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The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali the Consistency of the EU Africa policy

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Abstract

The EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis offers a good opportunity to assess the consistency of the EU’s Africa [Africa as used here refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—the region of the EU’s most extensive external policy] policy in the post-Lisbon era. Against the background of the EU’s external policy objectives with special reference to SSA, this Article will particularly offer a comprehensive overview of the legal and policy dynamics of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This will be discussed especially with reference to how they relate to (in)consistency in implementation as illustrated in the EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis. Although the EU initially made a decision to deploy an EU Training Mission to Mali, the EU did not activate the peacekeeping dimension of the CSDP as required at an advanced stage of the crisis. Instead, this gap was filled by France’s unilateral military intervention in Mali. The EU’s inertia in this regard raises the question of the consistency of its external policy instruments and policy objectives towards the region. Without excluding other possible contributing factors, the analysis submits that the ‘partial’ activation of the CSDP in Mali is mainly attributable to the constitutional specificity of the CSDP especially its lack of permanent and planning conduct structures. In any event, it is argued that these do not render the EU’s role in Mali less inconsistent both in the light of the relevant EU external policy instruments and objectives towards SSA in general, and in the light of the CSDP objectives in particular. In general, the Article uses Mali as a case study to illustrate the extent and therefore the limits of the consistency of the EU’s CSDP and its overall policy towards SSA especially post-Lisbon. Whilst acknowledging the current limits of the law in this context, the Article nevertheless argues that the dire implications of inconsistency for the effectiveness of the EU’s policies and for the credibility of the Union make a search for practical, if not legal solutions, a political imperative. This is necessary especially if the EU wants to protect or indeed rebuild its credibility as an international actor in general, and as an effective partner for crisis management in SSA, in particular [The EU’s credibility in much of the African Caribbean and Pacific states, especially SSA is reportedly already at an all-time low (Mackie J et al. in Policy Manag Insights ECDPM 2, 2010)].

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Notes

  1. See Council of the European Union (2012), para 5, 6th indent [author’s emphasis].

  2. Resolution 2071.

  3. Ibid, para 9; Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a terrorist network operating in the northern part of Mali which got mixed up with the separatist cause in the country (see Sect. 3 below).

  4. European Union External Action, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), EUTM, Mali/1, January 13; Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) [2013] O.J.L14/19.

  5. Security Council Press Statement on Mali, SC/10878 AFR/2502.

  6. See Sect. 2 below.

  7. These have been discussed in great detail elsewhere (see for example Koutrakos 2011; Hillion 2008; De Baere 2008).

  8. Or ‘internal market’ as it later became known by virtue of the Single European Act ([1987] O.J. L/169.

  9. Opinion 1/75 Re the O.E.C.D. Understanding on a Local Cost Standard [1975] E.C.R. 1355, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 85, at 1363–1364.

  10. However, while there was a specific legal basis for the trade policy as an aspect of the CCP, there was no such direct provision on development aid policy (the latter was only accorded a Treaty provision at Maastricht in 1992).

  11. p. 1254.

  12. Also see fn 12 above in relation to development cooperation policy.

  13. While there were other aspects of the EU’s external policy, the wide scope of these three core policy areas means that the other external policies could mainly be categorised as aspects of these three core policies.For example, the EU’s fisheries policy and energy policy are in practice aspects of trade policy and could rightly be categorised as commercial or economic policies. In the same vein, while the EU’s humanitarian aid policy has only been accorded a Treaty basis at Lisbon (Article 214 TFEU), humanitarian aid was for a long time categorised as an aspect of the EU’s development policy and also implemented as such. By and large, the law and policies of the EU’s external relations evolve from practice. Even the post-Lisbon CSDP is only a renamed pre-Lisbon European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with a Treaty basis.

  14. Ibid.

  15. Koutrakos (2007), p 250.

  16. Ibid.

  17. Article 21(3) TEU ‘The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.’

  18. And some other policies arguably derived from these three (see pp 4–5 above).

  19. Indeed, it remains arguable that the CFSP envelopes the EU’s external action in general. However, this line of argument is outside the limited scope of this analysis.

