Abstract
The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pie as well as the option of baking, and baking a pie entails baking. Now, suppose that I have both reason to bake and reason to bake a pie. Which, if either, grounds the other? Do I have reason to bake in virtue of my having reason to perform some instance of baking, such as pie baking? Or do I have reason to bake a pie in virtue of my having reason to bake? Or does neither ground the other? Perhaps, the reason in each case is grounded in the fact that each option would itself have optimal consequences. The aim of this paper is to compare two alternative responses to this issue—omnism and maximalism—and to argue that the latter is more plausible. Omnism is the view that what grounds a reason for performing an option is always that it has some feature F (such as that of having optimal consequences). By contrast, maximalism holds that sometimes what grounds a reason for performing an option is not that it is itself F, but that it is entailed by some other option that is F. I’ll argue that maximalism is more plausible, for it avoids two critical problems that befall omnism.
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Notes
An option for a subject is any member of the set that is such that, for any ϕ, whether that subject ought to ϕ depends both on whether ϕ is a member of that set and, if so, on how it compares to the other members of that set.
Options needn’t be mutually exclusive. I can have both the option of baking and the option of baking a pie even though the two are not mutually exclusive. Only alternative options need to be mutually exclusive. Thus, two options, ϕ and ψ, are alternative options if and only if both ϕ-ing and ψ-ing is not an option. By contrast, two options, ϕ and ψ, are distinct options if and only if it is not the case that each entails the other. And since baking doesn’t entail baking a pie, these two are distinct options even though they are not alternative options.
I thank Eric Swanson for suggesting this way of putting it. And I borrow the idea that a maximal option is one that is entailed only by normatively equivalent options from Brown (2015).
In the first case, the option is maximally specific—that is, entailed by no distinct option. In the second case, the option is maximally normatively specific, but not maximally specific—that is, entailed by some distinct options but not entailed by any normatively distinct options. I take no stand on whether there are situations in which a subject has no maximally specific options.
For instance, even if I have the option of spinning a wheel as well as the option of spinning it either gently or with all my might, I need not have the option of spinning it with precisely 15.88351 N (‘N’ standing for ‘newtons’) of force. For I may lack control over precisely how many newtons of force I spin the wheel with. This example is adapted from Hare (2011).
Both here and in my formulation of omnism below, I leave implicit that the right-hand sides of these bi-conditionals have grounding priority. Thus, we are to assume that, when the left-hand side of one of these bi-conditionals holds, it holds in virtue of the fact that the right-hand side holds.
Note also that my use of the term ‘maximalism’ is a bit idiosyncratic. Maximalism is typically taken to be an account of what one ought (or is permitted or is obligated) to do rather than an account of what one has reason to do. See, for instance, Brown (2015), Bykvist (2002), Gustafsson (2014), and Portmore (2016b). But if, as many now think, what one ought (or is permitted or is obligated) to do is grounded in facts about what one has reason to do, then we should think that this sort of maximalist view about what one ought to do must be combined with a maximalist view about what one has reason to do. And the above is an account of such a maximalist view, an account that I first introduced in Portmore (2013) and develop further here.
This is to endorse contrastivism about reasons: “Consideration r is a reason for agent S to perform action A iff r explains why S’s A-ing better promotes or respects some objective O than any other alternative” (Snedegar 2015, 382). I remain neutral regarding whether contrastivism is true. The point here is only to address a potential worry concerning my formulation that arises if contrastivism is true.
Thanks to Shyam Nair for pressing me on this.
Another way to handle cases where none of the agent’s options are ranked best or even tied for best is to adopt what Eric Swanson (2014) calls ordering supervaluationism.
If we want to hold that I have a reason to think of any relatively high number but not to think of any relatively low number, then we could substitute ‘a sufficiently good member’ for ‘a member’ in Max2*.
Note, then, that I draw a distinction between optimal consequences and optimific consequences. The consequences of an option are optimal if and only if there is no alternative that has better consequences. By contrast, the consequences of an option are optimific if and only if its consequences are better than that of every alternative. Note also that, as formulated above, this assumes a maximizing conception of a consequentially decisive reason. But I do this only for the sake of simplicity. The argument goes through, mutatis mutandis, even if we substitute ‘sufficiently good consequences’ for ‘optimific consequences’ throughout.
