Abstract
In a series of essays, Bratman defines a concept, which we may call the concept of Bratmanian action by many. Our discussion of this concept, in section 1, reveals that it is not the one called to mind by the usual examples of joint action. Section 2 lays alongside it a different concept of doing something together. According to it, many are doing A together if and only if the principle of the actions in which they are doing A is a joint intention to do A, an act of intending that is theirs. It seems fitting to call this joint intentional action. In distinction to Bratmanian action by many, joint intentional action is ubiquitous in human life. This raises the question what may be the interest of Bratman's concept. Its interest can reside only in a relation it bears to the concept of joint intentional action. Section 3 discusses the suggestion that Bratmanian action by many is a precursor of joint action in human phylogenesis. This is wrong because subjects are capable of Bratmanian action only in virtue of being subjects of joint action.
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Notes
Cf. Bratman 2008. Further conditions require meshing sub-plans and a disposition to help. I trust that my discussion of the cited conditions will make it obvious how it may be extended to these.
Cf. Bratman 1997, pp. 146–8.
Cf. Searle 1990.
Cf. Rödl 2011.
Cf. Rödl 2014.
Cf. Rödl 2007.
Thompson 2012.
Cf. Rödl 2014.
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Rödl, S. Joint action and recursive consciousness of consciousness. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 769–779 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9423-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9423-1