Abstract
There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia.
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Notes
In the last few years there has been growing interest in this issue; recent papers largely or exclusively devoted to it include Lopes (2000), Ross (2001), Keeley (2002), Noë (2002), Nudds (2004), and Gray (2005), as well as the papers presented at “Individuating the Senses,” Centre for Study of Perceptual Experience, University of Glasgow, December 4–5, 2004 (which will be collected in a forthcoming volume edited by Fiona Macpherson).
It might seem that synaesthesia shows that there are no such distinctive qualitative properties. Synaesthesia is a rare condition where a property distinctive of one modality supposedly is perceived through another modality; for example, in one manifestation, colors supposedly are heard. If colors really can be heard (and sounds can be perceived by a modality other than hearing, and so on), then it seems that the core common-sense view is false.
It’s difficult to tell, though, if synaesthesia really does indicate that color is not distinctive of vision, or if, instead, certain colors are merely associated with certain sounds. A suggestion in favor of mere association is that particular color–sound pairings are idiosyncratic. Cytowic points out, “Scriabin and Rimsky-Korsakov, for example, disagreed on the color of given notes and musical keys” (1995, p. 26). Admittedly, this point is not decisive. But, as well, our current understanding of synaesthesia is too murky to decisively reject the core common-sense view.
For example, common sense doesn’t address the question of whether mind-independence requires that properties not be dispositions to produce psychological states in particular circumstances.
Keeley calls this the proper object criterion; I’ll use the label “proper sensibles” to underscore that they are properties, not objects. As Keeley notes, the idea of distinguishing modalities on the basis of distinctive qualitative properties of objects goes back to Aristotle. For historical background, see Sorabji (1971).
Keeley calls this the sensation criterion.
For an extremely clear and detailed description of MDS, see Clark (1993, pp. 76–101, 210–221). Clark’s discussion p. 75 and pp. 76–101 notes that this technique is indebted to Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appearance (1977).
From the standpoint of Johnston’s (1992) five core beliefs about color, psychophysics meshes with what Johnston calls Unity, that is, the belief that determinate colors are located in a network of qualitative similarities. Johnston’s other core beliefs [aside from the belief he calls Revelation, which, at least on one interpretation is dubiously a common-sense belief at all (Ross, unpublished manuscript)] have specifically to do with the colors of ordinary physical objects, rather than colors tout court. Perhaps the only claim that common sense offers about colors tout court is Unity.
The qualification that similarities be simple avoids counting relative similarities amongst, for example, cars, as orderable into psychological spaces, and thus counting carhood as a qualitative property (Clark 1993, p. 79, pp. 91–94, 117–119).
Qualitative relations among more determinable properties, such as red and orange, can be thought of as relations among regions of a quality space, where a region includes a number of determinates which are contiguous.
Although similar points could be made by using other distinctive qualitative determinables such as sound.
In addition, Keeley (2002, pp. 15–16) tries to show that psychophysics in fact meshes badly with our common-sense concept of a sensory modality, and thus that psychophysics can’t support the common-sense concept in any case. Yet, Keeley’s claim that there is a bad mesh between psychophysics and common sense is not well supported. He assumes that the lack of a qualitative resemblance route between qualitative properties (such as red and moving left to right across the visual field) is necessary and sufficient for distinguishing senses. As Keeley shows (2002, p. 16), this assumption produces results counter to a common-sense concept of a sensory modality. But Keeley gives no reason to accept this assumption. Instead, the way to mesh psychophysics and common sense is as according to the core common-sense view: a qualitative determinable distinctive of a modality (thus not spatial properties such as motion) is merely necessary for distinguishing senses.
In this argument, Keeley’s target is qualia, which, following the typical characterization, he takes to be necessarily conscious. I’ll argue that mental qualitative properties are not necessarily conscious in Sect. 5. In the meanwhile I’ll respond to Keeley’s argument in a way that doesn’t assume that mental qualitative properties are necessarily conscious.
For an engaging discussion of the possibility of a human vomeronasal system, see Hughes (1999, Chs. 18–19).
However, by contrasting perceptual states with non-mental physiological states, I don’t mean to suggest that perceptual states are not physiological. I assume that biological creatures’ perceptual states are a subcategory of their physiological states. Thus, for example, states of dilation and constriction of the pupils (which function to control the amount of light that hits the retina) are physiological states that are not mental states.
