Phenomenological Psychopathology is a field of research that is characterised by a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, the subject matter of the pathogenic or abnormal human experience and behaviour suggests affiliation with the discourse of psychiatry and clinical psychology. On the other hand, the contributions rely on phenomenological epistemology which – to some degree – deviates from what is commonly denominated as psychiatry and psychology, at least methodologically.

The volume at hand, published by Christian Tewes and Giovanni Stanghellini, incorporates this ambivalence. The editors suggest that the approach their collection features “is no longer an outsider position in the cognitive sciences but has made an impact on mainstream science” (2021, 1). Yet, the crucial question is whether this claim to impact is legitimate. Differently put: Is phenomenological psychopathology actually able to contribute to the general discourse about psychopathology? This is the guiding question for this review. It has two aspects. On the one hand it relates to the theoretical and methodological framework of psychopathological research, on the other it concerns the application of phenomenological insight in psychotherapeutic and psychiatric praxis. I will focus on the first part in the following paragraphs.

Concerning the formal aspects, the general outline of the volume gives a promising prospect. It unites an international selection of well-established philosophers and scientists who are reputable experts in contemporary phenomenology. Furthermore, the texts have been carefully and flawlessly edited. It also provides a mixed person and keyword index which facilitates orientation. A major strength of the book’s design is that each chapter is accompanied by commentary from an expert in the field whose opinion complements, reinforces, or even contradicts (e.g., the comment by Samuel Thoma) the main contributions. Under these circumstances, the formal conditions for a substantial contribution to the discourse are ideal.

Most, if not all contributions to the volume are connected by a theoretical frame of reference. Among several researchers who serve as a shared background, one is of particular relevance, namely Thomas Fuchs. The fact that the book has been dedicated to his honour is a welcome coincidence but, even without it, his achievements in phenomenological psychopathology would serve as the benchmark for the topics which are engaged by the authors. Exemplary further common references are Josef Parnas and Louis Sass.

A second connection among many of the chapters is a shared tradition with two main parts. First, there is a direct heritage of phenomenological psychopathology, which encompasses classical contributions like Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology. An influential group of phenomenological psychiatrists that finds mention in many chapters is the so-called circle of Wengen (cf. Passie, 1992): Ludwig Binswanger, Eugène Minkowski, Victor Emil Freiherr von Gebsattel, and Erwin Straus. Most chapters concur with the ideas that have been developed in this tradition, although some (e.g., Edward A. Lenzo & Shaun Gallagher) try to move beyond it.

The second element of the mutual tradition in the volume at hand is philosophical phenomenology, to which several of the authors themselves – insofar as they are not psychiatrists or psychologists – pertain in the first place. Yet, it must be emphasised that most of the chapters do not attempt to make an original philosophical contribution, such as an exegesis of the Husserlian body of work. Most of the references to the philosophical background are introductory or cursory. As a matter of coincidence, Husserl’s conception of time consciousness is repeatedly introduced throughout the book, which demonstrates the conceptual coherence of the chapters. Additional philosophical sources of outstanding relevance to the book are Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger.

In spite of representing a major variety of basic standpoints within phenomenological psychopathology, some approaches are not represented. For example, Max Scheler and other realist phenomenologist, such as the Munich school, find close to no mention. In recent development of the discourse, these philosophical sources have proven themselves to be fecund soil for psychopathology. Two examples for the respective integration of realist-phenomenological thought are the psychopathology of value experience as it has been developed by the philosopher Guido Cusinato and the work of psychiatrist John Cutting. Cusinato, for example, utilizes the Schelerian notion of ‘valueception’ to determine the “modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia” (Cusinato, 2018).

