1 Introduction

This paper examines processes and actors involved in tenant selection processes in the low-income segment of the rental housing market in the Bronx, New York City, for West African migrants in particular, and reviews the gatekeeping function these actors perform. In particular, it reveals the ways in which West African migrants in the Bronx navigate both formal and informal systems of housing allocation, highlighting that both formal and informal approaches to securing housing entail meeting a number of expectations and requirements. Economic, social, legal and spatial barriers make international migration a time-consuming and costly endeavour, requiring access to resources (Cranston et al., 2018). These resources include financial assets as well as information to aid in accessing employment, legal documents, social security, and housing. While affluent migrant groups typically resort to institutionalised migration industries, i.e. public and private services, to get visas, accommodation, jobs, etc. (Koh & Wissink, 2018; Demireva & Quassoli, 2019), low-income migrants have fewer opportunities to access these services and frequently have to rely on co-ethnic communities in the destination country. When it comes to housing, especially in housing markets with low affordability, migrants largely depend on the support of housing providers and intermediaries (religious, advocacy and public authority groups). It is these housing providers and intermediaries which form the focus of this study, and which provide an insight into the systems which migrants to the Bronx must navigate in order to secure housing.

West African migrants compose a large ethnic community in the borough of the Bronx, and in a long-standing history of West African migration to the US, and New York City in particular, ethnic networks and associated services form a support network for new migrant flows. Being the poorest borough in the city with a median income of $25,000, 35% lower than the citywide median, the largely rent-regulated housing stock in the Bronx has a high number of recipients of public assistance (HVS, 2013). Housing providers in the formal system perform extensive screening of potential tenants to ensure that they comply with affordable housing tenant selection processes and are able to keep up with rent payments. Low-income migrants typically find the formal application process, including documentation checks, challenging (Usman et al., 2021). These circumstances give rise to informal practices, as intermediaries get involved and fill this void. Involvement and gatekeeping functions of a broad range of housing actors differ and they may foster access to resources within and outside legal frameworks. This paper will demonstrate how these actors embody outsourcing of public functions in management and control of access to housing among West African migrants.

Migration industries have gained attention in the academic literature in recent years (Cranston et al., 2018; Koh & Wissink, 2018; van der Broek et al., 2016), including a handful of studies exploring the role of gatekeepers and intermediaries helping with documents, legal and tax advice, remittances, crossing borders (Ambrosini, 2017, 2018; Hernández-Leon, 2020; Salt & Stein, 1997) and migrant employment (Groutsis et al., 2015; Lindquist et al., 2012; Findlay et al., 2013), but few have considered access to housing markets. The paper addresses this gap in the academic literature. By focusing on key actors and processes in the Bronx housing market, it discerns how different actors shape access to rental housing and examines their roles in the process of housing allocation.

Specifically, the paper seeks to examine how different actors – both within formal systems of housing allocation, and within informal networks encountered and drawn upon by West African migrants in the Bronx – shape access to housing, and mould experiences of navigating the processes entailed in gaining this access to housing. The paper asks what conditions migrants are compelled to meet in the process of housing allocation, and what gatekeeping roles might be played by various different actors along the way. Crucially, the paper discusses the processes and mechanisms that housing providers and intermediaries use in facilitating housing access and, subsequently, argues that the emerging informal industry mirrors the processes of a formal system.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explores literature on migration industries, and highlights how various intermediaries shape access to housing, either through formal or informal channels. Following this review of literature, the methodology is explained, and material is presented to contextualise the case study of the Bronx. The findings section then explores the involvement of providers and intermediaries in migrant housing provision and demonstrates that the main gatekeepers to housing are providers but there is a secondary part played by intermediaries. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

2 Migration industries, intermediaries, and formal and informal routes to housing acquisition

As Hanhörster et al. (2023) highlight, the neighbourhoods into which migrants arrive in their destination countries have a key role to play in people’s experiences of migration. Hanhörster et al. (2023) show that as well as broader trends in the housing market and in migration, governance has a key role to play in shaping ‘arrival neighbourhoods’, in which migrants live when they first arrive in their destination country. Specifically, a range of actors, including housing providers, private housing companies, and local government, shape the conditions of people’s arrival at their destinations (ibid.). Importantly, while access to housing has been shown to be crucial here (ibid.), it is also clear that housing affordability can present a considerable challenge.

