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Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?

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Abstract

In this article, we analyse the impact of business digitalisation on the principal-agent conflict. While there are several studies of impact of digitalization on corporate governance, the empirical evidence has so far been relatively scarce. We examine the principal-agent conflict from several angles: the number of shareholder-sponsored proposals submitted for the shareholder meetingsб the level of support for management-sponsored proposals and the frequency of proxy contests. As a proxy for the active digitalisation of a firm, we use the blockchain technology that has the potential to fundamentally change the distribution of power within an organisation, potentially mitigating the principal-agent conflict. We analyze a sample of 2813 NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX-traded firms for the year 2018, during which rapid blockchain adoption was exhibited. Our results suggest that firms active in business digitalisation overall have a lower level of principal-agent conflict. We find that such firms generally have shareholders that are more active, which indicates an environment less prone to the principal-agent conflict. While on average, proposals submitted by the management receive less support during voting, the share of approved proposals does not change for the digitising firms. Proxy contests appear relatively rare among the firms active in digitalisation, however, there is not yet enough data to confirm this.

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Notes

  1. See http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-1st-Edition-2015.pdf.

  2. https://www.jpmorgan.com/solutions/cib/news/digital-coin-payments

  3. https://www.cushmanwakefield.com/en/united-states/insights/us-articles/2019-02-dc-blockchain-and-the-future-of-cre

  4. We make an assumption based on the expert interviews that for a firm to go public with a blockchain initiative, it takes approximately 1 year to develop it privately. Hence, for that the firms that are mentioned in the press in 2019, we assume that the year of beginning blockchain activity 2018.

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Correspondence to Ilya Ivaninskiy.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Variables used in the research

Variable

Description

blockchain_weak

Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company has any public association with blockchain technology, such as a comment by the firm’s executive or a published report on the topic and 0 otherwise [Source: open sources, internet search]

blockchain_stronSOg

Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company has a confirmed blockchain initiative, such as participation in a consortium or development of a in-house blockchain solution [Source: open sources, internet search]

sh_prop

Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company received at least one shareholder-sponsored proposal for the annual meeting [source: ISS voting database]

N_sh_prop

Number of shareholder-sponsored proposals received by a firm for the annual meeting [source: ISS voting database]

level_of_support_total

Average % of votes in favor of all proposals for the meeting [source: ISS voting database]

level_of_support_mgmt

Average % of votes in favor of all management-sponsored proposals for the meeting [source: ISS voting database]

level_passed_total

% of passed proposals at the meeting [source: ISS voting database]

level_passed_mgmt

% of passed management-sponsored proposals at the meeting [source: ISS voting database]

size_lnmarcap

Natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation [Source: CapitalIQ]

growth_revenue

Compound annual growth rate of revenues for 3 years prior to the meeting[Source: CapitalIQ]

EBITDA_margin

Company’s EBITDA divided by the company’s revenues [Source: CapitalIQ

market_book

Ratio of company’s market capitalisation to the company’s book value of equity [Source: CapitalIQ]

leverage

Ratio of company’s total debt to the total book value of equity [Source: CapitalIQ]

Institutions

Fraction of company’s shares owned by institutions [Source: CapitalIQ]

Insiders

Fraction of company’s shares owned by company’s insiders [Source: CapitalIQ]

Sector dummies

Set of variables identifying the main sector of operations for a firm (Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer discretionary, Consumer staples, Healthcare, Financials, IT, Communication services, Utilities, Real Estate) as reported in CapitalIQ database [Source: CapitalIQ]

Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics: Blockchain adopters vs non-adopters

Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev

Min

Pctl(25)

Pctl(75)

Max

Descriptive statistics for blockchain adopters (Strong form of definition)

       

