Abstract
In this article, we analyse the impact of business digitalisation on the principal-agent conflict. While there are several studies of impact of digitalization on corporate governance, the empirical evidence has so far been relatively scarce. We examine the principal-agent conflict from several angles: the number of shareholder-sponsored proposals submitted for the shareholder meetingsб the level of support for management-sponsored proposals and the frequency of proxy contests. As a proxy for the active digitalisation of a firm, we use the blockchain technology that has the potential to fundamentally change the distribution of power within an organisation, potentially mitigating the principal-agent conflict. We analyze a sample of 2813 NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX-traded firms for the year 2018, during which rapid blockchain adoption was exhibited. Our results suggest that firms active in business digitalisation overall have a lower level of principal-agent conflict. We find that such firms generally have shareholders that are more active, which indicates an environment less prone to the principal-agent conflict. While on average, proposals submitted by the management receive less support during voting, the share of approved proposals does not change for the digitising firms. Proxy contests appear relatively rare among the firms active in digitalisation, however, there is not yet enough data to confirm this.
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Notes
We make an assumption based on the expert interviews that for a firm to go public with a blockchain initiative, it takes approximately 1 year to develop it privately. Hence, for that the firms that are mentioned in the press in 2019, we assume that the year of beginning blockchain activity 2018.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Variables used in the research
Variable | Description |
---|---|
blockchain_weak | Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company has any public association with blockchain technology, such as a comment by the firm’s executive or a published report on the topic and 0 otherwise [Source: open sources, internet search] |
blockchain_stronSOg | Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company has a confirmed blockchain initiative, such as participation in a consortium or development of a in-house blockchain solution [Source: open sources, internet search] |
sh_prop | Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company received at least one shareholder-sponsored proposal for the annual meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
N_sh_prop | Number of shareholder-sponsored proposals received by a firm for the annual meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
level_of_support_total | Average % of votes in favor of all proposals for the meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
level_of_support_mgmt | Average % of votes in favor of all management-sponsored proposals for the meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
level_passed_total | % of passed proposals at the meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
level_passed_mgmt | % of passed management-sponsored proposals at the meeting [source: ISS voting database] |
size_lnmarcap | Natural logarithm of the company’s market capitalisation [Source: CapitalIQ] |
growth_revenue | Compound annual growth rate of revenues for 3 years prior to the meeting[Source: CapitalIQ] |
EBITDA_margin | Company’s EBITDA divided by the company’s revenues [Source: CapitalIQ |
market_book | Ratio of company’s market capitalisation to the company’s book value of equity [Source: CapitalIQ] |
leverage | Ratio of company’s total debt to the total book value of equity [Source: CapitalIQ] |
Institutions | Fraction of company’s shares owned by institutions [Source: CapitalIQ] |
Insiders | Fraction of company’s shares owned by company’s insiders [Source: CapitalIQ] |
Sector dummies | Set of variables identifying the main sector of operations for a firm (Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer discretionary, Consumer staples, Healthcare, Financials, IT, Communication services, Utilities, Real Estate) as reported in CapitalIQ database [Source: CapitalIQ] |
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics: Blockchain adopters vs non-adopters
Statistic | N | Mean | St. Dev | Min | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Descriptive statistics for blockchain adopters (Strong form of definition) | |||||||
sh_prop | 258 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
level_of_support_mgmt | 258 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
proxy_contest | 258 | 0.004 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
blockchain_weak | 258 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
level_of_support_total | 258 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
N_sh_prop | 258 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
level_passed_total | 258 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.9 | 1 | 1 |
level_passed_mgmt | 258 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
blockchain_strong | 258 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
size_lnmarcap | 258 | 8.9 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 7.5 | 10.7 | 13.6 |
growth_revenue | 258 | 0.1 | 0.3 | − 0.8 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 3.3 |
EBITDA_margin | 258 | 0.2 | 0.2 | − 0.6 | 0.04 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
market_book | 258 | 5.1 | 11.6 | − 30.8 | 1.4 | 5.5 | 111.1 |
leverage | 258 | 1.2 | 3.3 | − 12.1 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 33.3 |
Institutions | 258 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.000 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.2 |
Insiders | 258 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.003 | 0.1 | 0.6 |
ROA | 258 | 0.1 | 0.1 | − 0.4 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
marcap | 258 | 48.1 | 101.3 | 0.004 | 1.8 | 45.1 | 832.6 |
