Abstract
Deontological evidentialism (DE) is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of (DE). I then use this very distinction against a defense of (DE) inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of (DE) is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us.
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Notes
The source of this normative authority is a matter of debate. Since the term ‘obligation’ is so often and so naturally associated with moral obligation, I will here give preference to the more neutral term ‘normative requirement’. I will elide the ‘authoritative’ qualifier throughout.
Some argue that Locke took his evidentialism to be restricted to those propositions that are of most importance to us (e.g. those about religion and morality). See Wolterstorff (1996, 63–66) for a defense of this reading. Since Locke’s views are not my main focus, I will put this exegetical detail to the side.
See Plantinga and Wolterstorff (1983) for discussion of this point.
Much of the literature in defense of evidentialism states it as an account of epistemic justification. In such cases, it is often unclear which kind of normative claim evidentialism is intended to be and, more to my present point, whether and how it is related to (DE). I suspect, at any rate, that my criticism of (DE) in this paper will be relevant to a good number of evidentialists about epistemic justification, but I will not examine or argue for this further claim here. See, for example, McCain (2014) and the essays collected in Dougherty (2011).
Cowie (2014, 4003) argues that there is a presumptive case in favor of what he calls intrumentalism about epistemic normativity: the claim that “there is reason to believe in accordance with one’s evidence because this is an excellent means of fulfilling the goals that one has, or should have.” His argument, however, is entirely negative. It is a product of his (2014, 4004) criticism of what he takes as the only non-error-theoretic prominent alternative, which he calls intrinsicalism about epistemic normativity: the claim that “there is reason to believe in accordance with one’s evidence in virtue of a brutely epistemic normative truth relating belief to evidence, or to some other epistemic property such as truth, or epistemic rationality”. The Lockean views of epistemic normativity discussed here, however, do not fit within either of these prominent categories. They explain epistemic normativity—unlike intrinsicalism—but do not appeal in any way to our goals—unlike instrumentalism. This is another reason—besides their historical influence and plausibility—why they deserve the separate and careful treatment they receive here.
I read Clifford differently from Brogaard (2014, 130–135). She takes him as committed to the premise that “false beliefs could have morally harmful consequences” (my emphasis).
Talk of wide and narrow scope is here talk about the place of the deontic operator in the underlying logical structure of premise (2). Let ‘\(\square\)’ represent a normative requirement, let ‘F’ stand for ‘false beliefs always have negative moral consequences’, and let ‘E’ stand for ‘avoids believing that p if p is false’. Then \((\hbox {narrow}_{1})\) has the form \(\forall\)x (Fx\(\rightarrow \square\)Ex). Now let ‘B’ stand for ‘has a false belief that p’ and let ‘R’ stand for ‘refrains from forming the dominant desire d which, when coupled with p, would give way to an action that has negative moral consequences’. Then \((\hbox {wide}_{1})\) has instead the form \(\forall\)x (Fx\(\rightarrow \square\)(Bx\(\rightarrow\)Rx)). For a broader discussion of wide and narrow scope requirements in connection to rationality, see Kolodny (2005), Broome (2007), Schroeder (2009), and Way (2011).
Grimm (2009, 259 fn. 32) is in fact aware that his claims are, as he puts it, “Cliffordian.”
There is a consequentialist reading of premise (2) that makes this last claim false. According to this reading, what makes us required to be good sources of information are the negative moral consequences of the action of providing bad information. This is neither the appropriate reading of Grimm’s intentions—to my mind—or the sense of premise (2) that I intend here. I take it instead as the claim that there is something disrespectful about providing someone with bad information, whether or not there are negative moral consequences to it. In this sense, premise (2) is akin to a Kantian appeal to the inherent dignity of individuals.
One may worry that in trying to avoid the demandingness of Grimm’s view we have swung too far towards the opposite extreme. On the suggested alternative, our epistemic normative requirements may seem too easy to fulfill. In particular, the alternative seems to lose an apparent virtue of Grimm’s view, namely, the fact that the interests of future people give rise to normative requirements that bind us now. This worry, however, misconstrues the proposed alternative. The requirement to be such that, if we inform someone about p, then we are a good source of information about p, does bind us now and it does arise due to the possibility that someone who cares about p might come to depend on us in the future. (See how both \((\hbox {narrow}_{2})\) and \((\hbox {wide}_{2})\) are formulated in terms of possible dependences.) On this matter, the Grimmean view and the proposed alternative are in agreement. Where they differ is in the nature—more exactly, the structure—of the requirement that they identify: the Grimmean view sees it as a requirement that can be satisfied in just one way, while the proposed alternative provides for a choice. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this worry to my attention.
