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Making corporate governance count: the fusion of ethics and economic rationality

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Abstract

Corporate governance codes extensively appeal to ethical standards of conduct. Rather than being articulated alongside economic axioms, ethical and moral precepts are intertwined within neo-classical economic argumentation across corporate governance standards. This paper explores the fusion between ethics and modern economic rationality and reflects on the scientisation of economics and ethics in academic discourse. The argument is then made that the enlistment of ethics within the epistemologically privileged posture of economics characterises corporate governance codes. The UK Combined Corporate Governance Code of 2006 is analysed to draw out the paper’s contention.

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  1. London School of Economics, London, UK

    Alnoor Bhimani

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  1. Alnoor Bhimani
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Correspondence to Alnoor Bhimani.

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Bhimani, A. Making corporate governance count: the fusion of ethics and economic rationality. J Manage Gov 12, 135–147 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9056-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9056-7

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