Indeed, in a discussion of Polish migrants’ experiences in Dublin, Smith (2015) shows that housing affordability represents a barrier to accessing ‘decent and safe housing’ (p.136). Further, the lack of affordability in the destination city is shown to be associated with overcrowding, and other unsatisfactory conditions (ibid.). Smith shows that the exchange of information between new migrants and their social networks within the destination city is often vital to their attainment of housing, yet at the same time warns that this circulation of information may make migrant networks more vulnerable to ending up in poor quality or poorly managed housing on the basis of referrals from within their networks (ibid.).

Various empirical studies have demonstrated the limited access of migrants to housing markets in different countries (e.g. Aigner, 2019; Wessendorf, 2018). Housing shortages as well as blocking strategies of housing providers may lead to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups, particularly of migrant origins. Ethnic migrant communities are known to create mechanisms and institutions within which to provide services to co-ethnic residents, and to promote and support further migration of the co-ethnic members, as asserted by research on the arrival and insertion of immigrants in destination societies (Massey et al., 1998; Ambrosini, 2017; Poros, 2001). Devlin (2018) distinguishes between urban informality according to need, and urban informality according to desire, in order to draw a distinction between those elements of informality which are essential to people living in poverty for securing basic necessities, and those which are often associated with the middle classes and which are orientated towards ‘convenience, efficiency, or creative expression’ (p.570). In the context of housing markets in destination cities which are evidently difficult for low-income migrants to afford, the informal routes to securing housing which many migrants take can be reasonably understood to represent what Devlin refers to as ‘informality of need’.

In further seeking to establish how migrants secure housing in destination cities, whether by formal or informal routes, it is useful to consider the function of various actors encountered along such routes. In a study of refugees’ access to housing in Vienna, Aigner (2019) shows that a number of different intermediaries play a role in this process, both through formal channels – such as in the social housing system – and through informal channels – such as other more established migrants subletting to new arrivals on a short term basis. Likewise, Bonnet et al. (2020) indicate through an interrogation of access to housing among low-income groups in Mogadishu that informal networks are an important resource for people unable to access formal routes of securing housing finance, and that both formal systems and personal relationships play a role in shaping people’s access to housing.

The migration industries literature offers a further useful inlet into this line of inquiry: Studies of migration industries represent a relatively new direction of research (Cranston et al., 2018) which has emerged from the literature on migration infrastructures (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). Migration industries scholars largely investigate actors and actions that are involved in shaping mobility patterns and mobile identities (Cranston, 2016): this includes business and commercial services facilitating migration and settlement – such as travel, legal services, and financial services – but might also refer to non-profit social networks, religious organisations and local community organisations. It might include smugglers, co-ethnic brokers, employers, NGOs, ordinary citizens and civil servants (Ambrosini, 2017). These industries shape the journey of a migrant before they move, support their travel and help them access resources on their arrival (Alpes, 2012; Cranston, 2016). For a variety of actors, their motives could be of a commercial nature, as well as driven by solidarity and altruism (van der Broek et al., 2016). Following the Lindquist et al. (2012) study of migration brokers and networks, we broadly define migration intermediaries here as agents that intervene at various critical junctures to connect migrants to services (and information) in the destination city.

In terms of the assistance provided to migrants, the literature distinguishes between immediate direct procurement of resources (through resource providers: employers, landlords, etc.) and provision of ‘second order’ resources (by gatekeepers such as intermediaries). As such, ‘second order’ resources entail access to strategic actors that control required resources (Boissevain, 1974). Migration industries incorporate not only official actors such as state agencies and professional brokers, but also informal actors that develop out of migration networks (Koh & Wissink, 2018). Various studies have explored how ethnic networks enable access to social capital (Granovetter, 1985; Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990), especially in settings of spatial proximity between members of a social network. For example, this occurs in ethnic immigrant enclaves: a study by Klaesson et al. (2018) showed that vicinity to an immigrant group with higher employment rates facilitated labour market integration of new immigrants. In these circumstances, resource providers and intermediaries are better connected to migrants and can facilitate access to resources in ethnic migrant communities.