Cutting, for his part, makes references to Scheler and other realist phenomenologists to build a foundation for phenomenological psychopathology (cf. Cutting, 2019). One might retort that these approaches have not quite reached the standard repertoire. On the other hand, contributions like Thomas Fuchs’ conception of “Values as Relational Phenomena” (Fuchs, 2020) suggests that axiological phenomenology in the work of figures such as Scheler and Geiger might form a more prominent part within the future of the discourse. Even the enactive theory of temporal resonance which is established in the opening chapter by Fuchs harmonises with late Schelerian thought about temporality, such as the essay ‘Idealismus-Realismus’ (see Scheler 2008).

Thanks to the common theoretical frame of reference and the shared tradition, it is safe to say that almost all contributions to the volume form a more or less homogeneous principal discourse: phenomenological psychopathology. In other words, the volume is not eclectic, and the individual analyses truthfully belong together. This also reflects in content since the majority of the psychopathological analyses draw on the basic phenomenological notions of body and time. These subject matters resonate with the core topics of the Fuchsian branch of the embodiment paradigm, called enactivism (cf. Fuchs, 2017).

This general relation to philosophical thought deserves a closer look. Albeit not being philosophical analyses, most contributions rely on philosophical reasoning and develop complex arguments. An example is the closing chapter, written by Tewes, on the psychopathological topic of Dementia. In the first place, it is a discussion of the philosophical notion of personal identity which questions the validity of empiricist conceptions as they can be found in John Locke or Derek Parfit. Nonetheless, Tewes succeeds in linking these reflections with the interpretation of qualitative empirical data, i.e., interviews with patients.

Looking back at the guiding question of this review, two conclusions must be made. First, the authors succeed in tackling psychopathological questions and, as in the case of Tewes, actively reach out to alternative paradigms in order to engage in a dialogue. Still, methodology and style of the chapters do not accord with what can be called the ‘mainstream’ discourse of psychopathology. This is the methodological main issue and must be considered when assessing the success of the editors’ aim of “demonstrating these research fields’ applicability to different illnesses and their relevance to treatment and clinical practice” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 5).

What is the ‘mainstream’ discourse? This is a controversial question both for psychology and psychopathology. Generally speaking, the most influential form of research after the so-called cognitive turn have been the ‘cognitive sciences’ and “[i]f one begins by thinking of cognitive science as it was first formulated in opposition to behaviorism, in terms of computational analysis and information processing, it is difficult to see how phenomenology might participate in the ‘Cognitive Revolution’” (Gallagher, 2012, 16). The reasons for it are manifold, but in the given context I wish to highlight the methodological differences. This means that most texts at hand do not concur with the standard of quantitative analyses in the general framework of operationalism, at least not formally.

A concrete example for the contrast between phenomenology and cognitive sciences is the comparison between ‘mainstream’ and ‘phenomenological’ paradigms for the investigations of schizophrenia presented by Stanghellini & Fusar-Poli (2012). The authors mention procedures like genetic studies and birth-cohort studies to characterise the ‘mainstream’. These forms of research are not similar to the approaches in the volume at hand. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons why this does not have to be a problem. First, the dialogue between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can take place on a different plain of scientific discourse, as demonstrated in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Scienes. Second, it is not safe to say that lacking quantitative methodology constitutes a deficiency for psychopathology. On the contrary, one could argue that the methodology of ‘mainstream’ psychopathology is rather lacking a phenomenological underpinning than the other way around. One way or the other, the relation between both branches of research remains to be a crucial epistemological and methodological question.

Looking beyond methodology, the content of the volume is well-structured. After a programmatic introduction and an honorary chapter by Thomas Fuchs, which develops a holistic account of the relation of circular and self-referential temporality with psycho- and pathogenesis, four parts engage with different contexts of psychopathology: (I) general aspects, (II) grief and anxiety, (III) borderline personality and eating disorders, (IV) depression, schizophrenia, and dementia. It can be rightfully said that the volume presents a comprehensive overview of the phenomenological approach to psychopathology and its investigation of several disorders. It also features a variety of epistemic approaches. Some texts are more methodological (e.g., Natalie Depraz), some symptomatological (e.g., Otto Doerr-Zegers & Héctor Pelegrina-Cetran), others conceptual (e.g., Matthew Ratcliffe & Anna Bortolan).

