Abstract
We tested whether an opposing expert is an effective method of educating jurors about scientific validity by manipulating the methodological quality of defense expert testimony and the type of opposing prosecution expert testimony (none, standard, addresses the other expert’s methodology) within the context of a written trial transcript. The presence of opposing expert testimony caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to flaws in the other expert’s testimony. Jurors rendered more guilty verdicts when they heard opposing expert testimony than when opposing expert testimony was absent, regardless of whether the opposing testimony addressed the methodology of the original expert or the validity of the original expert’s testimony. Thus, contrary to the assumptions in the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, opposing expert testimony may not be an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Despite the general tendency of expert testimony to influence juror judgments, some studies find that the effects of expert testimony may occur only under certain circumstances (Devenport and Cutler 2004; Leippe et al. 2004), such as when the expert testimony appeared after the evidence (Leippe et al. 2004), whereas other studies find effects for expert testimony only when it appears before the remaining evidence (Brekke and Borgida 1988; Schuller and Cripps 1998).
We also manipulated the credibility of the defense expert, but despite successful pilot testing with a student sample, the manipulation failed in the data collected from community members. The credibility manipulation did not interact with our other independent variables to affect our dependent measures so we removed the credibility manipulation from the analyses.
Collecting data using the internet versus traditional survey methods generally results in a lower response rate; however, several studies have demonstrated that results from internet research yield very similar results to laboratory-based research (Birnbaum 2004; Krantz and Dahal 2000). In this study, participants were sent e-mail invitations and reminders to participate in the study. In one study investigating such methods, over one-third of non-respondents did not respond to the invitation because they did not read their e-mail during the data collection period (Welker 2001, reported in Birnbaum 2004).
References
Barlow v. State, (1998). 270 Ga 54.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Human research and data collection via the internet. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 803–832.
Brekke, N., & Borgida, E. (1988). Expert psychological testimony in rape trials: A social-cognitive analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 372–386.
Bruck, M., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). Amicus brief for the case of State of New Jersey v. Michaels presented by committee of concerned social scientists. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1(2), 272–322.
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.
Cecil, J. S., & Willging, T. E. (1993). Court appointed experts: Defining the role of experts appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center.
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 212–251). New York: Guilford Press.
Cooper, J., Bennett, E. A., & Sukel, H. L. (1996). Complex scientific testimony: How do jurors make decisions? Law and Human Behavior, 20(4), 379–394.
Cooper, J., & Neuhaus I. (2000). The hired gun effect: Use of pay, credentials, and frequency of testifying as peripheral decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 24, 149–171.
Cutler, B. L., & Penrod, S. D. (1995). Mistaken identification: The eyewitness, psychology, and the law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cutler, B. L., Dexter, H. R., & Penrod, S. D. (1990a). Nonadversarial methods for sensitizing jurors to eyewitness evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 20, 1197–1207.
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1990b). Juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 14(2), 185–191.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). 113 S. Ct. 2786.
Devenport, J. L., & Cutler, B. L. (2004). Impact of defense-only and opposing eyewitness experts on juror judgments. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 569–576.
DeWitt, J. S., Richardson, J. T., & Warner, L. G. (1997). Novel scientific evidence and controversial cases: A social psychological examination. Law and Psychology Review, 21, 1–23.
Frye v. United States, (1923). 54 App.D. C. 46, 293 F.1013.
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, (1997). 522 U. S. 136.
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295–314.
Greene, E., Downey, C., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (1999). Juror decisions about damages in employment discrimination cases. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17(1), 107–121.
Griffith, J. D., Libkuman, T. M., & Poole, D. A. (1998). Repressed memories: The effects of expert testimony on mock jurors’ decision making. American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 16(1), 5–23.
Groscup, J., & Penrod, S. D. (2002). Jury instructions effects on juror assessments of scientific reliability. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Hooper, L. L., Cecil, J. S., & Willging, T. E. (2001). Assessing causation in breast implant litigation: The role of science panels. Law and Contemporary Problems, 64, 139–189.
Jasanoff, S. (1993). What judges should know about the sociology of science. Judicature, 77(2), 77–82.
Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the bar: Law, science, and technology in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430–454.
