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Being-in-movement: phenomenological ontology of being

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Notes

  1. Heidegger (1962, 143).

  2. Sheets-Johnstone (2020a, 124).

  3. Heidegger (1962, 82).

  4. Ibid.

  5. Husserl (1989, 252).

  6. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 198).

  7. Ibid., 136.

  8. Fink (1981, 24).

  9. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 116).

  10. Sheets-Johnstone (1999), pp. 276-277, (2011), pp. 240

  11. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 190–97).

  12. Cassirer (1957), Vol. 3, Chapter 6.

  13. (Sheets-Johnstone 2018a)

  14. Goldstein (1939, 1940).

  15. Cassirer (1957, 153, n. 10).

  16. Sheets-Johnstone 2019; see also Sheets-Johnstone 2018a.

  17. See, e.g., Merleau-Ponty (1968, 134); (1962, xvi; 254).

  18. Ibid., 100.

  19. Ibid.

  20. Schilder (1950, 11).

  21. Ibid.

  22. Robeck (1978); Furuhjelm, et al. (1976).

  23. Tactility is at times an essential sensory dimension of movement, as when an elbow or knee is bent and the skin of the two segments of arm or leg touch each other in the course of moving. The tactile experience is not a positional awareness but a tactile-kinesthetic awareness of what happens bodily in the process of moving.

  24. Proprioception is anchored in surface recognition sensitivity (Sheets-Johnstone 1999/2011). It preceded the evolutionary development of kinesthesia.

  25. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 267).

  26. “Coenesthesia” entered into medical and popular vocabularies in the 1800s and dropped out of circulation around the 1930s. The OED defines coenesthesia as “The general sense or feeling of existence arising from the sum of bodily impressions, as distinct from the definite sensations.” No sensory modality informs medical and popular notions of coenesthesia. For a brief discussion of the meaning and history of coenesthesis, see Starobinski 1989; see also Sheets-Johnstone 2020b.

  27. Ibid., 99.

  28. Ibid., 99–100.

  29. Ibid., 176, note 1; see below for more on ambiguity.

  30. Ibid., 268.

  31. Ibid., 269.

  32. Ibid., 198.

  33. Ibid.

  34. Ibid., 110.

  35. Ibid., 249.

  36. Shifting orientation changes the linear design of the body in the process of moving and the linear pattern of movement itself.

  37. Ibid., 137, note.

  38. Husserl (1989), 273.

  39. For more on animate being and its existential realities, see Sheets-Johnstone 2009a, Sheets-Johnstone 2020a, 2022.

  40. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 276, note 1).

  41. Ibid.

  42. Ibid., 198.

  43. Husserl (1983), 127; (1989), 35–36, 185; (1980), 2, 4 ff..

  44. Sheets-Johnstone 1999, pp. 135, 2011, pp. 116.

  45. Lawrence (1932, 199–200).

  46. Heidegger (1995).

  47. Heidegger (1962, 210).

  48. Merleau-Ponty (1968, 165).

  49. Ibid., 167.

  50. Heidegger (1995, 14).

  51. Ibid., 21.

  52. Ibid., 21–2.

  53. Ibid., 93.

  54. Ibid., 110.

  55. Ibid., 111.

  56. Ibid., 134–35.

  57. Ibid., 136.

  58. Ibid., 139–40.

  59. Ibid., 141.

  60. Heidegger (1962, 172–79).

  61. Ibid., 175.

  62. Ibid., 182.

  63. Ibid., 183.

  64. Sheets-Johnstone, 2006

  65. Heidegger (1962, 176).

  66. See Husserl (1973).

  67. Heidegger (1962, 291).

  68. Ibid.

  69. Jung (1978), 8–9.

  70. Jung (1980, 278–79).

  71. For more on the relationship between emotions and movement, see Sheets-Johnstone 1999; included in Sheets-Johnstone 2009b, Chapter VIII.

  72. Heidegger (1962, 392).

  73. Ibid., italics in original.

  74. Ibid., 393. For further distinctions that Heidegger makes, see 394–95.

  75. Ibid.

  76. Sheets-Johnstone 2015, p. 568

  77. Heidegger (1962, 438).

  78. Heidegger (1962, 98ff).

  79. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 137).

