Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Actuality and possibility: On the complementarity of two registers in the bodily constitution of experience

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of possibility, and not merely that of actuality, for an inquiry into the bodily constitution of experience. The paper will study how the possibilities of action that may (or may not) be available to the subject help to shape the meaning attributed to perceived objects and to the situation occupied by the subject within her environment. This view will be supported by reference to empirical evidence provided by recent and current research on the perceptual estimation of distances and the effects brought about by the use of a tool on the organisation of our perceived immediate space.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Changeux and Ricœur (2000).

  2. This is the guiding principle of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. See in particular Heidegger (1931). See also Patočka (1995), especially the section entitled The phenomenology and ontology of movement, pp. 29-30.

  3. See in particular Coello and Delevoye-Turrell (2007) and Jeannerod (2001).

  4. ‘Action simulation and associated predicted sensory consequences may represent the underlying principle that enables prereflective representations of the body for space categorisation and selection for action’. (Coello and Delevoye-Turrell, 2007).

  5. See in particular Turvey and Shaw (1979) on the notion of epistemic mediator. See also Turvey (1974).

  6. Scheler, Philosophischer Anzeiger, vol. II (1927), quoted in Patočka (1995), p.37.

  7. ‘Our existence is essentially bodily, embodied, and our lived body, insofar as it is a living body, insofar as it is a body that is able to move, insofar as it is a body over which we have control, is the foundation of any life of experience. Control over the body is a form of being which constitutes an understanding of its most fundamental possibilities, without which a life of experience, which understands itself, would not be possible. It is for this reason that we must insist that our existence is what it is not because movement inherently belongs to it, but because it is movement by its very nature’. (Patočka, 1995, p.107). See also p.25.

  8. To quote Patočka: ‘Our action revolves within horizons of possibility; an action is ahead of itself in the realisation of an anticipated possibility before returning from the possible back to the actual. This being-which-is-ahead-of-itself in horizons is characteristic of human normality, whereas the progression from one actuality to the next characterises certain pathological cases of our relation to the world.’ (Patočka, 1995, p.68)

  9. See Merleau-Ponty (1945), p.237.

  10. Our use of the notion of affordance is essentially phenomenological inasmuch as it is used to describe the way in which a man (or an animal) has a spontaneous perceptual experience of his ambient world, i.e. as a system of possibilities. We therefore contest Gibson’s realist use of the notion. Warren (1984) provides a useful account of Gibsonian realism, insisting that affordances are founded on the physical properties of the animal and of the environment and that they exist whether or not they are in fact perceived. To this extent they do not vary in accordance with the needs or the state of the perceiving agent.

  11. Here we argue that the world is spontaneously perceived by the individual as a system of affordances, though everything is dependent on an individual’s perceptual attitude. An individual may adopt an ‘analytical’ attitude or merely target the sensible dimension of phenomena (thus ceasing to perceive the ambient world as a system of affordances). But in an individual’s daily pre-reflective perceptual experience of the world, objects present themselves as a collection of affordances; they immediately present a functional meaning: in other words, the individual perceives what she may be liable to do with objects. By our conception, this is an irrefutable phenomenological fact.

  12. See Thomas (1984), quoted in Paillard (1994).

  13. Berkeley (1709). For an account of Berkeley’s theory as a precursor of issues in contemporary psychology, see Pacherie (1997).

  14. ‘I observe that the dimension, shape, and even the colour of external objects alter according to my body’s relative proximity to them, that the strength of smells and the intensity of sounds tend to increase or decrease as a result of distance, and finally that this distance primarily constitutes in itself the extent to which ambient objects are so to speak protected from the immediate action of my body. As my horizon widens, so the images within my surroundings appear to be outlined against a more uniform backdrop and to become indifferent to me. The objects circumscribed therein are distinctly positioned in accordance with the relative ease with which my body is able to touch them and to move them. In the same way as a mirror, they return its potential influence to my body; they organise themselves according to my body’s increasing or decreasing powers’. (Bergson 1896, p.15; see also pp.28–29).

  15. Merleau-Ponty (1945), p.168.

  16. Simondon (1964–1965), p.286. For similar interpretations, see also Heidegger (1927), paragraphs 22–24, especially p.102; Sartre (1943), p.573; Poincaré (1907), p.82; Ruyer (1952).

  17. See for example Gibson (1979), p.127.

  18. ‘Psychologists assume that objects are composed of their qualities. But I now suggest that what we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not their qualities. We can discriminate the dimensions of difference if required to do so in an experiment, but what the object affords us is what we normally pay attention to. The special combination of qualities into which an object can be analysed is ordinarily not noticed’ (Gibson 1979, p.134).

