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In the eye of another: comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal self-consciousness’

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Notes

  1. For various discussions of the semantic and metaphysical significance of plurals see Boolos (1984), Hossack (2000), Oliver and Smiley (2004), and MacBride (2005). For opposition see, Higginbotham (1998).

  2. See Frege (1977).

  3. I put ‘wide-scoped’ and ‘narrow-scoped’ in inverted commas to indicate agnosticism about the logical form of attitude ascriptions.

  4. That indexical and demonstrative expressions create distinctive problems for accounts of propositional attitude ascription has long been recognized. Among many others, cf. Richard (1990). Crimmins and Perry (1989). Forbes (1990).

  5. See Lewis (1979). Cf. also the discussion of the contrast between reflective self-knowledge and reflexive reference in Ch. 4 of O'Brien (2007).

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Acknowledgments

An earlier version of these comments were presented at the Oberlin Colloqium in May 2012. I’d like to thank Christopher Peacocke for conversation about the themes of his paper, and Naomi Eilan for illuminating discussion of issues surrounding the second person.

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Correspondence to M. G. F. Martin.

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Martin, M.G.F. In the eye of another: comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal self-consciousness’. Philos Stud 170, 25–38 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0173-z

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