As migration ‘brokers’ provide support on commercial or altruistic grounds, they address different types of migrants. Privileged and lifestyle mobilities typically contend to the former, and professional intermediaries ‘enable, structure and create transnational migration lifestyles’ (Koh & Wissink, 2018, p.593) of this migrant category. Low-income migrants, as far as possible, resort to ‘non-commercial’ intermediaries to gain access to resources. Typical services include labour recruitment and brokerage, transport and travel, banking, language and translations, and housing (e.g. Hernández-Leon, 2013; Salt & Stein, 1997). Moreover, migration industries might include legal and illegal services that facilitate the process of migration (Koh & Wissink, 2018), or simply include access to information, informal recommendation, and any non-formalised referral.

The intermediation and gatekeeping services for migrants are linked not only to migration industries but also to migration infrastructure scholarship (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). While studies in migration industries particularly focus on actors and services that help move and settle migrants, the migration infrastructure literature focuses on actors and technologies that mediate and produce migration mobilities (Lin et al., 2017). Previous studies have investigated the commercialisation and privatisation of services for migrants that had previously been supported by the government and which had since been taken over by profit-led providers, i.e. the detention of undocumented migrants or recruitment of skilled labour (Lindquist, 2010; Hernández-León, 2013). Some recent studies expanded the scope by considering facilitators of migration moves (Beech, 2018) and the commercialisation of migration expertise and its role in supporting global human mobility (Cranston, 2016). At the same time, intermediaries’ involvement can play both a ‘mediating and exploiting role’ in the process of mobility (Harney, 1977, p.42).

In this context, it is evident that there is a need for empirical studies examining the role of housing providers and intermediaries in controlling and mediating migrant access to housing markets, which include public and private organisations performing (or not) gatekeeping functions, thanks to their knowledge of the local housing market.

3 Methods

This paper uses qualitative data drawn from 37 semi-structured interviews: 14 with housing providers and 23 leaders of various intermediary organisations that perform functions related to housing access in the Bronx. Semi-structured interviews, in which a researcher poses a series of open questions to interview participants, are a commonly used method in the social sciences (see Petrescu et al., 2017). While interviews are often ‘taken for granted’ as a suitable form of data collection (Hitchings & Latham, 2020), they were selected for this study on the basis that they elicit in-depth responses, and enable “a better understanding of social reality” (Döringer, 2021: p.265). It was anticipated that this would provide research participants, who are from a range of backgrounds and have a wide range of experiences, with the opportunity to share the intricacies of their experiences with the topic in question.

The selection of housing providers and intermediary organisations to interview stemmed from several months of preliminary exploration and participant observation of the West-African community in the study area (across three case study sub-boroughs of the Bronx) which allowed the mapping out of the key actors performing functions related to housing provision and identification of the research subjects. The various intermediaries were interviewed in this study with the objective of gaining a triangulated perspective on the segment of the housing market that serves those living on the economic margins and understanding the role different housing actors play in allocation. To this end, interview participants were asked a range of questions about how they find tenants, how tenants find them, how they decide who to rent to, to what extent referrals are an important part of the process, whether the immigration status of their tenants matters to them, and whether how tenants pay their rent matters to them. Further qualitative data was gathered from documentary evidence, including the rental applications used to screen prospective tenants, data on housing units in a portfolio, and the range of monthly rental costs.

The housing providers interviewed in this research offer apartment units ranging in size from studio to three bedrooms, have from 5,000 to 48,000 units in their portfolios and include non-profit, public, and private providers and property management firms. Each interviewee had properties throughout the Bronx, had West African tenants, and some of their units fell under ‘rent stabilisation’ or were in subsidised properties. The providers were reached through cold-calling and emailing, neighbourhood canvassing, connecting through attorneys who frequently represent housing providers in eviction proceedings, and informal introductions through tenants and gatekeepers. The sequential interviewing technique was also applied. Interviews focused on the process for selecting tenants, including formal and informal criteria used to judge prospective applicants and collecting documentary materials such as rental applications where possible.

The heterogeneous group of 23 intermediaries interviewed for the study included: (a) representatives of religious institutions, (b) non-profit organisations involved in housing advocacy, tenant organising and other related services, (c) personnel from public agencies providing housing benefits, and constituent service staff from elected officials’ offices, and (d) amorphous groups that provided services for African immigrants. Non-profit and public organisations were found through internet searches and contacted by email or phone, and through referrals from other intermediaries. Questions for intermediaries revolved around their perspectives on the housing issues of the West African community; the intermediaries’ specific roles and services in the allocation process, including relationships with housing providers; their outreach processes and criteria for providing housing-related services. While the focus of this paper is on the housing actors and gatekeepers of the low-income housing market in the Bronx, the perspectives of the migrants were also considered and discussed else where (Usman et al., 2021).

