Abstract
Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral reasons are reasons for having sentiments—in particular, compassion and respect—and I argue that this view has important advantages over the standard view of moral normativity.
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Notes
For the purposes of this paper, I assume the truth of moral cognitivism. That is, I assume that moral predicates denote properties, thus that typical sentences in which they occur express propositions, and that moral judgments are beliefs.
This is not to beg the question against moral particularism, since moral rules might be as specific as the particularist would want—each such rule might include a complete description of the universe.
Parfit (2011).
Korsgaard (1996a).
Garner (1990).
Joyce (2001).
To be clear, the reasons at issue in PMN are not necessarily decisive—for all PMN says, they might be merely prima facie reasons, i.e., considerations that weigh in on one side or another without necessarily being on the correct side—although PMN does not rule out that they can be decisive, or even that they must be. In this way, PMN is maximally logically weak.
In order to accommodate different versions of Humean theories of reasons, ‘desire’ here should be taken in its technical philosophical sense, i.e., as denoting a wide range of motivational states and attitudes, such as intending, valuing, and desiring narrowly construed.
Humeanism is equivalent to a standard interpretation of Williams’ (1979) claim that there cannot be ‘external’ reasons for action. It should be noted that many Humean theories of practical reasons include the additional thesis that reasons are based on desires, where basing is a metaphysically or explanatorily robust relation, and the thesis that there is at least some type of desire that is sufficient for having a reason (see, e.g., Hubin 1999, 2001; Schroeder 2007a, b).
To be sure, my argument depends upon the assumption that the following theses are at least plausible, i.e., that each very well might be true: (a) Humeanism; (b) the falsity of Error Theory; (c) the thesis that it is possible that someone can do what is morally wrong while having no desire that would be served by refraining from such action. The plausibility of (b) and (c) should not be particularly contentious—indeed, most philosophers would assent to both of those theses. The main point of contention will be with (a)—Humeanism is a highly controversial view, and some seem to think that it is simply implausible (e.g., Parfit (2011)). I believe, however, that some degree of charity is in order when a theory is as prominent as is Humeanism—even those who believe that Humeanism is false should grant it a baseline level of plausibly due to its acceptance by a large number of philosophers. Furthermore, one standard argument against Humeanism is that it is inconsistent with the conjunction of (b), (c), and PMN. Part of my argument, however, is that we have no reason to accept PMN per se (I make this claim in the following section). Thus, my argument doubles as a defense of Humeanism itself. But even if one believes that Humeanism is implausible, one can view my proposal as being specifically for the Humean, i.e., as an account of how the Humean who accepts (b) and (c) can salvage the necessary and universal normativity of morality; and this would still be a significant result.
Smith (1994) is perhaps the only philosopher who argues for PMN in another way. Smith believes that PMN follows from the best explanation of the fact that we expect people to be motivated to do what they believe is morally required. For compelling objections to Smith’s argument, see Brink (1997, pp. 26–30) and Copp (1997, pp. 48–51).
Joyce (2001), p. 44.
Someone A fails to be in compliance with one of her reasons r just in case (1) r is a reason for A to ϕ, and (2) A fails to ϕ. (It should be noted that ‘ϕ’ need not refer to an action, but may also denote an attitude or indeed anything for which there can be reasons.) To be clear, it is not necessarily the case that one ought to comply with all of one’s reasons; indeed, it may prove impossible to do so (e.g., when one has both reasons to ϕ and reasons not to ϕ).
It should be noted that my understanding of moral sentiments will not depend upon any particularly contentious general theory of the nature of sentiments. Most such controversy revolves around the idea that some sentiments involve a cognitive or belief-like element. My view, on the other hand, depends only upon the relatively innocuous notion that moral sentiments involve a motivational element.
See, e.g., Nussbaum (2001) and Blum (1980). It is unclear to what extent ‘compassion’ in normal usage follows the philosophical trend. I suspect that ‘compassion’ is commonly used to refer both to the feeling of emotional pain in response to another’s misfortune, and to the broader sentiment I use the term to denote.
This distinction is from Darwall (1977).
For discussion of the further, theoretical issue of what the distinction between right-kind and wrong-kind reasons fundamentally consists in, see e.g. Parfit (2001, 2011), Hieronymi (2005), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004), and Schroeder (2010). For discussion of how to distinguish right-kind from wrong-kind reasons for sentiments, see D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).
The intuitiveness of the distinction between right-kind and wrong-kind reasons for attitudes is perhaps best seen by considering how those sorts of reasons apply to beliefs and desires, rather than sentiments. A right-kind reason to believe is, intuitively, a fact that bears on the truth (or probability) of a proposition. For example, the fact that it is raining is a right-kind reason to believe that the ground is wet, because the fact that it is raining raises the probability that the ground is wet. A right-kind reason to desire to do x (or that p) is a reason to do x (or bring it about that p). For example, the fact that ping pong is fun is a reason to desire to play ping pong, because the fact that ping pong is fun is a reason to play ping pong. A wrong-kind reason to believe or desire, on the other hand, is a consideration that bears on the value of merely having the relevant attitude. For example, that you will give me one million dollars if I believe that the ground is wet, or desire to play ping pong, would be a wrong-kind reason to have that belief, or to have that desire.
E.g., it is a reason to be afraid even if being afraid will cause you to freeze and be eaten by the lion. The reader might also consider anger. That she betrayed me is a reason to be angry with her, even if I have no desire that will be served by being angry (e.g., perhaps it will just make me feel worse).
Perhaps the right way to think about having most reason in SMN is not as being equivalent to a should or an ought (although I believe the ‘ought’ interpretation is plausible, and I am inclined to think of SMN in that way). The alternative is that having most reason to do x is equivalent to having merely sufficient reason to do x—reason that licenses or permits doing x, but does not require it. In support of this view, one might argue that there are no sentiments that one ought to have, since sentiments are not under our voluntary control, and thus the claim that one ought to have certain sentiments violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Realize, however, that if there is a sense in which ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ it is not clear that the relevant sense of ‘can’ implies voluntary control—rather, ‘can’ may denote something more permissive, e.g., physical or psychological possibility. Compare the case of belief. There seem to be many things that we ought to believe even though such beliefs are not under our voluntary control—e.g., that four is less than five, that I am not a pumpkin, that blue is a color. To be sure, the principle that ‘ought’ implies voluntary control seems plausible in the case of action; but it is a dubious thesis when applied to attitudes.
As in SMN, the reasons at issue in SMN+ are right-kind reasons for having sentiments.
There is perhaps another reason in the vicinity: not only does PMN fail to allow for unification in the realm of moral normativity, but it fails to allow for a more general kind of normative unification—it implies a fracturing of the normative realm, according to which certain reasons for action contribute to requirements, while others cannot. For a defense of this kind of bifurcated view of reasons, see Gert (2000) and Dancy (2004b).
How much of an advantage will depend upon the degree of plausibility of (a) Humeanism, (b) the falsity of Error Theory, and (c) the thesis that it is possible that someone can do what is morally wrong while having no desire that would be served by refraining from such action. The more likely (a) through (c), the greater the advantage SMN has over PMN (since the conjunction of (a) through (c) is incompatible with PMN); but as long as each thesis enjoys some reasonable degree of plausibility, SMN gains some advantage over PMN.
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Acknowledgement
I wish to thank Jonathan Dancy, Mark Schroeder, and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for extremely helpful comments and discussion on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Vogelstein, E. Morality, reasons, and sentiments. Philos Stud 155, 421–432 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9579-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9579-z