Kovera, M. B., Levy, R. J., Borgida, E., & Penrod, S. D. (1994). Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: Effects of expert evidence type and cross examination. Law and Human Behavior, 18, 653–674.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (2000). The effects of peer review and evidence quality on judge evaluations of psychological science: Are judges effective gatekeepers? Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(4), 574–586.
Kovera, M. B., McAuliff, B. D., & Hebert, K. S. (1999). Reasoning about scientific evidence: Effects of juror gender and evidence quality on juror decisions in a hostile work environment case. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(3), 362–375.
Krantz, J. H., & Dalal, R. (2000). Validity of web-based psychological research. In M. H. Birnbaum (Ed.), Psychological experiments on the internet (pp. 35–60). San Diego: Academic.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, (1999). 526 U.S. 137.
Leichtman, M. D., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). The effects of stereotypes and suggestions on preschoolers’ reports. Developmental Psychology, 31, 568–578.
Leippe, M. R. (1995). The case for expert testimony about eyewitness memory. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 1, 909–959.
Leippe, M. R., Eisenstadt, D., Rauch, S. M., & Seib, H. M. (2004). Timing of eyewitness expert testimony, jurors’ need for cognition, and case strength as determinants of trial verdict. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 524–541.
Lehman, D. R., Lempert, R. O., & Nisbett, R. E. (1988). The effects of graduate training on reasoning: Formal discipline and thinking about everyday-life events. American Psychologist, 43(6), 431–442.
Lyon, T. D. (1999). The new wave in children’s suggestibility research: A critique. Cornell Law Review, 84, 1004–1087.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (in press-a). Estimating the effects of misleading information on witness accuracy: Can experts tell jurors something they don’t already know? Applied Cognitive Psychology.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (in press-b). Juror sensitivity to methodological flaws in psychological science. Journal of Applied Social Psychology.
McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Viswesvaran, C. (1998). Methodological issues in child suggestibility research. In B. L. Bottoms & J. A. Quas (Co-Chairs), Situational and individual sources of variability in children’s suggestibility and false memories. Symposium presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo Beach, CA.
McAuliff, B. D., Nicholson, E., & Ravanshenas, D. (2007). Hypothetically speaking, can expert testimony improve jurors’ understanding of developmental differences in suggestibility? In B. D. McAuliff & D. Ravanshenas (Co-Chairs), Giving away developmental psychology in court: Can expert testimony on suggestibility and child abuse improve jurors’ decisions? Symposium presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Boston, MA.
McAuliff, B. D., Samis, A. Vargas, J., & Gonzalez, K. (2006). May we suggest a hypothetical? Expert testimony in witness suggestibility cases. In L. Levett (Chair), Juror decision making about expert evidence. Symposium presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Nisbett, R. E. (1993). Rules for reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Pavel v. Hollins, (2001). 261 F. 3d 210.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 19, pp. 123–203). New York: Academic Press.
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1998) Attitude change: Multiple roles for persuasion variables. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of social psychology (pp. 323–390). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Raitz, A., Greene, E., Goodman, J., & Loftus, E. F. (1990). Determining damages: The influence of expert testimony on jurors’ decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 14(4), 385–395.
Schuller, R. A., & Cripps, J. (1998). Expert evidence pertaining to battered women: The impact of gender of expert and timing of testimony. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 17–31.
State of Ohio v. Gersin, (1996). 76 Ohio St.3d 491.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 105–110.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Welker, M. (2001). Email surveys: Non-response figures reflected. In U. D. Reips, & M. Bosnjak (Eds.), Dimensions of internet science (pp. 231–238). Lengerich, Germany: Pabst Science Publishers.
Wingate, P. H., & Thornton, G. C. III (2004). Industrial/organizational psychology and the federal judiciary: Expert witness testimony and the Daubert standards. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 97–114.
Acknowledgments
This research was conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the first author’s master’s degree at Florida International University, under the supervision of the second author, and was supported in part by a grant-in-aid from the American Psychology-Law Society. Portions of this research were presented at the 2004 joint meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society and the European Association of Psychology and Law, Edinburgh, Scotland. We are grateful for the helpful suggestions of committee members Aya Gruber and Janat Parker.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
About this article
Cite this article
Levett, L.M., Kovera, M.B. The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors about Unreliable Expert Evidence. Law Hum Behav 32, 363–374 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9113-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9113-9