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Urban planning and tsunami impact mitigation in Chile after February 27, 2010

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Abstract

Urban and regional planning can and should be a crucial tool to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of a tsunami. This article analyzes the role of urban planning in mitigating the impact of tsunami in Chile, specifically in reaction to the Cobquecura tsunami of February 27, 2010. First, it examines the draft regulations and policies to reduce the impact of tsunami proposed at the national level in response to the 2010 socio-natural disaster. Then, it analyzes in detail tsunami mitigation measures developed at the local level in recent reconstruction plans for coastal towns and villages in the Región del Maule and Región del Bío Bío, based on semi-structured interviews and questionnaires realized with local and regional actors during 2011 and 2012. This article shows that there is a lack of guidance at the national level to mitigate the impact of tsunami and that mitigation policies are being developed mainly at the local level through non-binding coastal reconstruction plans, which focus strongly on “anti-tsunami” engineering solutions. Other available planning tools such as risk zone planning or relocation of housing and critical infrastructure have only been proposed in a few coastal reconstruction plans without adequate instruments for their implementation and lacking an active participation of citizens. Hence, a clear regulatory framework and set of urban policies is urgently required in Chile at the national and local level to reduce its vulnerability to tsunami.

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Notes

  1. Chile has had eleven destructive tsunamis in the last 440 years; this means that Chile has on average one destructive tsunami every forty years.

  2. The most affected buildings were timber-framed construction and unreinforced or poorly reinforced masonry structures, which were severely damaged by the strong hydrodynamic loads and the impact of floating debris. By contrast, reinforced concrete structures performed well in structural terms, even when water levels reached above the second floor (EERI 2010).

  3. Nationally funded government subsidies for about 220,000 homes were made available to families in the lowest three income quintiles, whose houses were destroyed or damaged by the 27F disaster.

  4. Earthquake damage was partly covered by insurance. However, large part of the reconstruction was financed by the state through temporary and permanent tax increase, budget reallocation (national copper fund) as well as private donations (OECD 2013).

  5. The CENSO 2002 categorizes all settlements as villages (ranging from 500 to 4000 inhabitants), except Constitución (34,000 inhabitants) and Talcahuano (162,000 inhabitants), which are classified as cities.

  6. The interview and questionnaire were constructed with open-ended and close-ended questions—regarding tsunami impact mitigation measures, public participation, relation with the national government, etc—in order to identify the opinion, experience and perception of the key actors.

  7. 8 semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were conducted with actors of the public sector at regional level (regional government, Seremi MINVU, etc.), 36 with key actors of the public sector at local level (mayor, urban advisor, municipal secretary, director of works, director of planning, secretary of planning, emergency manager, etc.), 3 with actors of the private sector (universities, NGOs, consultants, etc.) and 3 with community leaders. Five interviews and questionnaires were completed for Duao/Iloca/La Pesca, 11 for Constitución, 7 for Pelluhue/Curanipe, 5 for Dichato, 6 for Talcahuano, 6 for LLico, 6 for Tubul and 4 for Tirúa. The interview and questionnaire were conducted in approximately 30 min.

  8. Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones (LGUC) (General Law of Urbanism and Construction) (2010). Art. 28.

  9. D.S. No 475 (1994). It should be noted that this definition does not specify how to define the inland boundary of the coastal border.

  10. So far around 35 CITSU tsunami flood maps have been issued for larger cities and many more still have to be made, especially for coastal villages.

  11. Prior to 27F, the CITSU maps were only used for the design of tsunami emergency plans in a few coastal towns and for tsunami evacuation routes as a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. It should be noted that the topography of Chile’s coast helps evacuation, since, in general, Chile’s hills are very close to the shore and evacuation can be undertaken relatively quickly.

  12. Ordenanza General de Urbanismo y Construcciones (General Ordinance of Urbanism and Construction) art. 2.1.17 (D.S. No 9) (2011).

  13. Ley No 16.282, Ley de Sismos y Catástrofes (Law of Earthquakes and Disasters) art.27 (1966).

  14. Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones (LGUC) (General Law of Urbanism and Construction) (2010). Proposal to amend art. 105.

  15. Residential areas have to be elevated above the ground through tsunami-resistant pillars, etc.

  16. Interview with Laura Kong, Director, International Tsunami Information Center Hawaii (ITIC) (6 June 2012); Interview with Gary Y.K. Chock, President, Martin & Chock, Inc. (7 June 2012).

