Notes
See Frege (1977).
I put ‘wide-scoped’ and ‘narrow-scoped’ in inverted commas to indicate agnosticism about the logical form of attitude ascriptions.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier version of these comments were presented at the Oberlin Colloqium in May 2012. I’d like to thank Christopher Peacocke for conversation about the themes of his paper, and Naomi Eilan for illuminating discussion of issues surrounding the second person.
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Martin, M.G.F. In the eye of another: comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal self-consciousness’. Philos Stud 170, 25–38 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0173-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0173-z