3.1 The case study area

The case of the Bronx was chosen as this borough is the destination of choice for one of the fastest-growing groups of migrants in New York City – West Africans – and has the highest percentage of renters in the city. Based on conservative estimates excluding undocumented residents, there are 77,000 West Africans in the city, the majority of which live in the Bronx (Robbins, 2015; Census, 2018), followed by Queens and Brooklyn. The distinctive feature of the West African community is bonding social capital and strong ethnic ties. Indeed, Stoller (2001) indicates that West African migrants typically actively protect members of their community, and in particular undocumented members, from exploitation because of intense group bonds.

The case study area comprised three sub-boroughs in the Bronx: (1) Morrisania/East Tremont, (2) High Bridge, and (3) University Heights – which make up most of the western Bronx, the area where the majority of the borough’s West African nationalities are concentrated. These three sub-boroughs are similar to the Bronx as a whole in terms of income, poverty, composition of regulated and unregulated housing stock, and share of African Americans and Hispanics (the two most significant population groups − 43.6% and 56.4% respectively (Census, 2018).

The borough of the Bronx is characterised by high levels of poverty with a median income 35% lower than the citywide median (HVS, 2013). Compared to other boroughs, the Bronx retains the highest share of renter residents (80%), with Manhattan coming in second place with 76% (ibid.). In terms of housing policy in the US, the federal government supports low-income households in three key ways: (1) subsidies for the construction and operation of specific housing developments (including public housing, Sect. 8 and other supply-side programs); (2) financial support for renters in privately owned housing (e.g. housing vouchers); and (3) place-based grants to develop local housing programs (e.g. CDBG, the Home program) (Schwartz, 2015). Most programs are funded by multiple sources, such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and tax-exempt multifamily bonds (ibid.).

In addition to subsidy programs, local law in New York City facilitates access to housing through rent regulation. Under rent regulation, there is a legal limit on the monthly rent (subject to annual increase), and the occupying tenant has a statutory right to a lease renewal. As Table 1 shows, about 60% of the Bronx’s housing stock is comprised of ‘stabilised’ properties. Some rent-stabilised properties receive tax benefits (e.g. LIHTC and 421-a tax exemption) and, hence, have income-restrictions for tenants.

Table 1 Distribution of renter households by regulatory status within boroughs. The total number of households and percentages of households within each regulatory category in the Bronx are highlighted in bold text for ease of comparison with other boroughs.
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The paper uses the term ‘housing providers’ in lieu of ‘landlords’ that supply housing on the rental market, given that the individual or organisation who supplies housing is not always the property owner. Housing providers operate with portfolios of different housing properties, some of which are subsidised or regulated, or both. Against the backdrop of various housing policies in the Bronx, the formal process of accessing housing can be rather complex and may impose certain selection criteria for tenants.

4 Results

As highlighted in Table 2, the interview results drawn upon in this paper fall into two main categories. These are insights into the formal systems of housing allocation navigated by West African migrants in the Bronx, and into the informal systems of housing allocation navigated by this group. The table indicates the processes which prospective tenants must navigate across both informal and formal systems as housing providers seek to mitigate risk, and highlights the key housing intermediaries encountered in the process of attaining housing.

Table 2 A table summarising the key interview results discussed in this paper
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Table 3 Materials required in housing applications
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5 Analysis and discussion

5.1 Formal and informal pathways to accessing housing in the Bronx

5.1.1 A unified formal application process

There are a number of tenant selection processes initiated by housing providers within the formal housing market. The first step on the rental market in the Bronx is to contact a housing provider to inquire about vacancies: either directly, or through a housing broker. In both cases, the process begins with an application form requesting detailed information about the prospective tenant and their co-occupants, and requires financial and personal documentation. The application, therefore, sets out the process and establishes the procedures that one must follow.

For providers who operate subsidised rental properties— such as those using LIHTC and the 421-tax exemption programs in exchange for accepting only low-to-moderate income tenants—the foremost objective of the application is to screen out ineligible applicants: only applicants with low-to-moderate incomes are eligible and they must be legal US residents.