The individual contributions to the volume present the state of the art in phenomenological psychopathology. Since most authors represent well-established lines of research, the respective theses and propositions will mostly not surprise the readers who are sufficiently informed about the contemporary phenomenological positions. Nevertheless, the chapters make current trends of the field visible. For example, Ratcliffe and Bortolan draw attention to the intersubjective constitution of emotionality in order to tackle the symptomatology of borderline personality disorder (BPD). In the same vein, Froese and Krueger engage with schizophrenia, revealing intersubjectivity as one of the focal points of contemporary phenomenological investigation. Similar directions of thought can be found in Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlsen or Doerr-Zegers and Pelegrina-Cetran. The latter as well as Lenzo and Gallagher question the role of narratives in psychopathology, reflecting how the current topics of phenomenological philosophy also permeate the correlated psychopathology.

The case of narrative self-consciousness illustrates this relation between philosophical and psychopathological discourse: One can find an influential taxonomic distinction of narrative and experiential consciousness in Zahavi (2005). Therein, Zahavi points towards Paul Ricoeur for an elaborated phenomenological account of narrativity. Since then, the relation between experiential and narrative self-consciousness has been a focus of phenomenological research.

This also reflects in the volume at hand. Ratcliffe and Bortolan draw on Fuchs when emphasising, “Ordinarily, a coherent autobiographical narrative gives one’s life a meaningful, long-term structure” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 192). The psychopathological utility of this concept is that the collapse of habitual narrative patterns can explain experience and behaviour of BPD. Less terminologically said, the way patients make sense of their own life can account for the symptoms they show. The authors contradict the cognitivist understanding of BPD as an issue of the individual person. On the contrary, they claim that narratives are normally stabilised by trust in one’s social environment. Hence, loss of trust can lead to an erosion of one’s narrative which corresponds to characteristic reports of social isolation and distrust from BPD patients. In the same vein, Doerr-Zegers and Pelegrina-Cetran discuss “a narrative identity that implies the process of integration or at least a quest for coherence of the personal past, present, and future” so that “[i]n borderline personality disorder, it is not the implicit temporality that is altered, but the explicit one” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 274).

Not only the symptomatology of BPD can be improved by phenomenology of narrative selfhood. Lenzo and Gallagher discuss the relevance of narratives for the understanding of depression, connecting the deviation from ordinary narration with problems with emotionality: “The narrative reports of a patient with depression may reveal patterns that reflect disorders in mood and affective processing as well as disrupted processes connected to the sense of agency and identity” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 306). Differently put, altered emotions and relation to oneself that occur in depression show phenomenological traces in the way they think and speak about themselves. The authors suggest that psychopathology can show itself in an alteration of self-narration. Hence, phenomenologically understanding the structure and essence of narrative identity by means of philosophical investigation fosters the potentials of psychopathology.

Only a few chapters make an exception from the general impression of a close relation between phenomenological discourse and psychopathology. Two examples are, for separate reasons, the contributions from Wolfgang Tschacher and Shogo Tanaka. The prior makes fewer or no references to phenomenological philosophy because he engages with the topic of psychopathology from a different point of view. The common ground between Tschacher’s systemic approach and the phenomenological movement is the notion of embodiment. Enactivism, has different traditions, however. The second exception is Tanaka whose contribution aims at an intercultural dialogue, which is a project in its own right. It is a well-written and well-informed investigation into corporeality that facilitates phenomenological reduction by helping to detach from conceptual presuppositions because it makes cultural blind spots visible.

Generally speaking, the volume collects a reputable and recommendable compilation of texts which can rightfully serve as a standard reference for the contemporary state of the art in phenomenological psychopathology. It is safe to say that the aim of the editors “to present new insights from phenomenological psychopathology” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 4) has been successfully reached.