  19. In Gibson’s work, the “direct” character of perception appears to mean that the access that an individual (whether man or animal) has to useful information is not necessarily mediated by a process that involves the treatment of this information by the elaboration of a mental representation. Gibson’s concept appeared primarily to serve a critical function, and was mainly designed to clarify his position in response to opponents of his theory.

  20. ‘The effectivity of any living thing is a specific combination of the functions of its tissues and organs taken with reference to an environment. By this conception, an animal is defined as a set of effectivities, or an effectivity structure’ (Turvey and Shaw 1979, pp.205–206). This definition is designed to supplement Gibson’s description of affordance: ‘the affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surface taken with reference to an animal’ (Gibson 1977, p. 67).

  21. Gordon and Rosenblaum (2004) make an interesting point in their study of the ability of blinded subjects to assess the possibility of walking through doors of varying dimensions by echolocation. The conclusions were similar to those drawn by Warren and Whang (1987) about the visual estimation of this possibility. For Kirkwood (2007), this suggests that it is the dimensions of the body (in this case its height and its width at shoulder level) that act as a metrics framework in such assessments independent of the perceptual modality under observation.

  22. See also Proffitt et al. (2006) and Proffitt (2006). Witt et al. (2005) draw similar conclusions, showing that the the use of a tool to reach targets only brings about a reconfiguration of the ambient space if the perceiving agent intends or anticipates having to use it. See infra.

  23. Witt et al. (2004), p.587.

  24. Here we assume that variations in the estimations provided by subjects reflect variations in their perceptual experience of distance. This view appears to be corroborated by the fact that several modes of estimation were used in the course of these studies (verbal estimation or visual estimation by moving markers in the visual field that allow a matching of egocentric distance), and that they tend moreover to converge (see in particular Witt et al., 2005).

  25. See Witt et al. (2005).

  26. Bergson (1896), op.cit., p.15.

  27. ‘Anything which participates in the conscious movement of our bodies is added to the model of ourselves and becomes part of these schemata: a woman’s power of localisation may extend to the feather in her hat’ (Head and Holmes, 1911, p.188).

  28. See Coslett (1998), p.529.

  29. The idea that tool-use leads to the integration of the tool within an individual’s body schema is corroborated by the findings of recent studies of the processes of crossmodal extinction (Farnè and Ladavas 2000; Maravita et al. 2000, 2001, 2002a; Farnè et al. 2005; Legrand et al. 2007) and crossmodal interference in humans (Maravita et al. 2002b, c; Maravita et al. 2003). For instance, Farnè and Ladavas (2000) studied a subject displaying an extinction of tactile simulations on the left hand by competing visual stimuli on the right side of the right hand, and observed that after approximately five minutes of use under visual control of a tool in the right hand to reach objects situated opposite the subject, visual stimuli at the extremity of the tool produced more extinction than before the training period.

  30. See Legrand et al. (2007).

  31. Several studies of the effects of tool-use in human subjects corroborate the idea of the necessity of active use of the tool for the phenomenon of reconfiguration of lived body and space to occur. For instance Farnè and Ladavas (2000) observed that the extension of the space of visuo-tactile extinction to the end of the tool gradually dissipated when the subject merely held the tool without putting it to active use, and disappeared altogether after five to ten minutes. In the same vein, Farnè et al. (2005) observed in a patient suffering from visuo-tactile extinction that passively holding the tool was not enough to produce such an extension of peripersonal space (an extension inferred on the basis of the observed extinction patterns), and that an active use of the tool was required. See also Legrand et al. (2007).

  32. See also Maravita and Iriki (2004), p.81.

  33. Maravita and Iriki also raise this issue (2004) in the following terms: ‘When reaching with a long tool, is it the appearance of a body extension or the understanding about the tool’s “effective operational distance” that is essential for tool-to-body assimilation [...]?’ (p.85).

  34. Maravita and Iriki (2004), p.81.

  35. Petit (2003), p.146.

  36. Petit (2003), p.141.

  37. Merleau-Ponty (1945), p.122.

  38. Merleau-Ponty (1945), p.122.

  39. See for example O'Regan and Noe (2001) and Lenay (2006).

  40. See Rosenthal (1993), p.203.

  41. Iriki et al. (1996) provide a neurological verification of this process: the persistence of the extension of the visual receptive field of bimodal neurones when the monkey is no longer making use of the tool may be interpreted as one such example of fossilization—in this case admittedly reversible and restricted to a very short period (a few minutes)—of the hermeneutic function associated with the capacity to reach objects with the tool.

