Abstract
The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature of begging the question. Although the charge of begging the question is frequently made in philosophy, it is surprisingly difficult to pin down the precise nature of this dialectical infelicity (or family of such infelicities). Thus we offer some new proposals about the nature of begging the question with an eye to understanding what is going on in central cases in which the charge is legitimately made. We then defend the Consequence Argument against the charge that it begs the question, so construed. We contend that, whatever the other liabilities of the argument may be, it does not beg the question against the compatibilist.
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Notes
The epigraph comes from van Inwagen (2005, p. 346).
Nelson Pike offers a lucid regimentation of the argument in his (1965); for a discussion of the parallels between this argument and the argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise, see Fischer (1994). There is also a recent debate about whether the Pike-style argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom begs the question, which can be found in Merricks (2009), Fischer and Todd (2011), and Merricks (2011).
Sympathetic presentations of the Consequence Argument can be found in Fischer (1994), Ginet (1990), Van Inwagen (1983), and Wiggins (1973), among others. For some essentially (although not entirely) friendly critical discussions of the Consequence Argument, and (in some cases) suggestions for adjustments or modifications in the presentation or regimentation of the basic intuitive ideas, see (among others): Fischer (1983, 1988), O’Connor (2000, pp. 3–18), Warfield (2000), and Warfield and Finch (1998). Perhaps the most visible critical discussion of the Consequence Argument is in Lewis (1981). For recent critiques, see (among many others) Campbell (2007, 2008), Perry (2004), and Vihvelin (2004, 2008).
Fischer (1994, p. 88) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 21–22). The original formulation of PFPL can be found in Ginet (1990). Fischer (1994, esp. pp. 98–109), argues that accepting PFPL can issue in an illuminating analysis of Newcomb’s Problem. For discussion, see: Carlson (1998) and Fischer (2001a, b). Kadri Vihvelin (in personal correspondence) has pointed out that PFPL, if intended as a necessary truth, appears to rule out the possibility of time travel. The issue of time travel is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper, but in future work we hope to explore the relationship between time travel and various fixity principles.
This assumption (that the relevant agent doesn’t have access to a world with different laws) limits the project because our argument, which incorporates a certain sort of backtracking counterfactual, will not support acceptance of PFPL over acceptance of PFP by itself. And the compatibilist could arguably say what should be said about the central case in Sect. 3 while endorsing PFP but rejecting PFL. In other words, a full defense of the soundness of the Consequence Argument would require an argument that PFPL can do some work that PFP can’t. (Thanks to Andrew Bailey and E. J. Coffman for emphasizing these points in personal correspondence.)
To our knowledge, the only philosopher who has taken up this task (albeit under a different guise) is Warfield, in his (2000). Although Warfield’s paper wasn’t explicitly written as such (cf. footnote 15 on pp. 178–179), it can be construed as responding to a challenge offered by Flint in his (1987). (We should also note that Flint does not in that paper accuse the Consequence Argument of begging the question; he merely points out that it rests on a principle [roughly equivalent to what we have dubbed PFPL] that is unpalatable for compatibilists—and thus, we would add, is in need of argumentative support if the Consequence Argument is going to be of any use.)
Walton (1989, p. 245) offers the following characterization of begging the question:
According to Hamblin [1970, p. 32], the origin of the term “begging the question” is through the translation of Aristotle’s original Greek phrase to en arche aitesthai in turn translated into Latin as petitio principii, which means “beg for that which is in the question at issue.” The meaning of this curious phrase becomes clearer in the context of persuasion dialogue based on a conflict of opinion between two parties. In persuasion dialogue, one party may ask to be granted certain premises he needs to build up his case to persuade the other party of his thesis (his conclusion to be established in the dispute). The thesis (conclusion) is the question that is to be established by this party through his argument. Hence to include this conclusion within the premises asked to be granted is to beg the question, that is, to “beg for” the question (conclusion) that is supposed to be proved. In other words the fault is that of “begging for” something that should be earned through the work of argument.
