Alchourrón, C.E., Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1985). On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2), 510–530.
Article
Google Scholar
Anderson A.R., & Nuel, B.D. (1975). Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Google Scholar
Batens, D. (2001). A general characterization of adaptive logics. Logique et Analyse, 44(173-175), 45–68.
Google Scholar
Belnap, N.D. (1977). A useful four-valued logic. In Modern uses of multiple-valued logic (pp. 5–37): Springer.
Belnap, N.D. (2019). How a computer should think, (pp. 35–53). New York: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31136-0∖_4.
Google Scholar
Childers, T., Majer, O., & Milne, P. (2019). The (relevant) logic of scientific discovery. arXiv:2101.03593 [math.LO].
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. The Philosophical Review, 116(2), 187–217. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-035.
Article
Google Scholar
da Costa, N. (1974). On the theory of inconsistent formal systems. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 15(4), 497–510.
Article
Google Scholar
da Costa, N., & Subrahmanian, V. (1989). Paraconsistent logic as a formalism for reasoning about inconsistent knowledge bases. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 1, 167–174.
Article
Google Scholar
Dunn, J.M. (1976). Intuitive semantics for first degree entailment and ‘coupled trees’. Philosophical Studies, 29(3), 149–168.
Article
Google Scholar
Dunn, J.M. (2010). Contradictory information: Too much of a good thing. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39(4), 425–452.
Article
Google Scholar
Dunn, J.M., & Kiefer, N.M. (2019). Contradictory information: Better than nothing? the paradox of the two firefighters. In Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency (pp. 231–247): Springer.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Noûs, 41(3), 478–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x.
Article
Google Scholar
Fagin, R., & Halpern, J.Y. (1991). Uncertainty, belief, and probability. Computational Intelligence, 7(3), 160–173.
Article
Google Scholar
Font, J.M. (1997). Belnap’s four-valued logic and de morgan lattices. Logic Journal of IGPL, 5(3), 1–29.
Article
Google Scholar
Halpern, J. (2017). Reasoning about uncertainty. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Book
Google Scholar
Jaskowski, S. (1948). Propositional calculus for contradictory deductive systems. Studia Logica, 24, 143–157.
Article
Google Scholar
Jøsang, A. (1997). Artificial reasoning with subjective logic. In Proceedings of the second Australian workshop on commonsense reasoning, (Vol. 48 p. 34): Citeseer.
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In Goldman, A I, & Whitcomb, D (Eds.) Social epistemology: essential readings (pp. 183–217): Oxford University Press.
Klein, D., & Marra, A. (2020). From oughts to goals: A logic for enkrasia. Studia Logica, 108(1), 85–128. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09854-5.
Article
Google Scholar
Klein, D., Majer, O., & Rafiee Rad, S. (2020). Non-classical probabilities for decision making in situations of uncertainty. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 4 (68), 315–343. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf20684-15.
Google Scholar
Kolmogorov, A.N. (2018). Foundations of the theory of probability. New York: Courier Dover Publications.
Google Scholar
Mares, E.D. (1997). Paraconsistent probability theory and paraconsistent bayesianism. Logique et analyse, 40(160), 375–384.
Google Scholar
Přenosil, A. (2018). Reasoning with inconsistent information PhD thesis, Charles University, Faculty of Philosophy.
Priest, G. (1979). Logic of paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 219–241.
Article
Google Scholar
Priest, G. (2002). Paraconsistent logic. In Gabbay, D.M., & Guenthner, F. (Eds.) Handbook of Philosophical Logic, (Vol. 6 pp. 287–393).
Priest, G. (2006). In contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Book
Google Scholar
Priest, G. (2007). Paraconsistency and dialetheism. In Gabbay, D., & Woods, J. (Eds.) Handbook of the History of Logic, (Vol. 8 pp. 129–204).
Rescher, N., & Manor, R. (1970). On inference from inconsistent premisses. Theory and Decision, 1(2), 179–217.
Article
Google Scholar
Rodrigues, A., Bueno-Soler, J., & Carnielli, W. (2020). Measuring evidence: a probabilistic approach to an extension of belnap–dunn logic. Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02571-w.
Shafer, G. (1976). A mathematical theory of evidence Vol. 42. Princeton : Princeton University Press.
Book
Google Scholar
Zhou, C. (2013). Belief functions on distributive lattices. Artificial Intelligence, 201, 1–31.
Article
Google Scholar