With the purpose of conclusion, the initial question emerges again: Is phenomenological psychopathology actually able to contribute to the general discourse about psychopathology? In regard to content, it is not difficult to affirm the proposition: Phenomenological psychopathology has a promising prospect concerning ‘applicability to different illnesses and their relevance to treatment and clinical practice’. The volume offers convincing arguments for the validity of phenomenological approaches to ‘mental’ – or, rather, ‘lived-bodily’ – disorders. Yet, the dialogue with alternative forms of psychopathology does not come naturally. This is a methodological problem. Not only are the references to empirical findings rather sporadic or in the form of reaffirming evidence instead of substantial controversy, but also the rhetoric and style of most chapters do not correspond easily with ‘mainstream approaches’ – especially when it comes to hypothesis generation, experimental or field studies, and quantitative data analysis.

There is no sufficient reason to say that this was a flaw of the volume in particular or phenomenological psychopathology as such. Quite on the contrary, there are valid reasons to reject the empiricist methodology habitually employed for psychopathological research. But this contradiction must be made explicit, and an exchange must be reached on an equal footing if dialogue with the ‘mainstream’ is one of the aims for phenomenological psychopathology. It will take additional effort to bridge the different styles and rhetoric that divide the psychopathological discourse. Some of the contributions make a promising step into this direction, for example Tschacher.

One might feel prompted to reason that phenomenological and cognitivist psychopathology were mutually exclusive by their form of discourse. Yet, there are vital signs for compromises. For example, Depraz proposes “combining different levels of experience and analysis” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 95). Similarly, Lenzo and Gallagher deem an idea “both conceptually possible and empirically justified” (Tewes & Stanghellini, 2021, 295). The same authors implicitly allude to the approach of front-loading phenomenology (Gallagher, 2003a, b) when they refer to phenomenological reflection with the verb “theorise” (p. 296), implying that phenomenological thought could serve as theory for empirical validation.

In spite of these hints towards a methodological mediation between phenomenological thought and scientific approach, the integration itself is an epistemological issue. At the heart of this problem lies phenomenological epistemology. The eidetic path to understanding as it has been proposed by Husserl separates itself from empirical research on behalf of the distinction between science of essences and science of facts. Due to this epistemological stance, phenomenological insight into experiential invariants differs from empiricist generalisation. The attempt of converging both fields threatens to entail a secession from the phenomenological classics, at least from Husserl.

This conflict must be addressed before a constructive dialogue with cognitive sciences can unfold and it has been addressed in recent inner-phenomenological controversies, such as the exchange of arguments between Zahavi and Kristian Martiny on the one side and James Morley on the other (cf. Morley, 2019; Zahavi & Martiny, 2019) wherein the latter represented the so-called Descriptive Phenomenological Method whose creator has been Amedeo Giorgi. While Zahavi suggests that phenomenological epoché is not of the same relevance for phenomenologically inspired psychological research, Morley claims their dependence. It is important to see that controversies like this are the methodological backbone for the applicability of qualitative empirical research, such as the micro-phenomenological fieldwork that has been conducted by Depraz.

Even though the above-mentioned excepts might spark some hope for actual dialogue between the phenomenological and the cognitivist camp of the discourse, they come Janus-faced because they are entwined with the tendency of naturalising phenomenology. It is a tendency that is received with opposing temper within the phenomenological movement. Without the need to judge this inner-phenomenological controversy, it remains clear to see from the standpoint of sociology of science that the naturalising end of phenomenology might lose the hand of its non-naturalising sibling at the very moment it takes the hand of mainstream psychopathology or psychology. Thus, the investigation of the question whether phenomenological psychopathology is able to contribute to general psychopathology does not lead to an answer but to two new questions: Can it and should it be able to contribute to said discourse?

The present volume incorporates this philosophical controversy as a presupposition. The collection of texts represents different standpoints to bridge the relation between the empirical and the eidetic. As a whole, the book succeeds in advancing the discourse and can be rightfully treated as a standard work of phenomenological psychopathology.