  20. See Sect. 3 below.

  21. Articles 42 and 43 TEU.

  22. See Sect. 3 below.

  23. A Secure Europe in a Better World: EU Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003; Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the European Union—The European Consensus [2006] OJ C 46/24; Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (ECOWAS/SALW) [2005] OJ C115/10.

  24. Ibid; for a comprehensive overview of the scope of the EU’s development policy towards SSA as enshrined in The Cotonou Agreement: Partnership Agreement between the Members of the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States of the other part (2000) O.J.L317/3, see the Compendium on Co-operation Strategies, Partnership Agreement between the Members of the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States (signed at Cotonou, June 2000). As is evident, the Cotonou Agreement of course applies not only to SSA but also the EU’s partners in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In contrast, the EU has different policy instruments for North Africa (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) and South Africa (Trade and Development Cooperation Instrument). The Cotonou Agreement has been revised twice (First Revision (2005) O.J. L287/1; Second Revision March 11, 2010).

  25. Arguably, this is also one of the reasons the EU’s external action towards the region is the best test case for the study of the consistency of the EU’s external policies (see Sect. 5 below for other reasons in this regard).

  26. Article 21(3) TEU.

  27. The VP refers to Vice President, the position she also holds in the Commission.

  28. See Sect. 3 below.

  29. The possibility of spill-over effects when it comes to crisis in the region is well known (see for example EUTM Mali, fn 6 above).

  30. Nkundabagenzi cited in Kronenberger and Wouters (2004), p xx.

  31. See fn 26 above.

  32. Prior to the Cotonou Agreement, there had been the two Yaoundé Conventions (see Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community, signed at Yaoundé on 20 July 1963, [1964] O.J.L93/1430 (Yaoundé I); and Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with that Community, signed on 29 July 1969, [1970] O.J.L282, Yaoundé II); and also the four Lomé Conventions (See Lomé I Convention [1976] O.J.L25/1; Lomé II Convention [1980] O.J.L347/1; Lomé III Convention [1986] O.J.L86/3; Lomé IV Convention [1989] O.J.L229/1 (amended [1998] O.J.L156/3).

  33. The Cotonou Agreement (see fn 26 above) covers a wide range of objectives embracing the different objectives listed in Article 21(2) TEU.

  34. In practice, the term ‘crisis management’ covers the different stages of the conflict cycle (see Blockmans 2008, pp 8–11).

  35. See Sect. 3 below.

  36. See Martenczuk (2004) p 197 where he indicates that this Article could give rise to the CSDP.

  37. [2005] O. J. L 97/57.

  38. Ibid. Article 3 TEU [author’s emphasis].

  39. See Sect. 3 below.

  40. Council of the European Union, Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa, Doc. 10538/4/04 REV 4, Brussels, 16 November 2004, p 2, [author’s emphasis].

  41. See for example, Abass, A, ‘Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and Operation ARTEMIS’ in Trybus and White, fn 17 above, p 154; and Article 1(3) Common Position 2005/304/CFSP (fn 39 above).

  42. This was the same year as the Cotonou Agreement.

  43. The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05.

  44. See fn 26 above.

  45. Trade is in principle an integral part of the EU’s development cooperation policy towards SSA (see the successive development cooperation agreements between the EU and SSA in fn 26 and 34 above).

  46. See the Cotonou Agreement and the JAES.

  47. In contrast to trade policy for which the EU has exclusive competence, the EU’s development cooperation policy does not prevent the Member States from implementing their national development policies (Article 4(4)TFEU) or their national security policies (Article 2(4) TFEU). For more on the EU’s competence and the division of competence between the EU and its Member States see Articles 4-5 TEU and Articles 2–6 TFEU; and also for example, O’Keffee (2000, p 179).

  48. See Sect. 3 below; also see Koutrakos (2013), p, 1 where he discusses this with reference to a cartoon in the French daily Le Monde.

  49. European External Action Service, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed 14 August 2013).

  50. Article 43 TEU.

  51. See Sect. 4 below.

  52. It is arguable that the JAES implement the Cotonou Agreement and the other EU agreements with SSA. However, a detailed argument in this regard is outside the scope of this analysis.

