Abstract
Many find it plausible that for a given beneficiary, Y, benefactor, R, and action, ϕ, Y’s being grateful to R for ϕ-ing implies Y’s being grateful that R ϕ-ed. According to some philosophers who hold this view, all instances of gratitude to, or “prepositional gratitude,” are also instances of gratitude that, or “propositional gratitude.” These philosophers believe there is a single unified concept of gratitude, a phenomenon that is essentially gratitude that, and whose manifestations sometimes have additional features that make them instances of gratitude to as well. In this article, I show that view to be mistaken. I base my argument on two hypothetical cases, in each of which a beneficiary, Y, is grateful to a benefactor, R, for ϕ-ing, but not grateful that R ϕ-ed. Generalizing from those cases and other cases of gratitude, I argue that prepositional gratitude is the proper response to benevolence-motivated action and propositional gratitude consists in a beneficiary’s judging a state of affairs to be valuable for himself and welcoming that state of affairs. Because not every instance of a benefactor’s acting benevolently toward a beneficiary is something that beneficiary finds valuable for himself and welcomes, it is possible to be grateful to a benefactor for ϕ-ing but not grateful that she ϕ-ed. Prepositional gratitude and propositional gratitude can each occur without the other and are thus two distinct phenomena. I conclude by explaining the importance of accurately understanding the relationship between prepositional gratitude and propositional gratitude.
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Notes
See, for instance, Rush (2019).
I first introduced the term “prepositional gratitude” in Manela (2016a).
For a discussion of how a motivation to thank is a central part of prepositional gratitude, see Manela (2019: 301–303).
Relative to how I would feel if I were to learn that a random stranger is flourishing or suffering. I argue for these points in more detail in Manela (2016b).
I argue for this in Manela (2015).
I take the term “propositional gratitude” from McAleer (2012).
I add the phrase “for him” because propositional gratitude does not seem to be the proper response to states of affairs a beneficiary does not find beneficial to himself—even if he finds some value in those states of affairs. I might find value (see some good) in the fact that last night firefighters saved a man I did not know from a burning building, but though it seems reasonable for me to be glad that they saved such a man or to praise them for doing so, it would sound strange to say I am grateful that they saved the stranger. If firefighters saved me from a burning building last night, however, then it would be reasonable for me to be grateful that they saved me. The difference is that when the firefighters save me, I find that state of affairs good or valuable for me.
Others who see gladness as being part of propositional gratitude include Rush (2019:15).
Those who make this distinction include Rush (2019).
This example of receiving a thoughtful gift from a friend is an example used by, inter alia, Wellman (1999).
Though I will not address this question extensively here, I am skeptical that gratitude to someone for being a benevolent or caring friend can ever be properly warranted. I think that we can love someone (in part) for being a benevolent or caring friend, and I believe (and will argue later in this article) that a benevolent or caring motivation makes fitting prepositional gratitude for acts a friend might do for us; but such benevolence itself is not (at least typically) the proper object of prepositional gratitude. And although we can properly be grateful to loved ones for all the particular things they benevolently do for us, when we thank someone for being a good friend (or for being a good mother or a good spouse), what we really express with such thanks is not prepositional gratitude at all, but love (for them), appreciation (of their love and presence in our lives) and (perhaps) praise (for the praiseworthy features of how they love us). Not everyone agrees with my assessment of thanking others for being good intimates. Sungwoo Um (2019), for instance, has recently argued that gratitude for being a good intimate constitutes a sort of genuine prepositional gratitude that is distinct from prepositional gratitude for doings. Insofar as Um is correct, it remains an interesting question whether gratitude to someone for being a good intimate always entails gratitude that they are a good intimate. But that is not a question I have space to pursue in this essay, where my focus is on gratitude in response to doings.
Some might be concerned that stated in this stark, barebones form, the case seems less convincing—perhaps because “R’s ϕ-ing,” or “Robert’s bringing Youssef the book,” doesn’t contain the details that seem to make Y’s gratitude to R for ϕ-ing fitting, and, relatedly, that “R ϕ-ed,” or “Robert brought Youssef the book,” doesn’t contain the details that make it plausible that Y is not grateful that R ϕ-ed. Those with such concerns should note that (1) and (2) can be redescribed with as much detail as one might want to include from the case. (1), for instance, could be rewritten as (1′): “Youssef is grateful to Robert for bringing him the book from the apartment, which Robert did out of benevolence toward Youssef, and by which Robert lost an hour of his day,” and (2) could be rewritten as (2′): “Youssef is grateful that Robert brought him the book from the apartment, which Robert did out of benevolence toward Youssef, and by which Robert lost an hour of his day.” Both (1′) and (2′) mention all the same details from the case, and (1′) is clearly true while (2′) is plausibly false.
This case is similar to one described in Manela (2016b).
