Abstract
There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent’s capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for it is that it makes possible to engage in activities with a radically novel temporal structure, activities that are not merely continuous over time, but temporally integrated and unified. These activities are essential to our form of life and to our existence as temporally unified agents. The instrumental and cognitive benefits, if any, are merely secondary to the ontological ones.
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Notes
For a different approach to the combination of reflective and diachronic dimensions of the will, see Bratman (2007).
See Ferrero (ms).
The mechanisms envisaged by Velleman might operate in the functioning of the reflective will, which makes our agency self-governed and autonomous but they do not affect the temporal structure of intentional agency.
Strictly speaking ‘sophisticated choice’ is not synonym of ‘self-directed manipulation.’ In dynamical rational decision theory, an agent is said to make a ‘sophisticated choice’ rather than a ‘myopic’ one if she embarks only on long-term plans that she expects to be able to sustain given the forward-looking bias of her future preferences. But a sophisticated agent need not be passive with respect to the constraints on the feasible actions set by the preferences of her future selves. By pre-committing, the agent might manipulatively induce her future selves to carry out the original plan without running afoul of the forward-looking outlooks of future selves. The resolute chooser, instead, acknowledges that future selves have some backward-looking concerns which might induce them to carry out a plan without manipulation even if they would not pursue it if they were given the opportunity for a fresh start.
Cf. the discussion of the ‘Martian marionette’ in Dennett (forthcoming, p. 16).
In discussing the conclusory structure of narrative sequences, Velleman uses Frank Kermode’s example of the ticking of a clock as a sequence that we tend to perceive as organized in patterns of ‘ticks’ and ‘tocks’, where the ‘tock’ sound is perceived as ‘essentially conclusory’ (Velleman 2003, 11ff, However, this sequence better illustrates the dynamic resolution of a Perpetuum Mobile. A tock not only resolves the preceding tick, but leads to the next, in a potentially endless rhythmic sequence. The idea of resolution is better conveyed by the ‘clicking’ that might accompany the snapping into proper place of the components of a structure. This sound evokes the idea of completion not as termination but as proper fitting into a coherent compound.
The resolution might just propel a process into a novel stage with a renewed pressure for further non-terminating resolutions, in a sort of Perpetuum Mobile (see Sect. 2). However, unless we are like an immortal Scheherazade, particular instances of storytelling sooner or later come to an end. Their endings are likely to be satisfactory only if they correspond to a cadence in the recounted sequence. But the sequence of events that is the object of the narrative need not necessarily terminate at the point of resolution that marks the end of that narrative (moreover, when the sequence is expected to continue indefinitely the narration might terminate by fading away as in a musical morendo).
Narratives limited to a single activity are rare but they might provide the basic model for the more common and longer narratives (see Ricoeur 1984, 56ff).
The activity ‘aspires’ to the unity since it might fail at securing it. There are genuine narratives of failure, but they are parasitic on the idea of successful internal unity. A narrative embraces the actual unfolding of the activity by implicitly setting it against the model of its successful completion. A merely continuous activity simply stops, but an activity that aspires to temporal unity might genuinely fail (and this threat is the necessary counterpart of the achievement of internal unity).
The idea of internal unity does not specify the temporal horizon of its units, that is, how far in the past and in the future their boundaries are located. In addition, different temporal units of action and existence, with disparate temporal horizons, might overlap and conflict within stretches of a single biological existence (see Velleman 2006, pp. 222–223).
To value the engagement in temporally unified activities for its own sake does not mean that one is to maximize the actual exercise of the diachronic will. Often, it is actually less costly to rely on its surrogates. When internal unity is simply instrumental to goals that could be achieved by a simpler tracking mechanism (as in the highway scenario), we are happy to do without the burdens of continuous guidance in the mode of internal unity.
For the relation between agglomerativity and the unity of agency, see Ferrero (forthcoming).
My suggestion is more radical than Bratman (2002a, Sect. 9)’s inclusion of weaker ‘quasi-policies’. The demands for consistency and coherence need not be relaxed. Individual intentions and plans might actually come with more restrictive demands given that they determine a specific kind of internal unity (something that a generic policy might be unable to do). I am suggesting a more inclusive outlook, one that gives pride of place to the full range of our planning capacities and might include, at one extreme, such things as full-blown life-plans and ‘practical identities’ (cf. Bratman 2002a, fn41).
A feature of Bratman’s theory affected by the nature of internal unity is the ‘no-regret condition’ Bratman (1999; 2000b, p. 255) claims that in determining whether to stick to a prior intention an agent should consider whether she is going to regret her decision ‘at plan’s end’. This condition is alternative to Gauthier (1994)’s claim that the assessment should be based on the overall temporal structure of the plan, including its past portions. Bratman objects that Gauthier’s evaluation does not “do justice to the significance of temporal and causal location of our agency,” i.e., “to the basic fact that as agents we are temporally and causally located” and thus unable to change the past (Bratman 1999, p. 73). These features are indeed central to agency, but I do not see how evaluating actions in terms of their overall temporal structure runs afoul of the temporal asymmetry in causal control. What the agent is to do at any one time is a function both of what she can affect causally in the future and of the significance that her future conduct would acquire given its place in the overall temporal structure of her course of action (including its past stages). The no-regret condition is problematic if it requires an exclusively forward-looking outlook in the assessment of future conduct that obscures the constraints imposed by internal unity. The condition might however be warranted in those special scenarios (including possibly the ‘toxin’s puzzle) where the agent cares only about accumulation or the activity is not internally unified.
Velleman might protest that this conclusion ignores the fact that, without the belief that one is going to φ, there is no point in coordinating with the intention to φ (Velleman 2006, p. 271; 2007, 14ff). Although I doubt that this is true, it is hard to see how this could help account for the rich temporal structure of internal unity.
