fox’ and ‘vixen’ as independent terms, then you are right that something can be both not a female fox and not a non-vixen. But I don’t think these terms are independent. So I don’t see how you can claim that x is neither a female fox nor a non-vixen.’.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. The argument against realism considered here is quite similar to the argument found in Street (2015) mentioned in fn. 7 above. The only difference is that the unacceptable result in Street’s argument is moral scepticism rather than the claim that we would be justified in believing patently false moral claims like those mentioned in the main text.
As mentioned above, debunkers do not deny that rational reflection is a justification-enhancing process. They do so without worrying too much about its precise operation. Rational reflection, they claimed, is of no help to optimists because there are no justified moral beliefs to use as inputs. But the current argument we are considering relies on the outputs of rational reflection. Consequently, in order to substantiate their claims about its outputs, debunkers must now provide an account of its operation.
Debunkers rarely specify the precise contents of the moral beliefs for which they claim there is an evolutionary explanation. Street (2006:115) provides six examples of moral judgment she takes to be “the most basic evaluative judgements that human beings tend to make.” (115) These, according to her, are the kind of judgments for which we can expect to find evolutionary explanations. One of the examples she provides is the following: “The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member is a reason to do it.” (115) The argument in the main text applies, mutatis mutandis, to Street’s examples as well.
One common example of a true inescapable norm is that it is always morally wrong to torture babies for fun. But this norm (and similar ones) seems much too specific to have a plausible evolutionary explanation.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for inviting me to consider this response on behalf of debunkers.
See, e.g., White (2010).
Vavova’s (2014) presentation of debunkers’ arguments is, in some respects, quite similar to the two versions of the debunking argument considered here. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for calling my attention to this clear and engaging paper. However, despite the similarities in the set-up, Vavova’s reasons for rejecting each version of the argument are quite different from the ones proposed here. According to Vavova, the most plausible version of the debunking argument is the one similar to the argument described here as the Ver. 1. But, she argues, debunkers cannot establish that moral beliefs are likely to be false. In contrast, here it was argued that even if we grant that evolutionary explanations can show that our moral beliefs are likely to be false, debunkers still cannot establish the kind of scepticism they seek. The less promising options, according to Vavova, is similar to Ver. 2 considered here. Vavova’s criticism of this version of the argument is based on the epistemic principle on which the argument relies which, according to her, leads to global scepticism – a conclusion debunkers typically don’t endorse and one that makes their argument for moral scepticism redundant.
As discussed in Sect. 1 above, the result that the moral beliefs we in fact have are all unjustified – as option (2) would have it – can reasonably be viewed as a form of ‘moral scepticism’. However, as explained above, this is not the kind of scepticism debunkers are seeking.
See, e.g., Huemer (2018) Ch. 8.
See Huemer (2008). Additional examples on p. 386.
See, e.g., Daniels (1979).
See, e.g., Huemer (2011).
See, e.g., McGrath (2004).
Indeed, in recent literature we find criticisms of evolutionary debunking arguments that challenge the first two premises that we have granted in this paper for the sake of argument. Against the claim that evolution provides the best explanation of moral phenomena, it has been argued (for example) that since evolution can explain phenomena only at the level of the population, it cannot explain the relevant moral phenomena at all (see e.g., Mogensen (2015), Sinclair and Leibowitz (2016) and Hanson (2017)). Against the claim that evolutionary explanations of moral phenomena do not require that our moral judgments are true, some have proposed “third factor explanations” (see, e.g., Enoch (2010) and Wielenberg (2010)).
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Leibowitz, U.D. A dilemma for evolutionary debunking arguments. Philos Stud 178, 45–69 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01420-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01420-3