It is worth noting that although it is standard to define perceptual states as being qualitative states, I cannot, without begging the question, appeal to this definition. Instead, my strategy will be to defend the characterization of perceptual states as being qualitative states on (largely) empirical grounds, and then lay down the gauntlet for Keeley to provide an alternative characterization.
Since characterizability by qualitative determinables is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for perceptual states, whether a state is perceptual—or even mental—would have to addressed in terms of further considerations, for example, with regard to the state’s production of further cognitive states. (I’m thankful to Keeley for suggesting that I make this general point.)
So science could correct common sense with respect to what Nudds calls the counting question, “that is, why do we have five senses?” (2004, p. 31). In the case of a vomeronasal system, science could help to show that the underlying assumption of the counting question—that human beings have five senses—is false.
I’ve modified the set up of the thought experiment: Grice’s thought experiment assumes a difference in senses for which a difference in qualitative determinables is necessary. In contrast, I’ll argue for the contrapositive: a sameness in senses for which sameness in qualitative determinables is sufficient.
More importantly, I’ve modified how the thought experiment is used: in arguing for the core common-sense view, I make no assumption as to whether qualitative determinables are properties of physical objects or of mental states. In contrast, Grice uses the thought experiment to argue for the necessity of qualia in distinguishing senses.
Texture (including the range of smoothness to roughness), which is perceived by touch, is not distinctive of touch, for texture is also perceived by sight; in fact, for a wide range of textures, touch and sight are about equally proficient in perceiving texture (Warren & Rossano, 1991, pp. 120–121, 129–132).
Also I should point out that I am not denying that sensory modalities necessarily have some physical stimulus, perceived through some sensory organ which was developed through some evolutionary process. I think that is plausible. Rather what I am claiming is that difference in sensory modality doesn’t imply difference in physical stimulus, and that candidates merely derivative of qualitative determinables aren’t themselves necessary for distinguishing senses.
This alternative is described and defended at length in Rosenthal (2005a).
The fact that Grice (1962, p. 259) stresses the diaphanousness—what is currently called the transparency—of experience is consistent with his arguing for qualia. For an incisive discussion of the complexities of the relationship between transparency and qualia, see Kind (2003).
Furthermore, even though Grice himself doesn’t use the term “qualia,” instead favoring the term “introspectible character” throughout “Some Remarks,” and using the terms “phenomenal character,” and “experiential flavor or quality of experience” in his “Retrospective Epilogue,” I’ll follow the current convention and refer to such mental qualitative properties as qualia.
In fact, Grice doesn’t intend to propose independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for distinguishing senses. At best, Grice might suggest that distinct physical stimuli, sense organs, perceived properties, and qualia are disjunctively necessary for distinct sensory modalities. In that case, if a sense x-ing and a sense y-ing don’t satisfy any of the disjuncts, then x-ing and y-ing are the same sense, and the Martian thought experiment is intended to show that the distinctive qualia condition is needed as an additional disjunct. [For further discussion of Grice on the senses, see Ross (2001). At this point, I think that the core common-sense view is much more plausible than the proposal I offered for distinguishing the senses in that paper.]
I argue for the existence of mental qualitative properties that are not characterized as qualia in “Fitting Color into the Physical World.” However, this view offers only one way of avoiding qualia. A more common way is provided by intentionalist views which reject mental qualitative properties altogether (see, for example, Tye 2000).
Bach (1997, pp. 466–467) offers the rejoinder that assuming that “all the difference in the world” must be accounted for in terms of physical qualitative properties is likewise question begging. My aim, however is merely to show that, without independent basis, we needn’t accept an account in terms of qualia.
But see my “Fitting Color into the Physical World” for a development and defense of a proposal about the nature of color, in particular, a version of physicalism which avoids qualia. I owe many thanks to Keeley for helpful comments several drafts of this paper, including his commentary for a version presented at the 2005 APA Eastern Division meetings in New York. I also thank David Rosenthal, Pete Mandik, Doug Meehan, Josh Weisberg, Tony Dardis, Dion Scott-Kakures, Amy Kind, Peter Graham, and Carrie Figdor for helpful comments at presentations of this paper. I also owe many thanks to Kent Bach, Richard Gray, and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful suggestions and criticisms on drafts of this paper, and to David Horner for help with understanding the psychophysics of touch.
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Ross, P.W. Common sense about qualities and senses. Philos Stud 138, 299–316 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9038-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9038-z