Abstract
In some cases, a group of people can bring about a morally bad outcome despite each person’s individual act making no difference with respect to bringing that outcome about. Since each person’s act makes no difference, it seems the effects of the act cannot provide a reason not to perform it. This is problematic, because if each person acts in accordance with their reasons, each will presumably perform the act—and thus, the bad outcome will be brought about. Recently, Julia Nefsky has argued that this problem is solved by rejecting the assumption that if an act makes no difference with respect to an outcome, then the act cannot do anything non-superfluous toward bringing that outcome about. Nefsky suggests that, even if an act makes no difference, the act may nevertheless help: it may make a non-superfluous causal contribution. If this is right, it means that the potential effects of an act may give us a reason to perform the act, even if the act wouldn’t make a difference. In this paper, I offer some reasons to be wary of Nefsky’s approach. I first argue that her account generates problematic results in a certain range of cases, and thus that we may have no reason to help in any case. I then argue that, even if we do sometimes have a reason to act when it seems we cannot make a difference, this reason cannot be the one that Nefsky identifies.
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Notes
See Parfit (1984, ch. 3).
This is slightly adapted from Parfit (1984, p. 76).
Of course, some people deny that each contribution would make no difference. See, for example, Kagan (2011) and Norcross (2004). These people, in particular, argue that each individual contribution might make a difference. This approach is untenable, however, for reasons Julia Nefsky (2011) provides.
Some people are willing to “bite the bullet,” however, and claim that collective action cases are merely unfortunate situations—much like coordination problems—where no individual has done anything wrong. See Tannsjo (1989). See also Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), who nevertheless concludes that governments have a responsibility to make a difference in these cases. For reasons why these approaches, among others, are not tenable, see Nefsky (2015).
Taking the first option would also force us to reject the plausible thought that collectively satisfying the demands of morality will not lead us to morally suboptimal outcomes. This thought is a rough version of what has elsewhere been called “the principle of moral harmony”. Proponents of the principle include Parfit (1984, p. 54), Pinkert (2015), Portmore (2016) and Regan (1980).
Nefsky (2017).
I borrow this terminology from Nefsky (2017, p. 2744). Strictly speaking, though, collective impact cases also include those where acts or omissions of a certain type collectively bring about a good outcome but individually make no difference.
Nefsky (2017, p. 2752).
Nefsky (2017, p. 2753).
Nefsky (2017, p. 2753).
But here is an abridged version of my likely, again speculative response. Our reason to contribute in Slips on Water seems weaker because the other potential contributors are unwilling to add their water to the cart (and in the mechanism cases, it is because they are incapable of so willing). Since a willingness to act is, I think, no more than an intention to act under certain conditions, or a conditional intention to act, it seems that our reason to contribute partly depends on whether the others have a conditional intention to add their water to the cart. Conditional on what? Well, given the aim of cooperating is to produce the good outcome, it seems the intention must be conditional on whether the collective set of acts would produce this outcome. Thus the intention must be to add one’s water if and only if enough others so intend—enough, that is, to ensure that the suffering of those in the desert will be relieved. In this way, one’s own intention would be conditional on the intentions of the others: if none of them have formed an analogous intention—as in Slips on Water—one would have no reason to act on one’s own intention; and if enough of them have formed an analogous intention—as, perhaps, in Drops of Water—one would have such a reason. (Here I have in mind something similar to what Michael Bratman (2014) calls a shared intention involving obligation-based interdependence). Of course, none of this proves that we have any reason to form or act on conditional intentions of this sort in collective impact cases. But, at the very least, I think that it provides the best explanation of what our intuitions are tracking in these cases. It suggests that our reason to contribute seems stronger in Drops of Water because the condition that must be met for us to act may have been met, and that our reason to contribute seems weaker in both Slips on Water and the mechanism cases because this condition has surely not been met.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for truly helpful comments. And special thanks to Cheshire Calhoun and Doug Portmore for extremely helpful comments, discussions, encouragement, and advice.
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Fanciullo, J. What is the point of helping?. Philos Stud 177, 1487–1500 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01263-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01263-7