Abstract
The main message of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is twofold: that philosophy of science needs to locate science within its wider societal context, ceasing to analyze science as if it existed in a social/political/economic vacuum; and correlatively, that philosophy of science needs to aim for an understanding of scientific rationality that is appropriate to that context, a scientific rationality that integrates the ethical with the epistemic. The ideal of socially responsible science that the book puts forward, in fact, maintains that sound social values as well as sound epistemic values must control every aspect of the scientific research process, from the choice of research questions to the communication and application of results. And it is this that raises troubling questions for Matt Brown, Hugh Lacey, and Libby Potter. In this paper I attempt to answer their questions and make explicit exactly what is in the offing if I succeed.
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Notes
The social can, and on occasion does, intervene in science according to these analyses, of course, but when it does, the science is “irrational,” that is to say, contrary to the rationality defined by the analyses: “The sociology of knowledge [i.e., explanation in terms of social factors] may step in to explain beliefs if and only if those beliefs cannot be explained in terms of their rational merits” (Laudan 1977, p. 202).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Matt Brown, Hugh Lacey, and Libby Potter for their interesting and thoughtful comments, and Sharon Crasnow for organizing the 2012 American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Author-Meets-Critics symposium in which these comments were first aired. I would also like to thank Amy Kind for helping to make this publication possible.
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Kourany, J.A. Meeting the challenges to socially responsible science: reply to Brown, Lacey, and Potter. Philos Stud 163, 93–103 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0073-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0073-7