A more modest proposal could say that, though there are often more than just one correct way to perform a role, there are certain essential features that are shared by every correct way. I am grateful to Chris Meacham and Seth Cable for discussion of this point.
In this way, (Feldman 1988, 240–243) rejects his earlier claim that epistemic ought-claims should be understood in the same way as we understand the ‘ought’ in ‘we ought to pay our mortgage’. As he sees it, the latter is a case of a contractual ought, yet there is no sense in which we are bound by any contract (explicit or implicit) to believe in a certain way.
See Feldman (2008, 346–347).
See Altschul (2014, 252–254) for the claim that, contra Feldman, role oughts are not counterexamples to the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. I will not discuss this worry here.
In later work, in fact, Kornblith (2002, ch.5) may well be relying on the normative force of wide-scope normative requirements. This is because he argues that epistemic normativity is regular instrumental normativity where the antecedent is always satisfied. Since it is an open and lively question whether instrumental normativity has a narrow-scope or a wide-scope structure (see the aforementioned Kolodny 2005 and Broome 2007, for example), Kornblith’s own account of epistemic normativity may well be committed to wide-scope structures being capable of normative force.
This is not to suggest these various senses of the English ‘ought’ betray a difference in semantic structure and/or syntactic behavior. See, for example, Finlay and Snedegar (2014).
I take this to be a Moorean point. In the second preface to the Principia, Moore (1903, 3) says: “it cannot be too emphatically insisted that the predicate which... I call ‘good’, and which I declare to be indefinable, is only one of the predicates for which the word ‘good’ is commonly used to stand... [T]he predicate I am concerned with is that sense of the word ‘good’ which has to the conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ a relation which makes it the sense which is of the most fundamental importance for Ethics.” I am here suggesting something similar regarding ‘ought’, values, and normative requirements. I am grateful to Miles Tucker for bringing this to my attention.
Let me make five clarifications about my criticism of Feldman’s defense of (DE). First, I am not claiming that there are no epistemic role oughts. Second, I am not assuming that only the moral sense of the English ‘ought’ expresses a claim about normative requirements. Third, I am not assuming that there is a sense of ‘ought’ that expresses the notion of an all-things-considered ought, a claim about what is best once we take into consideration all true ought-claims. Fourth, I am not suggesting that sui generis epistemic value cannot give rise to sui generis epistemic normative requirements. Fifth, I am not ignoring Feldman’s (2000, 676) injunction that “it is our plight to be believers.” This seems to suggest a feature of epistemic role oughts that distinguishes it from more ordinary role oughts, such as the teacher role ought, and one might think that this distinguishing feature is enough to justify the claim that epistemic role oughts express normative requirements after all. But this is not the case. On this point, Kornblith (2001, 237–238) said it best: “Many people are forced into horrible roles; they are put in positions over which they have no choice. Some are forced into slavery; others into prostitution. Much as they may have no choice about playing certain roles, we don’t want to say in these cases that, whatever the role, they ought to perform them well.”
Feldman is not alone in grounding epistemic normativity on what is valuable from the epistemic point-of-view. For two influential further examples, see Alston (1993, 531) and Sosa (2009, 70). My argument in this section applies to these and similar views as well: authoritative requirements cannot be grounded merely on the claim that epistemic values issue from a certain point-of-view.
Notice that my criticism of Feldman in the previous section is independent of any positive account of privileged values. So long as we have it clear that role values, as a kind of value, fail to have authority over us, claiming that X is a role-value will be an inadequate explanation of its authority.
See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) for discussion.
For the instrumentalist approach to epistemic normativity, see Stich (1990), Kornblith (2002), and Cowie (2014). I do not assume that an account of epistemic normativity (instrumentalist or otherwise) is ipso facto an account of the notion of epistemic justification. For my views on justification, see Oliveira (2015) and Oliveira (forthcoming). For my views on epistemic normativity—and its relation to justification—see Oliveira (unpublished). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the encouragement to add the brief positive remarks that compose this section.
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Acknowledgments
I’m grateful to Hilary Kornblith, Christopher Meacham, Seth Cable, Timothy Perrine, Kristian Olsen, Scott Hill, Dennis Kavlakoglu, Ed Ferrier, Miles Tucker, Bob Gruber, and an anonymous referee for discussion and comments on previous drafts.
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Oliveira, L.R.G. Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values. Philos Stud 174, 485–506 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0693-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0693-4