Notes
Unless otherwise noted, all references are to this book
See also (p. 201–206) where Hopp distinguishes a number of different syntheses
Cf. also Evans’s generality constraint (1982, pp. 100–105)
As is well known, McDowell nuanced his views about the extent to which concepts can figure in perception in his later works on pressure of Travis (2004). His claim about perception being open to conceptualization has remained unaltered
Note that this is also a main theme in the first sections of Husserl’s Fifth Logical Investigations
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van Mazijk, C. Walter Hopp, Perception and Knowledge: a Phenomenological Account . Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 1185–1191 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9382-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9382-y