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Hotelling Revisited: Oil Prices and Endogenous Technological Progress

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Abstract

This article examines the Hotelling model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction in light of empirical evidence that petroleum and minerals prices have been trendless despite resource scarcity. In particular, we examine how endogenous technology-induced shifts in the cost function would have evolved over time if they were to maintain a constant market price for nonrenewable resources. We calibrate our model using empirical data on world oil, and find that, depending on the estimate of the initial stock of reserve, oil reserves will likely be depleted some time between the years 2040 and 2075.

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Acknowledgments

This article benefited from discussions with Martin Weitzman, Howard Stone, Gary Chamberlain, Partha Dasgupta, Aart de Zeeuw, Jerry Green, Anni Huhtala, Satoshi Kojima, Sjak Smulders, Anastasios Xepapadeas, and two anonymous referees, and from comments from participants at the 2004 EAERE-FEEM-VIU Summer School on Dynamic Models in Economics and the Environment in Venice. Lin received financial support from an EPA Science to Achieve Results graduate fellowship, a National Science Foundation graduate research fellowship, and a Repsol YPF—Harvard Kennedy School Pre-Doctoral Fellowship in Energy Policy. Meng, Ngai, Oscherov, and Zhu received funding from the National Science Foundation under the UC-Davis VIGRE Research Experiences for Undergraduates program. All errors are our own.

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Appendix: Proofs

Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

When there are no stock effects (i.e., \(\frac{\partial C}{\partial S}\left( \cdot ,\cdot ,\cdot \right)=0\)), then condition [#2] yields the Hotelling rule that the shadow price rises at the rate of interest:

$$ \frac{\frac{dp(t)}{dt}}{p(t)}=\rho. $$
(21)

When combined with condition [#1], this means that the market price minus marginal costs must increase at the rate of interest:

$$ \frac{\frac{d}{dt}\left( P(t)-\frac{\partial C}{\partial E}\left( S(t),E(t),t\right)\right)}{P(t)-\frac{\partial C}{\partial E}\left( S(t),E(t),t\right)}=\rho, $$
(22)

which yields, after rearranging terms, the following equation for the growth rate of market price in the absence of stock effects:

$$ \frac{\frac{dP(t)}{dt}}{P(t)}=(1-\theta(t))\rho +\theta (t)\frac{\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial C}{\partial E}\left( S(t),E(t),t\right)\right)}{\frac{\partial C}{\partial E}\left( S(t),E(t),t\right)} $$
(23)

where the weight θ(t) is defined as:

$$ \theta (t)\equiv \frac{\frac{\partial C}{\partial E}\left( S(t),E(t),t\right) }{P(t)}\text{.} $$
(24)

When marginal extraction costs are nonzero, θ(t) ≥ 0. Moreover, from [#1] and the non-negativity of the shadow price, θ(t) ≤ 1. Under A1, when there are no stock effects and costs are linear in extraction, Equation (23) reduces to:

$$ \frac{\frac{dP(t)}{dt}}{P(t)}=(1-\theta (t)) \rho +\theta (t)\frac{\frac{dh(t)}{dt}}{h(t)}. $$
(25)

In order for market price to be constant (i.e., \(\frac{dP(t)}{dt}=0\)), we need h(t) to rise at rate \(\left(1-\frac{1}{\theta (t)}\right) \rho ,\) which is nonpositive since θ(t) ≤ 1.

Proof of Lemma 2

(i) \(g(t)\equiv \frac{\frac{d}{dt}F(S(t))}{F(S(t))} =\frac{-F^{\prime}(S(t))E(t)}{F(S(t))}=\frac{\left\vert \frac{\partial C}{ \partial S}\left(\cdot \right) \right\vert}{\frac{\partial C}{\partial E} \left(\cdot \right)}.\) (ii) \(g(t)\equiv \frac{\frac{d}{dt}F(S(t))}{ F(S(t))}=\sigma E(t).\)

Proof of Proposition 3

Under A1, B1, and B2, [#1] can be written as \(p(t)=\overline{P}-F(S(t))h(t),\) which implies \(h(t)=\frac{\overline{P}-p(t)}{F(S(t))}.\) Taking the derivative with respect to time yields:

$$ \begin{aligned} \frac{dh(t)}{dt}&=\frac{-\frac{dp(t)}{dt}}{F(S(t))}-\frac{\overline{P}-p(t)} {F(S(t))}\frac{\frac{d}{dt}F(S(t))}{F(S(t))} \\ &=\frac{-\frac{dp(t)}{dt}}{F(S(t))}-g(t)\frac{\overline{P}-p(t)}{F(S(t))}. \end{aligned} $$

Thus,

$$ \begin{aligned} \frac{\frac{dh(t)}{dt}}{h(t)}&=\frac{\frac{dp(t)}{dt}}{p(t)-\overline{P}} -g(t)\\ &=\frac{g(t)\left( p(t)-\overline{P}\right) +\rho p(t)}{p(t)-\overline{P}} -g(t), \end{aligned} $$

where the second line comes from [#2]. Further simplification yields the desired result.

Proof of Corollary 4

The closed-form equation (19) for h(t) is the solution to the linear first-order differential equation (18). Condition [#1] and the non-negativity of p(t) implies \(h(t)\leq \frac{\overline{P}}{\Uppsi}e^{\sigma S_{o}-gt}\ \forall t ,\) so \(h(0)\leq \frac{\overline{P}}{\Uppsi}e^{\sigma S_{o}} .\) Non-negativity of costs implies \(h(t)\geq 0 \ \forall t ,\) which then implies that \(h(0)\geq \frac{\rho}{ \rho +g}\frac{\overline{P}}{\Uppsi}e^{\sigma S_{o}}\left(1-e^{-(\rho +g) \frac{S_{0}}{\overline{E}}}\right).\)

Proof of Proposition 5

Similar to proof of Proposition 3.

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Lin, CY.C., Meng, H., Ngai, T.Y. et al. Hotelling Revisited: Oil Prices and Endogenous Technological Progress. Nat Resour Res 18, 29–38 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11053-008-9086-5

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