The application allows us to see if you qualify for the apartment based on your income and whether you would be able to afford its rent. We need documents like your social security number to complete a credit and criminal background check. We also need a 4506 [Internal Revenue Service tax return request form] and IDs for the City […] to make sure that we are renting only to low-income US citizens. (Provider 14)

Many housing providers also have unsubsidized and unregulated properties in their portfolios, that are not bound by tenant-selection constraints, though like all providers they cannot discriminate based on race, sex, ethnicity, religion, or payment method. However, the analysis of the application forms used by interviewed providers shows that, despite the relative autonomy of some providers in choosing tenants, there remains remarkable convergence across all providers in the documentation they require from prospective tenants. The materials required for completing such housing application forms are extensive (see Table 3).

This application uniformity across providers illustrates that all housing providers seek data to discern the creditworthiness of applicants. First, the names of all adult occupants and prior tenancy histories are cross-referenced with the housing court for eviction history. Then, tax returns and employment records help to establish continuous income history. Additionally, providers use an applicant’s social security and identification cards to obtain their credit report and score. Even small-scale providers of multi-family properties report ask for similar information and documents, despite not having to use a standardised application form.

For providers of unsubsidised housing, the fundamental purpose of the application is to screen for default risk; prospective applicants would not be excluded based on their incomes being too high. Their objective is to price units at the maximum allowable amount within stabilisation parameters, if those apply on these properties, and to rent to tenants able to sustainably afford this rate. However, many providers operate a variety of properties and they use a formal application as a universal instrument for screening tenants:

With the application, we can see where you fit. First, we determine if you have the income necessary; we usually use the 30% rule, but not always. Second, if you do, we can then figure out what size unit you need based on family size and what’s available. Some of our properties receive 421-tax credits, so we have to be very careful with those; make sure they are rented to low-income families with all their papers [legal status]. But basically, we use the application to see if you’re going to be a risk or not because no one wants to go to Court. (Provider 7)

Eviction in New York City is expensive and time-consuming, costing thousands of dollars in court costs, legal fees and lost rent (Gunn, 1995). Therefore, providers are motivated to conduct a thorough and diligent examination of a prospective tenant’s income and payment history in order to make an informed decision.

Hence, the typical application process of most providers requires the same documentation regardless of housing type. As a result, providers indirectly exclude certain migrant applicants. Particularly, they request U.S. issued identification cards, social security information, tax records and other materials (see Table 2) that are difficult for some migrant tenants to procure. Consequently, a formal application process precludes prospective tenants who cannot supply the documentation needed by this formal process.

5.1.2 Informal referrals

The formalised process is not universally enforced and is not an exclusive pathway to access housing, since migrants who fail to pass the formal application process still obtain housing (Usman et al., 2021). Through looking at informal housing processes securing West African migrants’ access to housing, it becomes evident that these processes are similar to the ones provided by formal systems and institutional arrangements. While for wealthier economic migrants, housing migration industries and housing institutions operate on financial and legal bases, the case of West African migrants in the Bronx shows that lower-income immigrants get access to housing through different means, i.e., through social capital pulled through ethnic community ties. Indeed, as the following discussion makes clear, alternative informal procedures to find tenants operate in parallel to the formal process. However, entrance through this pathway requires connections to relevant gatekeepers and is commonly granted through referrals, provided by either an existing tenant or a credible intermediary.

[I receive applications] from the same immigrant community, or even tenants who are in the apartment. For example, I have a tenant that’s paying me every month. I would rather that person bring me somebody, a family member, a friend, a relative, than getting someone off craigslist that I don’t even know. […] so far, I’m happy with the result. (Provider 3)

This method offers an informal guarantee, as the referrer stakes their own credibility on behalf of the prospective tenant. As such, the referrals mirror the formal application process by serving the same function, i.e. minimising financial risk.

Moreover, the referral through a particular ethnic migrant network plays a substantial role in the informal application process.

If somebody comes to me and they’re eligible and they qualify… I have no problem giving them an apartment… But let’s say I have an African American [applicant] and the building is predominantly Spanish…and I have one of the Spanish people saying my sister really wants this apartment. Because of the referral, I give them that as opposed to the other person. I don’t discriminate, let’s say this whole building is Spanish, I’m not gonna put a black person in there. You can’t do that. (Provider 3)

This quote also demonstrates that, in some cases, the referrals of the informal process surpass the eligibility screens of the formal process in value terms. This provider evidently prioritises requests for tenancies from existing tenants’ social networks, particularly if this community is profitable as it stands. It appears that this provider is more than comfortable with allowing existing tenants to shape the ethnic composition of their residential community.