  53. See Blockmans, fn 36 above.

  54. See the CSDP Action Plan for Africa, fn 42 above. Essentially, while the direct intervention aspect of the CSDP (as provided in Article 42–43 TEU) is more generally known, it is also the case that the CSDP has non-direct aspects. Illustrative are the stipulations of the CSDP Plan of Action concerning capacity building and other non-direct interventionist support under the JAES such as financial support.

  55. Articles 42 and 43 TEU.

  56. Ibid.

  57. Article 43(1) TEU.

  58. In practice, only the military intervention dimension (excluding the military training aspect) of the CSDP is referred to as an ‘operation’. The military training dimension and the civilian and mixed-civilian dimensions are often referred to as missions.

  59. Of the thirty four CSDP missions that have so far been carried out by the EU, fifteen were in Sub-Saharan Africa (see CSDP Map available at http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart, accessed 10 August, 2013).

  60. Report to the Council, 14088/00, Brussels, 30 November 2000 at 5.

  61. As is hopefully clear by now, it is not that the EU did not act at all in Mali, but that it did not deploy a peacekeeping force when it was required on the back of the decision to deploy a EUTM (also see Section 3 below).

  62. See Koutrakos, fn 50 above.

  63. See in general, Miller and Bock (2004) 2 JEA 4.

  64. See Arbour (2012).

  65. For some of the reasons for the EU’s inaction, say for example, in Darfur, see Arbour, fn 66 above. In Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone where France and Britain respectively conducted unilateral operations instead of the EU just as happened in the Mali case, no clear reasons were given for the EU’s inaction.

  66. Even a decision to do nothing is an action as is the decision to activate one instrument of the CSDP rather than more.

  67. See Tsagourias (2007, p 132): ‘Member States have different military traditions, dogmas, and capabilities’; indeed, while France and the United Kingdom represent the push for ‘security and defence’ within the EU framework (Europeanists), and the push for ‘defence matters to be left under the NATO (Atlanticists) respectively, the other Member States were not necessarily neutral in the question of developing a security and defence policy within the EU framework. For example, the neutral or non-aligned Member States namely Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland etc. were not easily given to the idea of defence alliance (which the EU is not, at least not yet); invariably, the sovereignty argument strengthens whatever other arguments there may be.

  68. These were areas of deep divisions between Member States in terms of their approaches to security (Menon (2009) 85 IA 2, p 227); there has also been a reference to the ‘peacekeepers’ and the ‘war fighters’ (see Grevi, G, et al, ‘Introduction’ in Grevi et al. (1999–2009)’, Paris, ISS 2009, p 13. Indeed, an EU Member State namely Denmark expressly opted out of matters with defence implications by virtue of a declaration attached to the Treaties (See Article 5 of Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the TEU and the TFEU).

  69. Piris 2010), p 266; also see Tsagourias, fn 69 above, p 132: ‘[…] France and the UK have a long history of military activism’.

  70. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3–4 December 1998.

  71. Helsinki Headline Goal (available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf, accessed 10 August 2–13).

  72. Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Annex 1 to Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions (cited in Trybus 2005, p 97 at fn 23); also see Wessel (1999, p 276).

  73. See Blockmans, S, and Wessel, R, ‘The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty make the EU more effective?’ CLEER Working Papers 2009/1, p 44; and also Wessel, fn 74 above, p 274.

  74. This has remained the case following the inability to realise a subsequent Headline Goal 2010 (in contrast to the Helsinki Headline Goal which was about military dimension of crisis managment, this Headline Goal 2010 covers both military and civilian aspects of crisis management).

  75. Articles 42(5) and 44 TEU; although there is also a post-Lisbon mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by virtue of Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU, it is legally and structurally exclusive and clearly different from these other mechanisms (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU).

  76. The concept of Framework Nation was adopted in 22 July 2002 ‘as the conceptual basis for conducting autonomous operations with recourse to a Framework Nation, the assumption being that the designated member should be in a position to pay for and prepare for the deployment of an ESDP operation’ (Duke 2001, p 404).

  77. European Union Operations Chains of Command, Information Report, Doc A/2009, available at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2009.php, accessed 20 December 2011.