  42. See the cases cited by Simmel 1958; Poeck 1964; Melzack 1989; Merleau-Ponty 1945; Gallagher 2000. For Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the amputated subject suffering from the phantom limb syndrome consists in relying on a power which is no longer at her disposal, or ‘to remain open to the range of actions which only an arm is able to perform, (...) to maintain the practical field as it was before amputation’ (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.97).

  43. Paillard (1987).

  44. Turvey (1974) provides a useful summary of this view, contrasting the Gibsonian idea of a direct and unmediated perception of the signifying data conveyed by the environment with a theorisation of ‘constructive’ perception. See in particular Turvey (1974), p.166.

References

  • Ackroyd, K., Riddoch, M. J., Humphreys, G. W., Nightingale, S., & Townsend, S. (2002). Widening the sphere of influence: using a tool to extend extrapersonal visual space in a patient with severe neglect. Neurocase, 8, 1–12. doi:10.1093/neucas/8.1.1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergson, H. (1896). Matière et mémoire. Paris, PUF, 7ème édition, « Quadrige », 2004.

  • Berkeley, G. (1709). Essai pour une nouvelle théorie de la vision. Trad. collective sous la direction de G. Brykman, Œuvres, Tome I, Paris, PUF, 1985.

  • Berti, A., & Frassinetti, F. (2000). When far becomes near: remapping of space by tool use. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 415–420. doi:10.1162/089892900562237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bisiach, E., & Vallar, G. (2000). Unilateral neglect in humans. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds), Handbook of Neuropsychology, 459–502.

  • Carello, C., Grosofsky, A., Reichel, F. D., Solomon, H. Y., & Turvey, M. T. (1989). Visually perceiving what is reachable. Ecological Psychology, 1, 27–54. doi:10.1207/s15326969eco0101_3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Changeux, J. P., & Ricœur, P. (2000). Ce qui nous fait penser. La nature et la règle. Ed. Poches Odile Jacob.

  • Coello, Y., & Delevoye-Turrell, Y. (2007). Embodiment, spatial categorisation and action. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 667–683. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.07.003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coslett, H. B. (1998). Evidence for a disturbance of the body schema in neglect. Brain and Cognition, 37, 527–544. doi:10.1006/brcg.1998.1011.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coslett, H. B., Schwartz, M. F., Goldberg, G., Haas, D., & Perkins, J. (1993). Multi-modal hemispatial deficits after left hemisphere stroke: a deficit in attention? Brain, 116, 527–554. doi:10.1093/brain/116.3.527.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cowey, A., Small, M., & Ellis, S. (1994). Left visuo-spatial neglect can be worse in far than in near space. Neuropsychologia, 37, 1–6. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(98)00071-2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farné, A., & Làdavas, E. (2000). Dynamic size-change of hand peripersonal space following tool use. Neuroreport, 11, 1645–1649.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farnè, A., Bonifazi, S., & Làdavas, E. (2005). The role played by tool-use and tool-length on the plastic elongation of peri-hand space: a single case study. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3–4), 408–418. doi:10.1080/02643290442000112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (1986). Body image and body schema: a conceptual clarification. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 7, 541–554.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2000). Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience. Phenomenology and Cognition Research Group, CREA, Paris: Atelier phénoménologie et cognition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S., & Cole, J. (1995). Body image and body schema in a deafferented subject. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16, 369–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gapenne, O. (1997). Evaluation de l’atteignabilité d’une cible chez l’enfant de 3 à 6 ans. In J. Lorenceau, A. Streri, B. Victorri & Y. M. Visetti (Eds), Actes de la VIème école d’été de l’ARCO « Le mouvement : des boucles sensori-motrices aux représentations cognitives et langagières », 101–112.

  • Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In E. E. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting and knowing. Hillsdale, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsadle, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, M. S., & Rosenblum, L. D. (2004). Perception of sound-obstructing surfaces using body-scaled judgments. Ecological Psychology, 16(2), 87–114. doi:10.1207/s15326969eco1602_1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halligan, P., & Marshall, J. M. (1991). Left neglect for near but not for far space in man. Nature, 350, 498–500. doi:10.1038/350498a0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Head, H., & Holmes, G. (1911). Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions. Brain, 34, 102–254. doi:10.1093/brain/34.2-3.102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1927). Etre et temps. Trad. François Vezin, Paris, Gallimard, 1986.

