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Defending the Possibility of Knowledge

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Abstract

In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.

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Notes

  1. Kvanvig [9] also voices this opinion.

  2. Granted, a few assumptions on the epistemic modality are made, but nothing substantial about knowledge itself. Factivity and distributivity are hardly unique to knowledge.

  3. There are even supporters of verificationism that subscribe to this view. For example, though Tennant [15] and Dummett [5] reject the claim that Fitch’s paradox is a problem for intuitionistically minded verificationism, it is implied that it is a problem for the classical version verificationism that occurs in the paradox. The same remark applies to Beall [1], but replace intuitionistic by paraconsistent.

  4. One should also mention Lindström [10] and Rückert [12].

  5. Furthermore, we must require that ‘\(\psi \)’ be free for ‘p’ in ‘\(\phi \)’, meaning there is no ‘q’ occurring in ‘\(\psi \)’ such that ‘p’ occurs in the scope of a quantifier binding ‘q’ in ‘\(\phi \)’.

  6. This analogue of (Ver) is called the discovery principle by Burgess [3].

  7. The statement ‘\(SKN(q\wedge \neg Kq)\)could lead to (SVer) via another argument, but the point is that this can’t happen with the argument template above.

  8. The accessibility relations must satisfy: for all \(w\in W\), there exists \(v\in W\) such that \(R(w,v)\). This condition is always satisfied by reflexive accessibility relations.

  9. Another more sophisticated but natural application of the two-dimensional semantic framework is for the expression of semantic knowledge and contingent a priori truths (cf. [4, 7, 13]). Under the latter interpretation, the first coordinate is the world in which the meaning of the language is “determined”.

  10. To be perfectly precise, I should say the scope of the formula substituted for ‘p’ in ... rather than the scope of ‘p’ in ...

  11. If wikipedia is to be trusted, she is Neil Armstrong’s mother.

  12. This point is more frequently made with substitutions than quantifier instantiations. We get the same problem if we substitute ‘t’ for ‘s’ in ‘F(s)’ if ‘s’ is in the scope of a modality in ‘F’ and ‘s’ is non-rigid. For example, it is necessarily the case that 8 = 8, but not that the number of planets equals 8. I emphasize instantiation over substitution because that is what is going on at step 2 of the derivation.

  13. Kvanvig [9] defends himself against Williamson’s charge by invoking a neo-Russellian semantics of propositions, not with the present argument.

  14. By this I mean Tom at noon would be a different epistemic agent as Tom at midnight.

  15. The other Fitch conjunction proposals will also lead nowhere. In fact, they will be even easier to satisfy: all we will require is a non-actual agent.

  16. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out Brogaard and Salerno’s [2] paper to me, for it is highly relevant to the present analysis.

  17. c[k] is the equivalence class of k modulo the relation c

References

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Correspondence to Neil Kennedy.

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This paper was made possible by grant #149410 of the Fonds de recherche du Québec - Société et culture.

Appendix A: Proof of Main Result

Appendix A: Proof of Main Result

  1. (a)

    Suppose that the extension of p is \(\{w\}\), then \(w\Vdash p\). By (Ver), there exists v such that \(R(w,v)\) and \(v\Vdash Kp\). Since p is only true at w, \(v = w\). Moreover, \(w\Vdash Kp\) iff there exists \(a\in D(w)\) such that \(a[w]\subset \{w\}\). Since \(w\in a[w]\), by factivity, this means \(a[w] = \{w\}\). But then every proposition true at w will be known at w, contradicting (NO). The second part follows immediately.

  2. (b)

    Let \(W = \{w, x, y, z\}\). Define a as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of \(\{(w, x), (y, z)\}\) and b as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of \(\{(w, y), (x, z)\}\). Let \(D(w) = D(z) = \{a\}\) and \(D(x) = D(y) = \{b\}\). Let S be the total binary relation on W, and \(\Pi \) the set \(\{\{w, x\}, \{y, z\}, \{w, y\}, \{x, z\}\}\).

    \(\Pi \) is clearly closed under complementation, and we can easily verify that (Ver) and (NO) are true in each world (consider each possible case separately). For example, only the propositions \(\pi _1 = \{w, x\}\) and \(\pi _2 = \{w,y\}\) are true at w. \(\pi _{1}\) is known and \(\pi _{2}\) is unknown at w, but \(\pi _{2}\) is known at y, a world accessible from w. The other cases are verified in a similar fashion.