  17. Indeed, in the USA, a “national standard for engineering design for tsunami effects written in mandatory language does not exist” (Chock et al. 2011) and a chapter of updated provisions for tsunami loads and effects will be included in the 2016 edition of the ASCE 7 Standard. The ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) sets out Standard ASCE 7, which provides requirements for general structural design (minimum loads) and forms part of the building codes in the USA.

  18. PRES is an abbreviation for “Plan de Reconstrucción del BordeCostero” (reconstruction plan for coastal towns and villages), PRE an abbreviation for “Plan de Reconstrucción Interior” (reconstruction plan for middle-size towns) and PRU an abbreviation for “Plan de Regeneración Urbana” (reconstruction plan or urban renewal plan for small rural villages).

  19. Constitución, Pelluhue-Curanipe, Llico, Tubul and Dichato.

  20. Constitución, Iloca-Duao-La Pesca, Llico, Tubul and Dichato.

  21. Constitución, Pelluhue-Curanipe and Talcahuano.

  22. Constitución.

  23. CITSU maps for Constitución (2002), Lebu (2002), Penco (2000), Lirquén (2000) and Talcahuano (2000).

  24. Ranging from 350 to 3500 inhabitants.

  25. The ONEMI (Oficina Nacional de Emergencia)—created in 1974 and part of the Ministry of the Interior—is in charge of managing the emergency process as well as alerts and evacuations during a natural disaster.

  26. Llico, Tubul and Tirúa.

  27. Tirúa.

  28. Iloca-Duao-La Pesca.

  29. Constitución, Pelluhue, Curanipe, Isla Mocha and Caleta Tumbes.

  30. Excepting the small villages Isla Santa María, Caleta Lo Rojas and Purema, each with less than 1000 inhabitants.

  31. Indeed, the 2011 tsunami overtopped almost all the coastal defense facilities in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures such as breakwaters, inlet gates and coastal levees, resulting in an enormous loss of life (IRIDeS 2014).

  32. Spacing should be of about three meters between trees.

  33. Coastal forests reduce impact forces, flow depth and velocities and limit the extent of tsunami flooding. According to Forbes and Broadhead (2007) almost complete protection can be achieved from impact damage of 6–7 meter waves; a well-designed coastal forest could even mitigate the impact of a tsunami up to 8–10 meters (depending on the near-shore run-up slope which determines form and force of the wave). In general, coastal forests failed when forest width was limited, waves were very large and trees were widely spaced, of small diameter, without branches near ground level or of sparse undergrowth. Furthermore, rivers and gaps in coastal forests are likely to result in local increases in destruction.

  34. Constitución, Llico, Tubul, Caleta Perales, Isla Mocha, Penco, Lirquén, Talcahuano, Caleta Tumbes, Tirúa, Dichato, Caleta del Medio and Caleta los Morros.

  35. Penco, Lirquén, Caleta Tumbes, Tirúa, Dichato, Caleta del Medio, Caleta Los Morros and Isla Mocha.

  36. Constitución, Pelluhue, Curanipe and Llico.

  37. Constitución, Pelluhue, Curanipe, Llico, Tubul, Lebu, Caleta Tumbes and Quidico.

  38. Nationally funded government subsidies for about 220,000 homes were made available, but only to families in the lowest three income quintiles, covering around 49% of the affected families (Bresciani 2012).

  39. In Chile, there is no national disaster fund, but two percent of the national budget can be reassigned for emergencies.

  40. Ley N° 20.444.

  41. Also, the private sector has co-financed some projects identified by the reconstruction plans, especially in Chile’s Seventh region (Séptima Región del Maule).

  42. Reconstruction projects in Chile are usually assigned to the private sector by means of a public tender process and financed by the National Budget Bill (Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Público).

  43. Interview with Angela Prado, Departamento de Planificación y Normas Urbanas (Urban planning and urban norms unit), División de Desarrollo Urbano (Urban Development Unit), Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Ministry of Housing and Urbanism) (May 25, 2012).

  44. Other initiatives at national level, such as a proposed “tsunami law” and a “Technical Norm of Structural Design for Buildings in Tsunami Flood Zones” have, unfortunately, been put on hold and are in part based on obsolete policy.

  45. In Chile, only 30,5% of the public spending is administered by regional and local governments (OECD 2009).

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Acknowledgments

This investigation is supported by the research fund “Proyecto Semilla” of the Universidad Diego Portales. Acknowledgments to the research assistants Catalina Villalobos and María Fernanda Barreto.

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Correspondence to Marie Geraldine Herrmann Lunecke.

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Herrmann Lunecke, M.G. Urban planning and tsunami impact mitigation in Chile after February 27, 2010. Nat Hazards 79, 1591–1620 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-015-1914-4

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