This is the reasons analogue of what’s called the problem of act versions. See, for instance, Brown (2015).
Note that we’re talking about what a subject ought to do, not about what she’s obligated to do. Satisficers about obligation plausibly hold that it’s not always the case that a subject is obligated to perform her best option. By contrast, satisficers about ought hold that it is not always the case that a subject ought to perform her best option. And there’s an important difference between what a subject is obligated to do and what she ought, but is not obligated, to do, because it is only when a subject fails to do what she is obligated to do that she is blameworthy—at least, absent suitable excuse. And although we often have the right to insist or demand that subjects do what they’re obligated to do, we never have the right to insist or demand that they do what they ought, but are not obligated, to do. Now, I find satisficing about ought to be very implausible, but, as mentioned in note 11, the argument goes through even if we want to hold that an agent ought only to perform some sufficiently good option, whether that be her best option or not.
Those known as actualists reject the validity of this general inference form—see, most notably, Jackson and Pargetter (1986). They reject this because ψ-ing can have disastrous consequences even though ϕ-ing has optimific consequences and entails ψ-ing. Nevertheless, even Jackson now accepts the validity of some inferences of this type. Specifically, he claims that, from the fact that he ought (and, thus, has decisive reason) to raise both his arms at t, we can infer that he ought to raise his left arm at t—see Jackson (2014, pp. 645–646). And he holds this even if raising his left arm at t would have disastrous consequences. But I see no good reason for thinking that the above type of inference is valid only when ϕ and ψ are cotemporaneous, as they are in this case. Now, Jackson thinks that the case of Professor Procrastinate provides such a reason, but, as I show in Portmore (2016c), we should not think that the case of Professor Procrastinate provides a counterexample to this inference form. See also Kiesewetter (2015) for another response to this sort of actualist’s challenge to this general inference form.
We can’t infer that I have an amorous reason to kiss her non-passionately, but we can infer that I have an amorous reason to kiss her. Yet, someone may object: (1) One specific instance of kissing my partner is kissing her non-passionately. And (2) if I have an amorous reason to kiss her, and kissing her non-passionately is a specific instance of kissing her, then I must have an amorous reason to kiss her non-passionately. But (3) I don’t have an amorous to kiss her non-passionately, for this will, let’s assume, have disastrous consequences for our relationship. Therefore, (4) I don’t have an amorous reason to kiss her, as C2 implies. But we should reject (2). If this doesn’t seem obvious to you, see Nair (2015) for an explanation.
For a further defense of the view that reasons transmit in this way, see Kiesewetter (2015).
Note that it’s just as plausible to think that Dr. Singh’s giving Patrick both A and B at t 2 would have sufficiently good consequences, that her giving him both A and B at t 2 entails her giving him A at t 2 , but that her giving him A at t 2 would not have sufficiently good consequences. This is why I said in note 11 that the argument goes through, mutatis mutandis, even if we substitute ‘sufficiently good consequences’ for ‘optimific consequences’ throughout.
More generally, the problem with omnism is that it assesses whether S has decisive reason to ψ in terms of whether ψ is F and so regardless of whether or not there is some alternative, ϕ, that entails ψ-ing. This creates a problem because it seems that (1) whether S has decisive reason to ϕ (or ψ) depends on whether it is better than its alternatives, (2) ϕ-ing can entail ψ-ing even though each has different alternatives, and (3) ‘has decisive reason’ is closed under performance entailment such that, if S has decisive reason to ϕ and ϕ-ing entails ψ-ing, then S has decisive reason to ψ. Thus, it seems that although Singh has decisive reason to give Patrick both A and B at t 2 given that there is no better alternative, she does not have decisive reason to give him A at t 2 given that refraining from giving him A at t 2 is a better alternative. And yet Singh’s giving Patrick both A and B at t 2 entails her giving him A at t 2 . The problem arises because although her giving him both A and B at t 2 entails her giving him A at t 2 , the two have different alternatives. Giving him only A at t 2 is an alternative to giving him both A and B at t 2 , but it’s not an alternative to giving him A at t 2 . And this means that, although giving him both A and B at t 2 could not result in her giving him only A at t 2 , giving him A at t 2 could, as it does in this case, result in her giving him only A at t 2 . And this is why her giving him A at t 2 is not one of her best options despite the fact that it is entailed by one of her best options—viz., giving him both A and B at t 2 .
