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A theory of virtue: response to critics

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Notes

  1. Adams (2006). Parenthetical page references in the text refer to this book.

  2. Cf. Stocker (1979, 1981).

  3. I will grant that there is a virtue of being a responsible person. In part it is a matter of excellence in taking ownership of various kinds of luck in one’s life. But this is a rather particular point, not belonging to the more general part of a theory of virtue.

  4. Ross and Nisbett (1991), p. 20; quoted in Adams (2006), p. 131.

References

  • Adams, R. M. (2006). A theory of virtue: Excellence in being for the good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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  • Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.

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  • Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the bad—an essay in moral psychology. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 738–753.

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  • Stocker, M. (1981). Values and purposes: The limits of teleology and the ends of friendship. The Journal of Philosophy, 78, 747–765.

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Correspondence to Robert Merrihew Adams.

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Adams, R.M. A theory of virtue: response to critics. Philos Stud 148, 159–165 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9512-5

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