In the informal tenant selection process, the housing provider often does not expect the tenant to submit a full housing application beyond the basic information required to complete a lease. The prospective tenant is still expected to cover the upfront costs: the first month’s rent and a security deposit (usually equivalent to one month’s rent). In relying on the referral, the private provider assumes that the credibility of the existing tenant is sufficient to assure that the new tenant is reliable. Providers have confidence in this because they know that the migrant household will often be comprised of numerous rent payers who are all sharing the cost together. This arrangement proves affordable for the tenants and, from the provider’s perspective, is a logical solution to the affordability challenge that they might otherwise face. Finally, further advantages of the referral system are that it minimises the period that the unit is left vacant, and eliminates the administrative cost and delays associated with the due diligence process that accompanies conventional housing applications (e.g., credit checks, criminal, housing court history, prior tenancies). In summary, providers operate an informal process alongside their formal application process, which is a separate pathway that private providers make available to prospective tenants who are referred through reliable sources.

Although providers of private unregulated properties have greater freedom in selecting tenants— they are not bound to accept only low-income households with US legal status – nevertheless, all providers must adhere to non-discrimination laws: ethnic and racial background cannot be used as the basis for tenant selection. In practice, however, providers in the Bronx vary in their adherence to such rules and a number of interviewees among them revealed a strong preference for West African migrants. They are seen as hard workers who do not rely on benefits, and such perceptions inform tenant selection: ‘In my building, everyone works; that’s what we like in our tenants. Like [other] Africans, they always work and go about their business. […] you do your best so you do better in life financially and mentally’ (Provider 6). Furthermore, during interviews, these providers would hold West African tenants up as exemplars compared to tenants that receive benefits (e.g. housing vouchers) because, in their view, they are gainfully employed and do not rely on government assistance.

Hence, alongside the positive aspect of informal housing referrals, namely an opportunity for low-income West African migrants to overcome factors constraining access to the housing market, there are also negative sides to consider. Particularly, the social costs of such informal practices by housing providers include possible discrimination against other population groups, e.g. African Americans. As West African migrants have a reputation for being ‘non-complainers’, it appears that they are perceived favourably by many private housing providers. In the absence of formal procedures and institutional intermediation from the state, such discriminatory actions remain unattended. However, this and other possible disadvantages of informal housing arrangements require further empirical investigation.

5.2 Intermediaries in the housing allocation process

Intermediaries are both public and private organisations that, through their knowledge of the local housing market and familiarity with providers and government resources, can play a role as gatekeepers in accessing housing. They include housing advocacy non-profits, public authorities and religious institutions.

5.2.1 Housing advocacy non-profit organisations

Most of the non-profits in this study were formed to advocate for low-income tenants’ rights where housing providers neglect repairs or otherwise engage in exploitative practices. Housing advocacies work where community members have reported housing providers for violated tenants’ rights. They aim to build a tenant-led leadership infrastructure capable of collecting actionable facts that can be used to demand neglected repairs are remedied and to establish a durable tenant association that can lobby over the long run to ensure that the provider does not renege on their responsibilities.

The study found that while housing advocacy non-profits had certain success organising Hispanic and African American groups, they uniformly reported that West African migrants were apprehensive about seeking their support and tended to remain exceedingly insular, relying on one another for help.

We’ve seen many cases of people who come in, trying to figure out how the system works, and we tell them how complicated it is, and they simply say no, I think my cousin is going to help me or my uncle is going to help me. (Housing Advocacy 4)

While non-profit advocacy groups report that they try to consistently inform all their clients that they have legal protections and should not fear reprisal because of their immigration status, it is not clear that this information penetrates the West African community. This creates a cyclical dynamic: West African migrants are often fearful and unwilling to seek help or accept information on their rights, and advocacy groups, for their part, are unable to disseminate information and organise these communities because of their apprehension.

The thing about the African community [is that] they seem to be very comfortable with our rights being infringed on. … if a [non-African] lived in a house and there’s no heat, no hot water that person would, on a legal ground, refuse to pay and then go to court… But the African man will say it just happened in the month for a week or two or maybe it’s just been happening randomly so they’ll contend with that and move on… Landlords are more comfortable having African tenants because they are not problematic. [That’s why] they don’t have a problem getting housing, it’s just affordability… (Public Authority 3).