If there is not just one way that the world would be if S were to ϕ but only several different ways that the world could be if S were to ϕ, then we should replace all talk of the way the world be if S were to ϕ with talk of the prospect of S’s ϕ-ing. The prospect of S’s ϕ-ing is a probability distribution over the various possible ways that the world could be if S were to ϕ. That is, it is the set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ways the world could be if S were to ϕ, with each possibility assigned a probability such that the sum of those probabilities equals 1.
See Portmore (2011) for how this could be done for any sort of substantive view.
This case is closely modeled after the case of Stan from Dorsey (2013, p. 366).
See, for instance, Singer (2009) and Unger (1996). Note that we may not be able to identify which specific ten strangers we saved by making a specific donation (that is, a donation of specific amount of money made wired at a specific time and to a specific organization), but nevertheless there must be some specific people who were saved as a result of our donation, for if all the same people would have lived whether or not we had made the donation, our donation did not save anyone.
For more on this, see Noggle (2009). And note that our surplus time and resources is whatever time and resources that we have in excess of what’s necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of our own flourishing and moral virtue.
For a further defense of this claim, see Portmore (2011), especially chapter two.
This case is closely modeled after the case of Gus from Dorsey (2013, p. 365).
This is counterintuitive for we are to assume that everything else is equal. Thus, we are to assume that Roy will save the same number of people in the future whether or not he saves these ten specific strangers at present. Even so, there are maximal options in which he doesn’t save these ten at present but compensates for that by saving ten additional strangers in the future.
Remember, we are to assume that everything else is equal. Thus, we are to assume that the difference between the way things would be if Roy were to threaten Terry and the way things would be if Roy were not to threaten Terry is that in the former but not the latter ten additional lives (specifically, these ten) will be saved by Roy over the course of his life.
One reviewer was skeptical that non-simultaneous conjunctive actions—e.g., the act of first ϕ-ing at t 1 and then ψ-ing at t 2 —count as genuine options. But there are several reasons to think that they do. First, our agency seems to be temporally extended in that we make plans to perform sets of actions over time—see, for instance, Bratman (1987, 2007). For instance, I once planned on taking the morning flight to Houston, grabbing lunch at the terminal during my layover, hopping on the afternoon connecting flight to New Orleans, taking a cab on my arrival from the airport to my hotel, napping for a couple hours at the hotel after checking in, and then meeting my friend in the lobby at 7:30 PM. Second, it seems that I have control over whether I perform such temporally extended courses of action in that whether I perform them depends on whether or not I plan on taking them (see Portmore 2016b). Indeed, in the above example, I did exactly what I planned on doing precisely because that’s what I had planned on doing. Third, it seems that it could be that I ought to perform such a course action, and, as pointed out in note 1, I take an option to be just any sort of thing that can be the object of an ought. Lastly, many options (such as typing the word ‘the’) are constituted by non-simultaneous conjunctive actions (e.g., typing T at t 1 , H at t 2 , and E at t 3 ).
In the case of Roy, we are to assume that everything else will be the same regardless of whether or not he threatens Terry. Thus, we are to assume that Roy will, in the future, dedicate the same amount of time and resources to each moral and prudential goal that he has regardless of whether he threatens Terry and saves these ten at present. And this is why the omnist holds that Roy has more moral reason to threaten Terry than to refrain from doing so, for how things would be if he were to threaten Terry is to be preferred, morally speaking, to how things would be if he were not to do so. But, on maximalism, we don’t look at how things would be if he were, at present, to act this way or that way. Instead, we look at how things would be if he were to perform this or that maximal option over the time period in question. And we derive his reasons for performing this or that action at present in terms of what those maximal options entail his doing at present.
For more on this, see Portmore (2016a).
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this worry.
For helpful comments and questions, I thank Shyam Nair, Justin Snedegar, and several anonymous reviewers.
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Portmore, D.W. Maximalism versus omnism about reasons. Philos Stud 174, 2953–2972 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0819-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0819-8