  • Heidegger, M. (1931). Aristote. Métaphysique Thêta 1-3. De l’essence et de la réalité de la force (GA33). Traduction Bernard Stevens et Pol Vandevelde. Paris, Gallimard, 1991.

  • Holmes, N. P., Calvert, G. A., & Spence, C. (2004). Extending or projecting peripersonal space with tools? Multisensory interactions highlight only the distal and proximal ends of tools. Neuroscience Letters, 372, 62–67. doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2004.09.024.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iriki, A., Tanaka, M., & Iwamura, Y. (1996). Coding of modified body schema during tool use by macaque postcentral neurones. Neuroreport, 7, 2325–2330.

    Google Scholar 

  • Iriki, A., Tanaka, M., Obayashi, S., & Iwamura, Y. (2001). Self-images in the videomonitor coded by monkey intraparietal neurons. Neuroscience Research, 40, 163–173. doi:10.1016/S0168-0102(01)00225-5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jeannerod, M. (2001). Simulation of action as a unifying concept for motor cognition. In S. H. Johnson (Ed.), Cognitive neuroscience. Perspectives on the problem of intention and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirkwood, B. C. (2007). Information from impact sounds: normal and impaired hearing. Ph.D. Thesis, Technical University of Denmark.

  • Legrand, D., Brozzoli, C., Rossetti, Y., & Farnè, A. (2007). Close to me: Multisensory space representations for action and pre-reflexive consciousness of oneself-in-the-world. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 687–699. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.06.003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lenay, C. (2006). Enaction, externalisme et suppléance perceptive. Intellectica, 43, 27–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Longo, M. R., & Lourenco, S. F. (2006). On the nature of near space: Effects of tool use and the transition to far space. Neuropsychologia, 44, 977–981. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.09.003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Longo, M. R., & Lourenco, S. F. (2007). Space perception and body morphology: extent of near space scales with arm length. Experimental Brain Research, 177(2), 285–290. doi:10.1007/s00221-007-0855-x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., & Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(2), 79–86. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.008.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Spence, C., Clarke, K., Husain, M., & Driver, J. (2000). Vision and touch through the looking glass in a case of crossmodal extinction. Neuroreport, 11, 3521–3526. doi:10.1097/00001756-200011090-00024.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Husain, M., Clarke, K., & Driver, J. (2001). Reaching with a tool extends visual-tactile interactions into far space: Evidence from cross-modal extinction. Neuropsychologia, 39, 580–585. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00150-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Clarke, K., Husain, M., & Driver, J. (2002a). Active tool-use with contralesional hand can reduce crossmodal extinction of touch on that hand. Neurocase, 8, 411–416. doi:10.1093/neucas/8.6.411.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Spence, C., Sergent, C., & Driver, J. (2002b). Seeing your own touched hands in a mirror modulates cross-modal interactions. Psychological Science, 13, 350–355. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2002.00463.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Spence, C., Kennett, S., & Driver, J. (2002c). Tool-use changes multimodal spatial interactions between vision and touch in normal humans. Cognition, 83, B25–B34. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00003-3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maravita, A., Spence, C., & Driver, J. (2003). Multisensory integration and the body schema: close to hand and within reach. Current Biology, 13, R531–R539. doi:10.1016/S0960-9822(03)00449-4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mark, L. S. (1987). Eyeheight-scaled information about affordances: a study of sitting and stair climbing. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 13, 361–370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mark, L. S., & Vogele, D. (1987). A biodynamic basis for perceived categories of action: a study of sitting and stair climbing. Journal of Motor Behavior, 19, 367–384.

    Google Scholar 

  • Melzack, R. (1989). Phantom limbs, the self and the brain. Canadian Psychology, 30, 1–16. doi:10.1037/h0079793.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, Gallimard, Collection Tel.

  • O'Regan, K., & Noe, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), 35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oudejans, R. R., Michaels, C. F., Van Dort, B., & Frissen, E. J. P. (1996). To cross or not to cross: the effect of locomotion on street-crossing behavior. Ecological Psychology, 8(3), 259–267. doi:10.1207/s15326969eco0803_4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pacherie, E. (1997). Du problème de Molyneux au problème de Bach-y-Rita. In J. Proust (Ed.), Perception et Intermodalité, Approches actuelles du Problème de Molyneux, Paris, PUF.

  • Paillard, J. (1987). Vers une psychobiologie de l’intentionnalité? In: M. Laurent, P. Therme (Eds.), Recherches en A.P.S. 2, 163–194.

