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Notes
In this respect, Nelkin sides with Markosian (1999), who also has argued for a compatibilist view like this.
One difference between Mele on the one hand and Pereboom and me on the other, is that Pereboom and I think in terms of relatively untutored subjects, whereas Mele (2006) thinks it better to consult the intuitions of those who remain unsettled but have already thought long and hard about the free will debate.
To avoid any misimpression: Nelkin’s work here was completed before I even began to draft my most recent reply to Pereboom. So I’m not suggesting that she ought to have credited me here. Indeed, it seems I ought to credited her (and I will). My only point is that my reply, which I crafted unaware of Nelkin’s remarks here, can be used in support of her reply to Pereboom.
This is to adopt Pereboom’s (2001) notion of robustness. I myself prefer a slightly more demanding formulation of robustness, but Pereboom’s will do for present purposes.
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McKenna, M. Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility . Philos Stud 163, 105–116 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0082-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0082-6