  78. The respective headquarters are OHQ—Potsdam, OHQ—Mont-Valerien (Paris), OHQ—Centocelle (Rome), OHQ—Larissa, OHQ—Northwood (London) (see Information Report, Doc A/2009, fn 79 above).

  79. Bjorkdahl and Stromvik (2008, p 2).

  80. Duke (2008).

  81. Ibid.; It is not clear whether this is also the case for EUFOR Chad where France was also a Framework Nation.

  82. See for example, Darfur, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire mentioned above.

  83. GAERC, Brussels, 22 March, 2004, ‘The Battlegroups Concepts, UK/France/Germany Food for Thought Paper, 10 February, 2004, in ‘EU Security and Defence: Core Documents’, vol V Chaillot paper 2005 No 75.

  84. Trybus, fn 74 above, p 153.

  85. The Battle Groups are not excluded from using the OHQs provided by the Framework Nations (see Lindstrom et al. 2007, No 77, p 14).

  86. Indeed, it is arguable that the intervention in Mali was a credit to France.

  87. The EU Council have a specific EU Military Committee (EUMC) which provides expert military advice and recommendations to the EU. The EUMC can advise against an operation (Davis 2010, p 16).

  88. Article 44 TEU; where this is the case, those Member States in association with the HR/VP shall agree among themselves on the management of the task pursuant to Article 44(2) TEU.

  89. Davis Cross, fn 87 above, p 16); this view has also been expressed by Biscop et al. (2012).

  90. See fn 77 above.

  91. Protocol (No.10).

  92. Article 46(6) TEU.

  93. See the Framework nation and the battle group concepts above.

  94. See Wessel, fn 74 above.

  95. Ibid, p 287; the obligation to consult is found in Article 32TEU (ex Article 16TEU).

  96. Article 28(1) TEU; in principle, the decision defining actions to be undertaken by the Union is a decision to conduct a joint action where the international situation requires operational action by the Union. This decision ‘shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’.

  97. Article 24(3) TEU (ex Article 11(2) TEU).

  98. For a list of CSDP operations and missions in SSA, see CSDP Map fn 61 above.

  99. MNLA is the French acronym with which the movement is widely known.

  100. ‘MNLA re-awakens Tuareg separatism in Mali’, JTIC Brief, Jane's Information Group.

  101. BBC New Africa, 20 January 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16643507, accessed 10 February, 2013.

  102. Dioura and Diarra 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/31/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE82U0DG20120331, accessed 10 February, 2013.

  103. They had accused the government of giving them inadequate resources to fight the rebels (Ibid).

  104. ECOWAS Press release, No: 074/2012, Abuja, 22 March 2012.

  105. AU Peace and Security Council, 316th Meeting, Communique, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 April, 2012, para 4.

  106. European Union, ‘Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Coup d’etat in Mali’, A 142/12, Brussels, 22 March, 2012.

  107. Security Council Press Statement on Mali conflict, SC/10590 AFR 2359.

  108. See Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2071 (2012), adopted by the Security Council at its 6846th meeting, on 12 October 2012.

  109. Ibid, para 7.

  110. See p 2 above.

  111. EUTM, Mali/1, fn 6 above, p 1.

  112. Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) [2012] OJ L187/48.

  113. See EUTM, Mali/1, fn 6 above.

  114. Biscop, fn 92 above, p 1.

  115. ESS (Conclusion), p 14.

  116. ESS, p 11.

  117. ESS., p 1.

  118. Statement by the President of the Republic, Situation in Mali, 11 January 2013.

  119. Dr. Nicolas Westcott, Africa Managing Director, EEAS, in a speech delivered to the EUISS conference on EU-Africa foreign policy after Lisbon, 18 October 2011.

  120. See ‘Do you support France’s Military Intervention in Mali, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/poll/2013/jan/11/support-france-military-intervention-mali-poll?intcmp=239, accessed on 14 February 2013.

  121. Security Strategy for the Sahel, p 6.

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    Gloria Okemuo

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Okemuo, G. The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali the Consistency of the EU Africa policy. Liverpool Law Rev 34, 217–240 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-013-9139-7

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