Notes
Please, dear reader, do not commit the usual STS fallacy of thinking that because there is a fuzzy boundary between performance and argument the categories/forms-of-life cannot be separated. For example, this review is full of performative flourishes but it is, nevertheless, an argument—for the crucial idea of formative intentions see (Collins and Kusch 1998, pp. 10–12, 18–19, etc.).
For the daftness see (Collins and Yearley 1992).
I believe it was Steve Shapin who invented the phrase. I have no space here to discuss the way ANT appealed to boundary-crossers of every type. For instance, it provided a perfect metaphysics for the animal-rights movement, which need no longer be concerned with meaning and language.
For further explanation see (Collins and Yearley 1992).
There is, I understand, some belated recognition of the problem even among the writings of ANTs—but then they are no longer doing ANT.
To use Goodman’s (1976) terminology, theatre is ‘allographic’.
References
Collins, H.M., and R. Evans. 2007. Rethinking expertise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Collins, H.M., and M. Kusch. 1998. The shape of actions: What humans and machines can do. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Collins, H.M., and S. Yearley. 1992. Epistemological chicken. In Science as practice and culture, ed. A. Pickering, 301–326. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goodman, N. 1976. Languages of art. Indiana: Hackett.
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Collins, H. Performances and arguments. Metascience 21, 409–418 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-011-9562-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-011-9562-0