The shared advantage is often measured in a currency set by the activity itself. An internally unified activity is often made choiceworthy by the nature of goals that can be conceived of and pursued only thanks to the activity’s internal unity.
Sophisticated choice (see Sect. 3 above) does not guarantee internal unity. Because of her forward-looking orientation, a sophisticated agent chooses in light of both present and future expected outcomes of her conduct. Hence, at the time of action she might think that her conduct is internally unified from that moment on. But she cannot pursue it under this guise: her future selves see the activity as temporally unified only starting from their own present moment. The constant resetting of the temporal horizon induced by the mere passage of time undermines the possibility of genuine internal unity.
Bratman’s instrumentalist view does not run into this problem: for him, the intention to φ moves the agent to φ because of habits and propensities of non-reconsideration, not by way of a desire for the instrumental benefits of steadfastness. Bratman (1987, p. 52, 65–66) invokes instrumentalist considerations only in justifying the rationality of our general reliance on habits and propensities of non-reconsideration.
See Bratman (1987). In Ferrero (ms) I argue that decision-based reasons as ‘exclusionary reasons’ might avoid unwanted bootstrapping. But these reasons are grounded not on a standing desire for internal unity but on the demands of transtemporal division of deliberative labor.
The ontological import of the diachronic will might bear directly on a particular pursuit only under special circumstances, e.g., when one tries to resist temptation by considering the reputation effect of her conduct. If the current choice is seen as evidence about one’s future choice in similar circumstances, one might be induced to stick to one’s decision so as not to lose confidence in one’s future resolve. Hence, an agent might think that any individual failure to secure internal unity might undermine, by the reputation effect, the general effectiveness of her capacity for future-embracing intentions. But pace Ainslie (2001), the diachronic will does not normally operate in this way. The reputation effect is only a technique for regaining or reinforcing a weak strength of will or a willpower (see Ferrero 2005). Similar considerations apply to Velleman (2006, pp. 272–274)’s suggestion that our ‘constancy’—the disposition to carry out future-directed intentions—is grounded on our incentive to give ourselves evidence of our future reliability. As long as one can assume the stability of one’s appreciation of the reasons for action (which is the default condition for the operation of the diachronic will), one can rely on the future willingness to take part in the unified activity out of one’s future appreciation of the original merits of the activity rather than out of a concern for one’s own reliability (see Ferrero ms).
The constitutive view might contribute to a Bratman-style defense of the norms of intending by suggesting a more fine-grained articulation of these norms. Extended agency in the mode of internal unity seems to come with a more restrictive set of norms than those distinctive of the ‘planning systems’—to use Bratman’s term—that engage in simpler kinds of extended agency. Compliance with means-end coherence and belief-intention consistency is already required for present-directed agency. More complex forms of diachronic agency might require more elaborate sets of norms (including norms of agglomeration). I think that Bratman would not oppose the idea that different kinds of diachronic agency come with different sets of norms (see Bratman, forthcoming-b). This idea, however, might pose a serious challenge to cognitivism if the norms of theoretical rationality were insufficient to account for the temporal structures of the various kinds of diachronic agency.
The homing behavior of salmons, for instance, is a case of a sequence of mere local responsiveness with a long-range cumulative effect that mimics the product of temporal unity. According the ‘olfactory hypothesis,’ when salmons swim away from home they acquire a sequential olfactory map of their itinerary. On their return journey, they proceed to trace their way back by continuing to adjust their direction in response to mere local olfactory perceptions so as to match the sequential olfactory map in reverse order.
According to Calvin (1983, see also Osvath and Gärdenfors 2005, p. 5, Suddenforf and Corballis 2007, Sect. 6), stone-throwing played a crucial role in the evolution of our planning abilities. Throwing objects accurately in order to hit a distant target is a deceptively simple task that only hominids have been able to master. Accurate throwing requires a sophisticated neural mechanism to calculate in advance the coordination of a sequence of motions that follow each other too rapidly to allow for correction once the throwing has began. The thrower needs to calculate the correct sequence of motions in advance taking into account the mutual and global constraints of the stages of this unitary process. She needs a complete ‘plan’ of a sequence of motions that once underway can no longer be guided. According to Calvin, once the neural mechanisms for this advanced coordination had evolved, they became available as the basis for appreciating structures (both in thought and action) whose parts are orderly and globally arranged (the development of syntax being a case in point).
Previsions versions of this paper were presented at department of Philosophy at Stanford University, at the conference on Action Theory at Zurich in April 2005, at the Humanities Fellows Seminar at Stanford University in 2006. I thank the audiences for their comments and criticisms, especially Ulrich Bach, Michael Bratman, Christian Budnik (my commentator at Zurich), Katherine Dunlop, David Hills, Christopher Hookway, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jessie Labov, Seth Lerer, Michael Rawson, Kathy Richmond, Bruce Rusk, Tamar Schapiro, and Eliott Sober. Thanks to William Labov for a stimulating workshop on narrative. Thanks to Elijah Millgram for an intriguing conversation about narrative and identity. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify my thoughts about diachronic rational choice theory. I am grateful to Nate Sharadin and Roy Blumenfeld for their meticulous proofreading. This paper was written while in residence at the Stanford Humanities Fellows Program (thanks to Anna North, administrator and fellow). I am especially grateful to the program’s direction, Seth Lerer, for creating a most stimulating and enjoyable intellectual environment, and for fostering a truly constructive exchange of ideas across the humanities.
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Ferrero, L. What good is a diachronic will?. Philos Stud 144, 403–430 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9217-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9217-1