As with the previous case, some might be concerned that stated in this stark, barebones form, the case seems less convincing—perhaps because “R’s ϕ-ing,” or “Ruth’s sticking her hands into the machine,” doesn’t by itself contain the detail that seems to make (1) true, even if it does make clear why (2) is false. One might also be concerned that if R’s ϕ-ing were redescribed in this case as “Ruth saved Yakov from losing a hand,” then (1) might seem more plausibly true but (2) would not seem as obviously false. Again, though, as with the previous case, those with such concerns should note that (1) and (2) can be redescribed with as much detail as one might want to include from the case—and there is a level of detail we can add in such redescriptions such that both propositions contain the same content and the first is plausibly true while the second is plausibly false. For instance, (1) could be rewritten as (1′): “Yakov is grateful to Ruth for sticking her hands into the machine, which she did out of benevolence toward Yakov so that he wouldn’t lose one hand (which he didn’t), and by which she lost both of her hands (which she foresaw),” and (2) could be rewritten as (2′): “Yakov is grateful that Ruth stuck her hands into the machine, which she did out of benevolence toward Yakov so that he wouldn’t lose one hand (which he didn’t), by which she lost both of her hands (which she foresaw).” Both (1′) and (2′) mention all the same details from the case, and (1′) is plausibly true while (2′) is plausibly false.
I have argued for this view in Manela (2016a).
These are paraphrased from Rush (2019: 16). Rush says these conditions form a “definition” of gratitude to, but that surely cannot be correct. After all, a person could meet conditions (1)–(4) and be completely unmotivated to thank his benefactor, or completely indifferent to his benefactor, or completely unwilling to reciprocate a benefit for his benefactor—and such a person would clearly be ungrateful. Rush’s conditions (1)–(4) are better understood, I think, as an attempt to articulate the conditions under which gratitude to is owed or warranted, not a definition of gratitude.
One might argue that condition 4), the “no disqualifying reasons” condition, is not met in this case, because indifference is a disqualifying reason. But if indifference is allowed as a disqualifying reason, along with malice or ill will, that is tantamount to saying that some sort of positive attitude, like benevolence, is a necessary condition for Y’s gratitude to R for ϕ-ing to be appropriate.
This last condition (that Y must welcome, want, prefer or accept that p), which I have called the welcoming condition, is similar to a necessary condition for the fittingness of prepositional gratitude suggested by several philosophers. John Simmons, for instance, has argued that in order for gratitude to R for providing a benefit to be warranted, the beneficiary must want the benefit and must not want the benefit not to come from R. (Simmons 1979: 178) My second case in Sect. 3 shows this not to be a necessary condition for prepositional gratitude to be warranted. Yakov may prefer that Ruth not have stuck both her hands into the machine to save his hand, and even if he was glad someone stuck her hands in the machine to save his hand, he may have not wanted that benefit to come from Ruth. Nevertheless, it still seems clear he should be, and can be, grateful to her. Even though this “welcoming condition” is thus not a necessary condition for prepositional gratitude, however, reflection on my gratitude cases and more standard gratitude cases does show it to be a necessary condition for propositional gratitude.
Some philosophers have been tempted to subsume prepositional gratitude under the umbrella of propositional gratitude as well. See, for instance, Rush (2019).
I discuss this misconception in Manela (2016b).
I describe two such people in detail in Manela (2016a).
At the end of the day, one might wonder how big such concerns are. One might believe that even if it is conceptually possible that gratitude to can occur without gratitude that, I haven’t shown the falsity of the claim that as a general rule, gratitude to implies gratitude that. And even if there might be some people who are, as a matter of character dispositions, habitually grateful to but not habitually grateful that, I haven’t shown the falsity of the general rule that people who are habitually grateful to are habitually grateful that. Now, one might be tempted to argue that insofar as ethics and social science should be concerned with general rules, not absolute entailment claims, the cases I have presented where gratitude to occurs without gratitude that are too rare and atypical to justify a large shakeup in our thinking about gratitude. In response to this line of reasoning, it should be noted that we often don’t know whether, or to what extent, a general rule should be relied upon until we start to systematically explore what appear at first to be a few unusual exceptions to it. Sometimes, such exploration reveals a “general rule” to have so many predictable exceptions that we are left with no choice but to replace it with more precise and accurate rules. My arguments in this article may not be sufficient to persuade an ardent skeptic that we should in all contexts abandon the general rule that gratitude to implies gratitude that. But my arguments here should at the very least show an ardent skeptic that there is risk in relying unreflectively on such a rule, and they should convince a skeptic that an exploration of the exceptions to such a general rule, which I have begun in this article, is well worth continuing.
References
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for providing especially thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful to Jason D’Cruz for inviting me to discuss the central question of this article with students in his graduate seminar at the University at Albany in the spring of 2019. I am indebted to him and his students for their helpful insights in that discussion.
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Manela, T. Does gratitude to R for ϕ-ing imply gratitude that R ϕ-ed?. Philos Stud 177, 3245–3262 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01368-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01368-z