sh_prop

258

0.3

0.5

0

0

1

1

level_of_support_mgmt

258

0.6

0.2

0.1

0.5

0.9

1.0

proxy_contest

258

0.004

0.1

0

0

0

1

blockchain_weak

258

1.0

0.0

1

1

1

1

level_of_support_total

258

0.6

0.2

0.2

0.5

0.8

1.0

N_sh_prop

258

0.7

1.3

0

0

1

7

level_passed_total

258

0.9

0.1

0

0.9

1

1

level_passed_mgmt

258

1.0

0.1

0

1

1

1

blockchain_strong

258

1.0

0.0

1

1

1

1

size_lnmarcap

258

8.9

2.5

1.4

7.5

10.7

13.6

growth_revenue

258

0.1

0.3

− 0.8

0.02

0.1

3.3

EBITDA_margin

258

0.2

0.2

− 0.6

0.04

0.3

1.0

market_book

258

5.1

11.6

− 30.8

1.4

5.5

111.1

leverage

258

1.2

3.3

− 12.1

0.3

1.5

33.3

Institutions

258

0.7

0.3

0.000

0.6

0.9

1.2

Insiders

258

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.003

0.1

0.6

ROA

258

0.1

0.1

− 0.4

0.02

0.1

0.7

marcap

258

48.1

101.3

0.004

1.8

45.1

832.6

sector_id

258

6.3

2.2

1

4

8

11

sector_energy

258

0.03

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_materials

258

0.01

0.1

0

0

0

1

sector_industrials

258

0.1

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_discr

258

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_stapl

258

0.1

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_healthcare

258

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_finance

258

0.2

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_IT

258

0.3

0.4

0

0

1

1

sector_communication

258

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_utilities

258

0.02

0.1

0

0

0

1

Descriptive statistics for blockchain adopters (Weak form of definition)

       

sh_prop

412

0.3

0.4

0

0

1

1

level_of_support_mgmt

412

0.7

0.2

0.1

0.5

0.9

1.0

proxy_contest

412

0.005

0.1

0

0

0

1

blockchain_weak

412

1.0

0.0

1

1

1

1

level_of_support_total

412

0.7

0.2

0.1

0.5

0.9

1.0

N_sh_prop

412

0.5

1.2

0

0

1

8

level_passed_total

412

0.9

0.1

0

0.9

1

1

level_passed_mgmt

412

1.0

0.1

0

1

1

1

blockchain_strong

412

0.6

0.5

0

0

1

1

size_lnmarcap

412

8.7

2.3

1.4

7.5

10.2

13.6

growth_revenue

412

0.1

0.2

− 0.8

0.03

0.1

3.3

EBITDA_margin

412

0.1

0.2

− 0.9

0.02

0.2

1.0

market_book

412

5.9

26.8

− 30.8

1.4

4.9

508.5

leverage

412

1.1

3.2

− 12.1

0.2

1.4

33.8

Institutions

412

0.7

0.3

0.000

0.6

0.9

1.2

Insiders

412

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.004

0.1

0.7

ROA

412

0.1

0.1

− 0.4

0.02

0.1

0.7

marcap

412

36.4

83.7

0.004

1.8

28.1

832.6

sector_id

412

6.3

2.3

1

4

8

11

sector_energy

412

0.03

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_materials

412

0.01

0.1

0

0

0

1

sector_industrials

412

0.2

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_discr

412

0.1

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_stapl

412

0.1

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_healthcare

412

0.1

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_finance

412

0.2

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_IT

412

0.3

0.5

0

0

1

1

sector_communication

412

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_utilities

412

0.02

0.1

0

0

0

1

Descriptive statistics for blockchain non-adopters

       

sh_prop

2,401

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

level_of_support_mgmt

2,401

0.8

0.2

0.1

0.7

0.9

1.0

proxy_contest

2,401

0.01

0.1

0

0

0

1

blockchain_weak

2,401

0.0

0.0

0

0

0

0

level_of_support_total

2,401

0.8

0.2

0.1

0.6

0.9

1.0

N_sh_prop

2,401

0.1

0.7

0

0

0

14

level_passed_total

2,401

1.0

0.1

0

1

1

1

level_passed_mgmt

2,401

1.0

0.1

0

1

1

1

blockchain_strong

2,401

0.0

0.0

0

0

0

0

size_lnmarcap

2,401

6.9

1.9

0.8

5.6

8.2

13.7

growth_revenue

2,401

0.1

0.3

− 3.1

0.02

0.2

5.7

EBITDA_margin

2,401

0.1

0.2

− 1.0

0.0

0.2

1.4

market_book

2,401

3.3

10.5

− 92.4

1.2

3.5

286.6

leverage

2,401

0.9

5.1

− 45

0.1

1.1

124

Institutions

2,401

0.7

0.3

0.0

0.4

0.9

1.4

Insiders

2,401

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.01

0.1

1.4

ROA

2,401

0.1

0.1

− 2.1

0.0

0.1

1.7

marcap

2,401

5.1

22.2

0.002

0.3

3.8

928.2

sector_id

2,401

5.6

2.6

1

3

7

11

sector_energy

2,401

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_materials

2,401

0.04

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_industrials

2,401

0.2

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_discr

2,401

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_cons_stapl

2,401

0.04

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_healthcare

2,401

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_finance

2,401

0.2

0.4

0

0

0

1

sector_IT

2,401

0.1

0.3

0

0

0

1

sector_communication

2,401

0.04

0.2

0

0

0

1

sector_unilities

2,401

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Ivaninskiy, I., Ivashkovskaya, I. & McCahery, J. Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?. J Manag Gov 27, 695–725 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09584-8

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