Abstract
The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content of experience and from this the ground of the distinction between phenomenal and representational properties is identified.
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Notes
I well recognize that the above distinction is a simplification of the varied and often complex positions and arguments offered by each side and likewise omits otherwise mediating points of view. For instance, we might further distinguish pure from impure representationalism (Chalmers 2004). My aim here, however, is not to offer a survey of the various positions on the issue, but instead, to offer a solution to the problem of phenomenal properties. From this latter perspective, the above distinction serves to establish the context according to which the solution to the problem of phenomenal properties here given may be understood and as such, need not necessarily apply, in all points, to those identified with such positions.
We here restrict discussion of phenomenal properties to the perceptible properties of our experience. We can of course speak of what it is like to think, suppose, believe, and so on, and in such cases, we might identify an intentional content in relation to experience of one’s own acts of consciousness, and alternatively, a phenomenal content in relation to consciousness of what the experience of one’s own acts of consciousness is like. In spite of our focus upon perceptible properties, the solution here offered is understood to apply globally to the whole of consciousness of experience.
“One generally agreed upon fact about phenomenal states is that they are perspectively subjective…knowing what it is like to feel pain requires one to have a certain experiential point of view or perspective, namely the one conferred upon one by being the subject of pain.” (Tye 1999, 706)
For example, in his Language, Thoughts and Consciousness (1996, pp. 154–155), Peter Carruthers states, “Even if knowing what an experience is like is a special sort of capacity…still it is a capacity which will involve the ability to recognise, to imagine, and to remember a given type of experience, all of which presuppose a capacity for reflective self-awareness. In order to be able to recognise a pain, you have to be capable of knowing that you are in pain, when you are; and similarly for imagination and memory. So the conclusion is established: in order to know what an experience is like, you have to be capable of higher-order awareness of the occurrence of that experience.” So too, in The Transcendence of the Ego (1960, pp. 40–41), Jean-Paul Sartre states of pre-reflective consciousness, “We should add that this consciousness of consciousness—except in the case of reflective consciousness which we shall dwell on later—is not positional, which is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object. Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is why consciousness posits and grasps the object in the same act. Consciousness knows itself only as absolute inwardness. We shall call such a consciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected consciousness.” For further discussion of this distinction, see Zahavi (2008).
Of course, observation implies awareness as well as self-awareness. From this we might initially conclude that observation and awareness are one and the same. There is, however, an important difference. By awareness is in general meant the abiding recognition of one’s own consciousness (pre-reflective or reflective) that is carried along with and accompanies experience. On the other hand, observation includes within itself awareness and further implies a relationship between the observer and the observed. In other words, whereas awareness refers to a feature of the observer itself within consciousness, observation refers to a relationship between the observer and the observed.
The addition that the observation take place “here now” is understood and left unstated.
For further discussion of the role of referential indicators such as I, he, they, etc., see Castaneda (1966, 1967), Bermudez (1998) and more recently, Hank (2013). It is worth noting that most discussions of such indicators in relation to consciousness tend to center around the nominative “I”, whereas less emphasis in general is focused upon the dative “to/for me” and genitive “my own/mine” structures here developed. We do find some initial inquiry, however, into the concept of “me-ishness” in Block (1995).
The genitive mode is the definitive mode expressed by Martin Heidegger within his Sein und Zeit in relation to Dasein, viz., “We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine.” (Heidegger 2001, 42)
Among such approaches, however, there is some tacit admission of the role of phenomenal experience in at least the recognition and production of our subjective reports about pain (Nakamura et al. 2002).
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Costanzo, J.M. Shadows of consciousness: the problem of phenomenal properties. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 851–865 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9366-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9366-y