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Competitive Location and Pricing on Networks with Random Utilities

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the effect of including price competition into a classical (market entrant’s) competitive location problem. The multinomial logit approach is applied to model the decision process of utility maximizing customers. We provide complexity results and show that, given the locations of all facilities, a fixed-point iteration approach that has previously been introduced in the literature can be adapted to reliably and quickly determine local price equilibria. We present examples of problem instances that demonstrate the potential non-existence of price equilibria and the case of multiple local equilibria in prices. Furthermore, we show that different price sensitivity levels of customers may actually affect optimal locations of facilities, and we provide first insights into the performance of heuristic algorithms for the location problem.

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Notes

  1. Additionally, a tie breaking criterion is needed.

  2. An alternative model does not fix the number of facilities in advance, but incorporates fixed setup costs \(f_{j} \in \mathbb {R}^{+}_{0}\) for (potential) facilities j; cf. Benati (2003) for a version of this problem without (explicit) price competition.

  3. Note that, differing from Benati (2000), we allow co-location of the players.

  4. While the statements are essentially the same as in Benati (2000), modifications are needed with respect to the transformation of Dominating Set instances and the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4.

  5. Please refer to Online Resource “Degenerate Equilibrium Example Instance” (provided as supplementary material with this paper) for details on the example instance.

  6. Choi et al. (1990) and Rhim and Cooper (2005), among others, apply a variational inequality approach to compute Nash equilibria in prices. In the context of LPL, a major drawback of this approach is, among others, the necessity of having to solve a series of optimization problems. In each of these solution processes, divergence issues may arise.

  7. Please refer to Online Resource “No Equilibrium Example Instance” (provided as supplementary material with this paper) for details on the example instance.

  8. Please refer to Online Resource “Multiple Local Equilibria Example Instance” (provided as supplementary material with this paper) for details on the example instance.

  9. The uniqueness of the price equilibria has been manually confirmed by plotting the corresponding profit derivatives over the domain of prices.

  10. Note that β≈0 results in LPL reducing to a pure location game with parametric prices, i.e. a model “without” price competition, see Theorem 4 and Lemma 2.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Determining \(\tilde p_{q}\)

figure a

Appendix B: Vanishing Profit Derivatives

Lemma 6

\(\underset {p_{q} \to \infty }{\lim } {\frac {\partial {\Pi }_{q}}{\partial p_{q}}} = 0\) for q∈{I,E}.

Proof

Making use of the results of Section 3.1 and defining Z q , q∈{I,E}, as in Eq. 4, we get

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \lim_{p_{q} \to \infty } {\frac{\partial {\Pi}_{q}}{\partial p_{q}}} &=& \lim_{p_{q} \to \infty } \left( \sum\limits_{i \in V }{\sum\limits_{j \in Z_{q} }{\pi(i)P_{ij}^{q}}} + (p_{q} - c_{q}) \sum\limits_{i \in V }{\sum\limits_{j \in Z_{q} }{\pi(i)} \cdot \frac{\partial P_{ij}^{q}}{\partial p_{q}}} \right) \\ &=& -s \beta \lim_{p_{q} \to \infty } {(p_{q} - c_{q}) \cdot \sum\limits_{i \in V }{\sum\limits_{j \in Z_{q} }{\pi(i)} P_{ij}^{q} \left( 1 - \sum\limits_{k \in Z_{q} } {P_{ik}^{q}} \right)}} = 0, \end{array} $$

because, by applying L’Hospital’s rule, we derive

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \underset{p_{q} \to \infty }{\lim } {p_{q} P_{ij}^{q}} &=& \underset{p_{q} \to \infty }{\lim } \frac{p_{q}}{\sum\limits_{k \in Z_{q} } { e^{s({a_{k}^{q}}-{a_{j}^{q}}-\alpha(d_{ik}-d_{ij}))} } + \frac{c}{e^{s({a_{j}^{q}} - \alpha d_{ij} - \beta p_{q})}} }\\&=& \underset{p_{q} \to \infty }{\lim } \frac{ e^{s({a_{j}^{q}} - \alpha d_{ij} - \beta p_{q})} }{c s \beta} = 0 \end{array} $$

for any iV, jZ q and c as defined in Eq. 17. □

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Kress, D., Pesch, E. Competitive Location and Pricing on Networks with Random Utilities. Netw Spat Econ 16, 837–863 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-015-9301-y

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