  • Paillard, J. (1994). La conscience. In M. Richelle, J. Requin & M. Robert (Eds.), Traité de psychologie expérimentale, chap. VI.6 (639–684). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Google Scholar 

  • Patočka, J. (1995). Papiers phénoménologiques. Traduction Erika Abrams. Grenoble, Jerôme Millon.

  • Pegna, A. J., Petit, L., Caldara-Schnetzer, A.-S., Khateb, A., Annoni, J.-M., Sztajzel, R., et al. (2001). So near yet so far: neglect in far or near space depends on tool use. Annals of Neurology, 50, 820–822. doi:10.1002/ana.10058.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petit, J. L. (2003). La spatialité originaire du corps propre : phénoménologie et neurosciences. Géométrie & Cognition, numéro spécial publié sous la dir. de G. Longo, Revue de synthèse, 5ème série, année 2003, t. 124, 2004, 139–171.

  • Pick, A. (1908). Uber Störungen der Orientierung am eigenen Körper. In: Arbeiten aus der deutschen psychiatrischen Universitatsklinik in Prag. Berlin: Karger, 1-19.

  • Poeck, K. (1964). Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs. Cortex, 1, 269–275.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poincaré, H. (1907). La Science et l’hypothèse. Paris: Flammarion.

    Google Scholar 

  • Proffitt, D. R. (2006). Embodied perception and the economy of action. Perspectives on psychological science, 1(2), 110–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Proffitt, D. R., Stefanucci, J., Banton, T., & Epstein, W. (2003). The role of effort in perceiving distance. Psychological Science, 14, 106–113. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.t01-1-01427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Proffitt, D. R., Stefanucci, J., Banton, T., & Epstein, W. (2006). Reply to Hutchinson and Loomis. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 9, 340–342.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rochat, P., & Wraga, M. (1997). An account of the systematic error in judging what is reachable. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 23, 199–212. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.23.1.199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenthal, V. (1993). Cognition, vie et… temps. In: Intellectica, Biologie et cognition, n° 16, 1993/1, 175–207.

  • Ruyer, R. (1952). Néo-finalisme. PUF: Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L’être et le néant. Paris: Gallimard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmel, M. L. (1958). The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 102, 492–500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simondon, G. (1964-1965). Cours sur la perception. Les éditions de la transparence, 2006.

  • Solomon, H. Y., & Turvey, M. T. (1988). Haptically perceiving the distances reachable with handheld objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 14, 404–427. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.14.3.404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, G. J. (1984). Memory: Time binding in organisms. In L. R. Squire & N. Butters (Eds.), Neuropsychology of memory, chap. 34 (374-384). London: The Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turvey, M. T. (1974). Constructive theory, perceptual systems, and tacit knowledge. In W. B. Weimer & D. S. Palermo (Eds.), Cognition and the symbolic processes (165–180). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turvey, M. T., & Shaw, R. E. (1979). The primacy of perceiving: An ecological reformulation of perception for understanding memory. In L. G. Nilsson (Ed.), Perspectives on memory research, pp. 167–222. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vallar, G. (1998). Spatial hemineglect in human. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 87–97. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01145-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vuilleumier, P., Valenza, N., Mayer, E., Reverdin, A., & Landis, T. (1998). Near and far visual space in unilateral neglect. Annals of Neurology, 43, 406–410. doi:10.1002/ana.410430324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Warren, W. H. (1984). Perceiving affordances: visual guidance of stair climbing. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 10, 683–703. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.10.5.683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Warren, W. H., & Whang, S. (1987). Visual guidance of walking through apertures: Body-scaled information for affordances. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 13, 371–383. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.13.3.371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Witt, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., & Epstein, W. (2004). Perceiving distance: a role of effort and intent. Perception, 33, 577–590. doi:10.1068/p5090.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Witt, J. K., Proffitt, D. R., & Epstein, W. (2005). Tool use affects perceived distance, but only when you intend to use it. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 31(5), 880–888. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.5.880.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful to Robert Reay-Jones for translating this text from the original French. The authors are also grateful to the reviewers for their comments, which helped to improve the overall quality of the final draft of this paper and opened new avenues of thought for future research.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Technology of Compiegne (UTC), Costech – CRED, Centre Pierre Guillaumat – BP 319, 60203, Compiègne Cedex, France

    Gunnar Declerck & Olivier Gapenne

Authors
  1. Gunnar Declerck
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Olivier Gapenne
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Olivier Gapenne.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Declerck, G., Gapenne, O. Actuality and possibility: On the complementarity of two registers in the bodily constitution of experience. Phenom Cogn Sci 8, 285–305 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9128-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9128-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation