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You can see what ‘I’ means

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Abstract

This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.

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Notes

  1. Siegel (2006, pp 490–491).

  2. Forthcoming. Levine reviews but does not endorse the argument.

  3. Forthcoming.

  4. Especially Schwitzgebel (2008).

  5. The expectation that there will be a phenomenal contrast is built into the name of the argument.

  6. Pylyshyn (2003).

  7. Lewis (1980).

  8. Siegel (2006, pp. 490–491).

  9. see Tye 1995 and Dretske 1995.

  10. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001).

  11. Ward and Sagiv (2007).

  12. It is questionable whether this would be the sort of de-coupling needed here since without the color photism, we would end up with a different visual experience.

  13. This argument concerns congenital synesthesias. Acquired synesthesias resulting from trauma or induced through hypnosis may be better described by associationism.

  14. Asher et al. (2009).

  15. Galton (1883).

  16. Ward and Simner (2005).

  17. Sollberger (2011). Gray (2001) offers a contrasting view.

  18. Maurer and Mondloch (2004).

  19. See Maurer and Mondloch (2004).

  20. For discussion see Ward et al. (2008), and Rothen and Meier (2010).

  21. For discussion see Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001, 2003), and also Mulvenna (2007).

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Gary Bartlett, Peter Mandik and Elizabeth Schechter for feedback that led to improvements.

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  1. Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

    Jennifer Matey

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  1. Jennifer Matey
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Correspondence to Jennifer Matey.

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Matey, J. You can see what ‘I’ means. Philos Stud 162, 57–70 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9988-2

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