Abstract
A Boltzmann Brain, haphazardly formed through the unlikely but still possible random assembly of physical particles, is a conscious brain having experiences just like an ordinary person. The skeptical possibility of being a Boltzmann Brain is an especially gripping one: scientific evidence suggests our actual universe’s full history may ultimately contain countless short-lived Boltzmann Brains with experiences just like yours or mine. I propose a solution to the skeptical challenge posed by these countless actual Boltzmann Brains. My key idea is roughly this: the skeptical argument that you’re one of the Boltzmann Brains requires you to make a statistical inference (most Fs are Gs, this is an F, so it’s probably a G), but the Principle of Total Evidence blocks us from making the inference (because I also know this F is an FH, and most FHs are not Gs). I discuss how my solution contrasts with a recent suggestion, made by Sean Carroll and David Chalmers, for how to address the skeptical challenge posed by Boltzmann Brains. And I discuss how my solution handles certain relevant concerns about what to do when we have higher-order evidence indicating that our first-order evidence is misleading.
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Notes
See Kotzen (forthcoming) for a useful general discussion and further references.
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Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank Matt Kotzen for extremely valuable feedback.
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Dogramaci, S. Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?. Philos Stud 177, 3717–3723 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01404-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01404-y