In addition to such philosophers as Bok, Lewis, and Hill (who have put the charge in print), various philosophers—including Joseph Keim Campbell and Kadri Vihvelin—have made this charge against the Consequence Argument in some comments on Vihvelin (2010). Campbell, for instance, says that an argument that appeals to PFPL “is not so much an argument as an expression of incompatibilist belief.” According to Campbell, appealing to PFPL begs the question against anyone who accepts the classical view of free will as the ability to do otherwise. Vihvelin says that “If the incompatibilist argues that we lack free will at a deterministic world because we lack the freedom to do otherwise, and then stipulates that the freedom to do otherwise is the power to ‘add to the given past, holding fixed the laws,’ then … that begs the question.”
Thanks to E. J. Coffman, Tom Flint, and Aaron Segal for helping us realize the importance of this distinction.
It’s also possible, of course, for an argument to beg the question in virtue of some combination of the premises, but since the offending premises can always be conjoined into one, we’ll refer to them in the singular.
Wright (2001, p. 357) offers a similar account: “I have begged the question if I support a conclusion with reasons that would not be accepted in the context by anyone who did not already accept the conclusion.”
Neal Tognazzini originally suggested (a conceptual ancestor of) this approach to specifying the nature of begging the question in a comment on Vihvelin (2010). There is a complication, however, that is worth noting. There are two cases in which someone (S) might not have any good independent reason to accept the relevant premise. In the first case, there simply aren’t any such reasons. In the second case, such reasons exist but S isn’t aware of them. And this distinction raises a further issue, which has to do with an ambiguity in the term “argument.” The Consequence Argument is typically thought of as a set of numbered propositions (i.e., a set of premises, together with a conclusion). But as van Inwagen reminds us (1983, p. 69), a set of numbered propositions is merely a “bookkeeping device” that stands in for an argument. Strictly speaking, an argument (e.g., an argument for incompatibilism) consists of the relevant set of numbered propositions together with a defense of the premises. What this means is that the same bookkeeping device could refer to two different arguments—the first of which begs the question, and the second of which doesn’t. This could happen if there exists some independent reason for accepting a particular premise, but the first argument doesn’t appeal to that reason, and thus begs the question, whereas the second argument does appeal to that reason. (Notice also that when an argument begs the question in virtue of failing to appeal to an independent reason, that could be because the proponent of the argument isn’t aware of the reason [as most often happens], or it could be because the proponent of the argument is aware of the reason but chooses not to appeal to it. This latter possibility appears to create a problem for our account, because it seems that someone could offer an argument that is obviously logically circular and yet, according to our analysis, does not beg the question. [For an example of such a situation, cf. the “McCoy” case in Hazlett (2006, p. 346).] For the sake of simplicity, and since we are not attempting a full-blown analysis of begging the question, we will ignore this possibility and make the idealizing assumption that anyone offering an argument will offer the best argument available to them, given their evidential state.) If the bookkeeping device doesn’t make it clear what independent reasons there may be for the conclusion, then we who encounter the argument are prompted by the principle of charity to at least attempt to come up with them on our own. And if we’re unable to do so, given an honest effort, then we are arguably within our rights to level the accusation of begging the question.
So: Although we’ll ignore these complications in the main text, what we’re arguing is that although the bookkeeping device most often associated with the Consequence Argument doesn’t make it clear whether or not the argument itself begs the question, there are reasons for accepting the relevant premise that are independent of the conclusion—and thus the argument itself need not beg the question. (Thanks to Joe Campbell, Jacob Domeyer, and Neal Tognazzini for bringing these complications to our attention.)
On the identity interpretation, an argument begs the question iff there are no reasons (to accept the relevant premise) that are not identical to the conclusion. Contraposing and canceling a double negation gives us the following: An argument does not beg the question iff there exists a reason to accept the premise that is not identical to the conclusion.
Entailment in the other direction won’t work either. If we say that “independent of the conclusion” should be interpreted as “not entailed by the conclusion,” then an argument avoids begging the question if there’s at least one reason to accept the premise that isn’t entailed by the conclusion. But this interpretation, much like the non-identity interpretation, is too permissive. A conjunction of the conclusion and some other true proposition could be a reason to accept the premise, and would not be entailed by the conclusion, but of course would not be independent of the conclusion in the sense we’re looking for. (Thanks to Aaron Segal for his help in highlighting the difficulties in finding a suitable interpretation of the notion of independence.)