sector_id | 258 | 6.3 | 2.2 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 11 |
sector_energy | 258 | 0.03 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_materials | 258 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_industrials | 258 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_discr | 258 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_stapl | 258 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_healthcare | 258 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_finance | 258 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_IT | 258 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
sector_communication | 258 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_utilities | 258 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Descriptive statistics for blockchain adopters (Weak form of definition) | |||||||
sh_prop | 412 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
level_of_support_mgmt | 412 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
proxy_contest | 412 | 0.005 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
blockchain_weak | 412 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
level_of_support_total | 412 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
N_sh_prop | 412 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
level_passed_total | 412 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.9 | 1 | 1 |
level_passed_mgmt | 412 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
blockchain_strong | 412 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
size_lnmarcap | 412 | 8.7 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 7.5 | 10.2 | 13.6 |
growth_revenue | 412 | 0.1 | 0.2 | − 0.8 | 0.03 | 0.1 | 3.3 |
EBITDA_margin | 412 | 0.1 | 0.2 | − 0.9 | 0.02 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
market_book | 412 | 5.9 | 26.8 | − 30.8 | 1.4 | 4.9 | 508.5 |
leverage | 412 | 1.1 | 3.2 | − 12.1 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 33.8 |
Institutions | 412 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.000 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.2 |
Insiders | 412 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.004 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
ROA | 412 | 0.1 | 0.1 | − 0.4 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
marcap | 412 | 36.4 | 83.7 | 0.004 | 1.8 | 28.1 | 832.6 |
sector_id | 412 | 6.3 | 2.3 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 11 |
sector_energy | 412 | 0.03 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_materials | 412 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_industrials | 412 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_discr | 412 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_stapl | 412 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_healthcare | 412 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_finance | 412 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_IT | 412 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
sector_communication | 412 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_utilities | 412 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Descriptive statistics for blockchain non-adopters | |||||||
sh_prop | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
level_of_support_mgmt | 2,401 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
proxy_contest | 2,401 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
blockchain_weak | 2,401 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
level_of_support_total | 2,401 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
N_sh_prop | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
level_passed_total | 2,401 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
level_passed_mgmt | 2,401 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
blockchain_strong | 2,401 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
size_lnmarcap | 2,401 | 6.9 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 5.6 | 8.2 | 13.7 |
growth_revenue | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | − 3.1 | 0.02 | 0.2 | 5.7 |
EBITDA_margin | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.2 | − 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
market_book | 2,401 | 3.3 | 10.5 | − 92.4 | 1.2 | 3.5 | 286.6 |
leverage | 2,401 | 0.9 | 5.1 | − 45 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 124 |
Institutions | 2,401 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.4 |
Insiders | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.01 | 0.1 | 1.4 |
ROA | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.1 | − 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.7 |
marcap | 2,401 | 5.1 | 22.2 | 0.002 | 0.3 | 3.8 | 928.2 |
sector_id | 2,401 | 5.6 | 2.6 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 11 |
sector_energy | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_materials | 2,401 | 0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_industrials | 2,401 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_discr | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_cons_stapl | 2,401 | 0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_healthcare | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_finance | 2,401 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_IT | 2,401 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_communication | 2,401 | 0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
sector_unilities | 2,401 | 0.02 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
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Ivaninskiy, I., Ivashkovskaya, I. & McCahery, J. Does digitalization mitigate or intensify the principal-agent conflict in a firm?. J Manag Gov 27, 695–725 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09584-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09584-8
Keywords
- Corporate governance
- Blockchain
- Digital transformation
- Corporate voting
- Proxy contest
- Shareholder activism