  80. Merleau-Ponty (1968, 151).

  81. Husserl (1983, 127); (1989, 35–6; 185); (1980 2; 4 ff).

  82. Merleau-Ponty (1968, xlcapitalization in original).

  83. Ibid., 24.

  84. See Aristotle (435a114; 435b6-7): “[E]very body that has soul in it must...be capable of touch... which is indispensably necessary to what is an animal.”

  85. Merleau-Ponty (1964,162).

  86. Ibid., 164.

  87. Ibid., 162.

  88. Ibid.

  89. Ibid.

  90. Ibid., 162–63.

  91. Merleau-Ponty (1968, 165).

  92. Collingwood (1958, 144; see also Sheets-Johnstone 1990, 249-250).

  93. Heidegger (1977, 185).

  94. Heidegger (1962, 397).

  95. Ibid., italics in original.

  96. Ibid., 398.

  97. Ibid., 399.

  98. Ibid. 479; italics in original.

  99. Ibid. 387–388; all italics in original.

  100. Ibid., 438.

  101. Ibid., 347.

  102. Ibid.

  103. Ibid., 348.

  104. Ibid., 437; italics and bold in original.

    Ibid., 438; italics in original.

  105. Ibid., 438; italics in original.

  106. Darwin (1987, 564; italics in original).

  107. Sheets- Johnstone 2010, p. 159; see also Sheets-Johnstone 2023

  108. Crick and Koch (1992, 153).

  109. Zeki (1992 69).

  110. Jung (1968 6).

  111. Jung (1970 93–94.

  112. Howells (1959, 341).

  113. Darwin (1968) [1859], 1981 [1871], 1965 [1872], respectively.

  114. See Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 2002, 2011, 2020b.

  115. McCleary (1964, xxi).

  116. Merleau-Ponty (1964, 97).

  117. Heidegger (1975, 208).

  118. Ibid., 208–09.

  119. Ibid., 207.

  120. Ibid.

  121. Ibid., 207–08.

  122. Ibid., 208, all italics in original.

  123. Sheets-Johnstone 2015, 553.

  124. Heidegger (1961, 1).

  125. Sheets-Johnstone 1990.

  126. Sheets-Johnstone 1981; expanded version in Sheets-Johnstone 1999a, 2011, and Sheets-Johnstone 2009b, Chapter II.

  127. Sheets-Johnstone 1986, Included in Sheets-Johnstone 1990, Chapter 8 and in Sheets-Johnstone 2009b, Chapter IV.

  128. We might indeed ask why the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is not complemented by, if not logically preceded by, the question “Why is there movement rather than stillness?” “Why is there something rather than nothing?” puts matter in the form of objects at the helm. The less familiar but equally provocative if not more penetrating question – why is there movement rather than stillness? – puts dynamics at the helm. In this respect it is of substantive import to note that naming talk – what we might call Heideggerian ‘idle chatter’ – is an adult practice, not the practice of infants and young children whose experiential knowledge of the world is nonlinguistically constituted and whose basically tactile-kinesthetic constitution of the world lays the foundation for its later linguistic constitution (See Sheets-Johnstone 1999/2011). Infants and young children, after all, have yet to be indoctrinated into the epistemological name-game by which what is unfamiliar is made putatively familiar by naming. Learning the world originally, regardless of one’s ancestry or religious environment, means making one’s way not by dint of language but in the flesh, exploring it. In doing so, infants and young children take what is initially strange directly into their world, familiarizing themselves with it in the process.

  129. Sheets-Johnstone 1990, 223.

  130. Sheets-Johnstone 1990, 226, 229.

  131. Sartre (1956, 545).

  132. Voltaire (1901, 174).

  133. See Husserl (1970, 97–8; 110–11); (1973, 106–08; 217–18); (1980, 4–6; 103–04); (1989, 185; 266–67 on animate organism).

  134. Heidegger (1962, 207).

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    Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

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Sheets-Johnstone, M. Being-in-movement: phenomenological ontology of being. Cont Philos Rev 57, 17–43 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-024-09631-9

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