It’s worth highlighting here that our analysis is in terms of someone’s having a certain kind of reason, rather than there merely being such a reason. If we analyze independence in terms of there being such a reason, then we are forced to say that an argument begs the question only if there exist no reasons for the relevant premise that are independent of the conclusion. But consider a case (which we borrow from Aaron Segal) in which the relevant premise p is identical to the conclusion c, and there is a reason r for p that entails p—but the proponent of the argument is not aware of this entailment relation (i.e., not aware that there is a reason for p). This argument clearly begs the question (since p = c), but there is a reason for p (namely, r) that exists apart from a prior acceptance of c. So, given our interpretation of independence, it can’t be right to say that an argument begs the question only if there exist no reasons for the relevant premise that are independent of the conclusion.
Thanks to E. J. Coffman for making us aware of this proposed desideratum on accounts of begging the question.
Both Alston (1986) and Bergmann (2004) have argued that some types of epistemic circularity are benign. Pryor (2004) argues in similar fashion with respect to certain types of epistemic dependence, although he is admittedly more concerned with the reasoning processes underlying Moore’s argument than he is with the argument itself. In particular, he is primarily concerned with the question of whether the reasoning process represented by Moore’s argument is legitimate—i.e., whether that reasoning process can instantiate a genuine justificatory structure. (He thinks it can.) Pryor then points out that even if Moore’s reasoning process is legitimate, there may nevertheless be some audience (e.g., a skeptical audience) that would not be convinced by an argument based on that reasoning process. This point presumably generalizes to other contexts in which an argument based on a reasoning process is presented to an audience, which means that even though the Consequence Argument does not beg the question, there may nevertheless be some audiences who would not be convinced by it. This is another issue that would need to be addressed in a full defense of the Consequence Argument.
Notice that we are deliberately avoiding the requirement that a contrastive reason entail the falsity of the relevant counterpossibility. This requirement would be too strong. There are some cases in which the relevant counterpossibility is simply the negation of the conclusion, and in these cases a sub-argument for a premise that entails the falsity of the counterpossibility would thereby entail the truth of the conclusion—thus rendering the main argument unnecessary. And if a sub-argument that entails the main argument’s conclusion is the only way to support the relevant premise, then the main argument virtually begs the question. (The notion of virtually begging the question comes from Klein (1995).) Thus an account of begging the question that required that a contrastive reason entail the falsity of the relevant counterpossibility would be self-defeating, as it would in some cases trade begging the question for virtually begging the question.
Note also that we are not endorsing the more general thesis of contrastivism about reasons (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2008).
In footnote 28 we say a little bit more about why the Consequence Argument doesn’t beg the question even if an independent contrastive reason for the premise is required.
In other words, we can suppose that nothing is preventing Sam from acting out of character by making a decision to go ice-skating. We can be confident that he won’t act out of character, but it doesn’t follow that he can’t.
Note also that the Consequence Argument can be absolved of the charge of begging the question even if an independent contrastive reason is required. The relevant counterpossibility (that’s inconsistent with both the relevant premise and the conclusion) is a situation in which determinism is true and S has it within his power to do A even though A cannot be an extension of the temporally intrinsic past in w, holding the natural laws fixed. (In other words, the relevant counterpossibility is simply a situation in which compatibilism is true.) Our defense of PFPL undermines (without entailing the falsity of) this counterpossibility as follows: If it would be irrational when deliberating to consider worlds with a different past, then it would be odd to say that S nonetheless has the power to do otherwise even though doing otherwise cannot be an extension of w’s past. Why would it be irrational to consider (bringing about) a situation that is within one’s power to bring about?
For a defense of this contention, see Fischer (1994, pp. 87–110).
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Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this paper were presented to the Metaphysics Reading Group (organized by Michael Rea) at the University of Notre Dame and also to the Philosophy Department at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville; we are very grateful for the helpful comments we received on those occasions. We would also like to thank Alex Arnold, Andrew Bailey, Kenneth Boyce, Joseph Keim Campbell, D. Justin Coates, Thomas P. Flint, Michael C. Rea, Bradley Rettler, Aaron Segal, Philip Swenson, Patrick Todd, Neal A. Tognazzini, and Kadri Vihvelin for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. (We are particularly grateful to E.J. Coffman for detailed and extremely helpful comments on various drafts.) In addition, we are grateful for comments from an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies, which helped shape this paper into its final form.
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Fischer, J.M., Pendergraft, G. Does the consequence argument beg the question?. Philos Stud 166, 575–595 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0053-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0053-y