  3. (c)

    To show this part we apply (Ver) and (NO) alternatively. Let \(w_{0} \in W\) be any world. By (NO), there exists a proposition \(\pi _{0} \in \Pi \) that is unknown at \(w_{0}\), i.e. for every knower \(a\in D(w_{0})\), \(a[w_{0}]\not \subset \pi _{0}\). By (Ver), there exists \(w_{1}\), accessible from \(w_{0}\) via R, such that \(\pi _{0}\) is known at \(w_{1}\), i.e. there exists \(a_{1}\in D(w_{1})\) with \(a_{1}[w_{1}]\subset \pi _{0}\). Clearly, \(w_{1}\) is distinct from \(w_0\). By (NO), there exists \(\pi _{1} \in \Pi \) such that \(\pi _1\) is unknown at \(w_1\). The proposition \(\pi _{0} \cap \pi _{1}\) is also true and unknown at \(w_{1}\), so in particular \(\pi _{0} \cap \pi _{1}\) is distinct from \(\pi _{0}\). By (Ver), there therefore exists \(w_{2}\) such that \(\pi _{0} \cap \pi _{1}\) is known at \(w_{2}\). Since both \(\pi _{0}\) and \(\pi _{1}\) are known at \(w_{2}\), \(w_{2}\) is distinct from both \(w_{0}\) and \(w_{1}\). By (NO), there exists \(\pi _{2} \in \Pi \) such that is true but unknown at \(w_{2}\). And so on and so forth. We can therefore generate an infinite sequence of distinct worlds \(w_{n}\) and propositions \(\pi _{n}\) such that the propositions \(\pi _{0}, \pi _{1}, ..., \pi _{k-1}\) are known at \(w_{k}\) but not the proposition \(\pi _{k}\). It follows then that W and \(\Pi \) are infinite.

  4. (d)

    We define a model \(\mathcal {M} = \langle W, D, R, \Pi \rangle \) with the desired properties. Let \(W = \mathbb {Z}\times \mathbb {N}\). For each \(n\in \mathbb {N}\), let \(c_{n}\) be the relation of congruence modulo \(2^{n}\): \(c_{n}(x, y)\) iff \(x - y\) is divisible by \(2^{n}\). We define \(a_{n}\) as the binary relation on W such that: \(a_{n}(w,v)\) iff \(w_{2} = v_{2}\) and \(c_{n}(w_{1}, v_{1})\), where \(w = (w_{1},w_{2})\) and \(v = (v_{1}, v_{2})\). For \(w = (w_{1}, w_{2})\), let \(D(w) = \{a_{n} : n\leq w_{2}\}\). We let R be the total binary relation on W (other choices will do also). Finally, \(\Pi \) is defined as the set of \(\pi \subset W\) such that \(\pi = \pi _{0}\times \mathbb {N}\) and \(\pi _{0}\) is of the form:

    $$(*) \quad \pi_{0} = c_{n}[k_{1}] \cup c_{n}[k_{2}] \cup ... \cup c_{n}[k_{m}], $$

    where \(n>0\) and \(k_{1}, k_{2}, ..., k_{m}\) are such that \(0 \leq k_{1} < ... < k_{m} < 2^{n}\) (with m possibly zero, in which case \(\pi = \varnothing \)).Footnote 17In other words, \(\pi _0\) is a (possibly empty) union of equivalences classes.

\(\Pi \) is closed under complementation because the complement of a (possibly empty) union of equivalence classes is also a (possibly empty) union of equivalence classes (of the same relation). \(\Pi \) is also closed under intersection. To show this, first observe that if

$$\begin{array}{rll} \pi_{0} &=& c_{n}[k_{1}] \cup c_{n}[k_{2}] \cup \,\, ... \,\, \cup c_{n}[k_{m}] \\ \pi_{0}' &=& c_{n'}[l_{1}] \cup c_{n'}[l_{2}] \cup \,\, ... \,\, \cup c_{n'}[l_{m'}] \end{array} $$
(A1)

with \(0 \leq k_{1} < k_{2} \textrm { ... } k_{m} < 2^{n}\) and \(0 \leq l_{1} < l_{2} \textrm { ... } l_{m'} < 2^{n'}\) (\(m, m'\) possibly zero), then there exists a similar decomposition for \(\pi _0\) and \(\pi _0'\) with the equivalence classes of the relation \(c_{n''}\), for any \(n'' \geq \max (n', n)\). This follows from the fact that \(2^{n''}\) is a (common) multiple of \(2^{n}\) and \(2^{n'}\), and therefore every equivalence class of \(c_{n}\) or \(c_{n'}\) is the union of equivalence classes of \(c_{n''}\). If \(\pi _{0}\) is a disjoint union of equivalence classes of the relation \(c_{n''}\) and the same is true of \(\pi _{0'}\), then their intersection is a disjoint union of the classes they have in common. Hence, \(\Pi \) is Boolean.

Let us show now that \(\Pi \) is epistemically closed. We show this by induction on the number of connectives in \(\phi \). If there are none, the result is a consequence of the definition of an the interpretation function. For the induction step, we proceed by considering the main connective of \(\phi \). The Boolean cases follow by the induction hypothesis and the arguments of the preceding paragraph. We are left with the case where \(\phi \) is of the form \(K[w]\psi \), for some \(w = (w_{1},w_{2})\in W\). Suppose \(v = (v_{1},v_{2}) \in W\). By definition, we have that \(v\Vdash K[w]\psi \)

$$ \begin{array}{l} iff there exists a\in D(w) such that a[v]\subset \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \psi \right]\kern-0.15em\right]\\ iff a_{w_{2}}[v]\subset \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \psi \right]\kern-0.15em\right]\\ iff c_{w_{2}}[v_{1}]\times \{v_{2}\} \subset \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \psi \right]\kern-0.15em\right]\\ iff c_{w_{2}}[v_{1}] \subset c_{n}[k_{1}] \cup c_{n}[k_{2}] \cup \,\, ... \,\, \cup c_{n}[k_{m}] \end{array}$$

Since \(c_{w_{2}}\) is an equivalence relation, \(c_{w_{2}}[v_{1}] = c_{w_{2}}[m]\) for any \(m\in \mathbb {Z}\) such that \(c_{w_{2}}(v_{1},m)\), so that

$$\left[\kern-0.15em\left[ K[w]\psi \right]\kern-0.15em\right] = \left(\bigcup \{c_{w_{2}}[m] : m \in \mathbb{Z} \textrm{ such that } c_{w_{2}}[m] \subset \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \psi \right]\kern-0.15em\right] \}\right)\times\mathbb{N}.$$

The proposition defined by ‘\(K[w]\psi \)’ is therefore in \(\Pi \).

We must now show that (Ver) and (NO) are true everywhere in the model. Let us start by (Ver). Let \(\pi = \pi _{0}\times \mathbb {N}\) be a true proposition at \(w = (w_{1},w_{2})\). There exists a minimal n such that \(\pi _{0}\) admits a decomposition like (*) above. Since the equivalence classes of (*) are disjoint and \(\pi \) is true at w, there exists a unique class containing \(w_{1}\), the class \(c_{n}[w_{1}]\). Since the proposition \(\pi \) is a consequence of the proposition \(c_{n}[w_{1}]\times \mathbb {N}\), i.e. \(c_{n}[w_{1}] \times \mathbb {N} \subset \pi \), it suffices to know \(c_{n}[w_{1}]\times \mathbb {N}\) in order to know \(\pi \). By definition of the relations \(c_{m}\), it is clear that \(c_{m}[w_{1}]\subset c_{n}[w_{1}]\) whenever \(m \geq n\). Hence, for any \(m \geq n\), \(a_{m}[w_{1}]\subset \pi \) so that \(\pi \) is known at \((w_{1}, m)\).

To show (NO), for all \(w\in W\), we must show there is a proposition that is true but unknown at w. If \(w = (w_{1},w_{2})\), then \(a_{w_{2}}\) is the most knowledgeable knower at w. By definition of \(\Pi \), \(\pi = c_{w_{2}+1}[w_{1}]\times \mathbb {N}\) is a proposition and we have that \(c_{w_{2}}[w_{1}] \not \subset c_{w_{2}+1}[w_{1}]\), so that \(\pi \) is not known by \(a_{w_{2}}\). Since \(a_{w_{2}}\) is the most knowledgeable knower at w, this proves the result.

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Kennedy, N. Defending the Possibility of Knowledge. J Philos Logic 43, 579–601 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9282-6

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