In his recent critical discussion, Miguel Hoeltje raises a number of important issues. I begin this brief reply with some concessions (Sect. 1) before discussing two key issues: the motivation for introducing ways of being normal (Sect. 2) and the theory that underlies them (Sect. 3)
Abstract
Hoeltje (Linguist Philos 40(2):101–118, 2017) raises a number of important issues about my theory of generics. In this brief reply, I address some of these challenges.
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References
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I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments.
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Nickel, B. Ways of normality: reply to Hoeltje. Linguist and Philos 41, 289–293 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9230-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-018-9230-6