Intermediaries’ responses corroborate what many providers stated in describing West African migrants as ‘non-complainers.’ Based on the data, these migrants are not interested in forcefully advocating for their rights and demonstrate a high tolerance for suboptimal housing conditions.

Housing advocacy non-profits serve certain tenant demographics, but not typically West African migrants. While their functions are important to ensure housing fairness, these non-profits proved not to fill the role of gatekeepers. Providers would have minimal inclination to retain an amiable relationship with advocacy groups, for they are viewed as antithetical to the profit-maximisation goals of providers, and their tenant referrals might be seen as problematic, and potential ‘complainers.’ Hence, the relevance of housing advocacy organisations in the housing process is tenuous and adversarial: these advocacy organisations act within the formal market but do not function as housing gatekeepers in the migrant tenant selection process.

Crucially, this apparent reluctance of West African migrants to seek support from housing advocacy organisations can lead to negative ramifications. Studies exploring other migration industries – such as crossing borders, remittances, employment and legal advice – indicate that intermediaries can play an exploiting role in the process of mobility (Harney, 1977; Koh & Wissink, 2018). The interview data reveals that housing gatekeepers act in a similar way. As such, as previously described, using the referral channel, housing providers are able to find a financially reliable tenant among migrants, with minimal administrative expense, and some providers opt not to apply the same procedures to referred migrant tenants and turn a blind eye to the cohabitating tendency of these tenants because doing so ensures steady profitability. Notably, by allowing informal referrals, providers not only sustain their profits by ensuring a steady supply of tenants, but also exploit the very same reluctance of West African migrants to protect their housing rights by being ‘less problematic’ tenants.

5.2.2 Public authorities

Public authorities include the local housing court and government-funded social service agencies. While these organisations are not involved directly in housing allocation, the court functions as an arbiter when disputes arise between housing providers and tenants, such as for non-payment, repair neglect or noise complaints. The social service agencies provide direct assistance to tenants, which takes the form of cash payments for arrears when a tenant is late with their rent and at risk of eviction and homelessness. The court and social service agencies work in tandem: tenants at immediate risk of eviction receive assistance from social services at the direction of the court. Agencies then intercede on behalf of indigent tenants. When the agencies determine that there is a possible path forward to ensure that the tenant can return to solvency, but lacks the resources needed to pay arrears, they apply for emergency funding. This is known as ‘the one-shot deal’. This program pays the housing provider back rent on condition that they withdraw the case and sign a stipulated payment agreement with the tenant.

Housing court and social service agencies begin to work with low-income tenants after they have received formal notice of an impending eviction or termination of utilities, but West Africans rarely reach the stage where their case is brought before the Housing Court. Many of these migrants live in shared accommodation where there is minimal opportunity for institutional involvement unless a case is made by one of the cohabitants. However, raising such a case would be disadvantageous for the tenant, as eviction for some or all of the occupants is the only resolution to an illegal subdivision or overcrowding. Thus, despite their role in regulating and resolving housing provider-tenant housing disputes, public authorities remain disconnected from West Africans. This is corroborated by statements from intermediaries who explain how migrants rarely reach out for assistance.

A lot of it goes back to immigration status… they’re afraid of being deported… It’s our job to do outreach to those communities so they’re aware of the free legal services that they’re entitled to and the services that the government provides to them. (Public Authority 9)

Yet, in most cases, government agencies do not have an incentive to advertise their finite resources. Instead, the responsibility tends to be on community leaders to learn what is available and to share that information within their community. The challenge, also echoed by housing advocacy non-profits, is that West African migrants generally do not have community leaders who are sharing this information to make communities aware of resources available to them.

Like housing advocacy groups, public authorities have a limited connection to migrants. The main finding from intermediaries is that they appear to play no critical function in terms of housing gate-keeping. Rather, their role is reactive, and they only react to persons who seek out their services, who do not often include West Africans. What intermediaries do reveal about migrants is that they look within the established migrant community for social support.

5.2.3 Religious institutions

Places of worship serve a role as information clearing houses for the West African community. Churches and mosques are found to provide a space and platform for trust-based connections between migrants, enabling people with West African nationalities to meet, bond, and share knowledge with each other on employment opportunities and housing offerings. The utility of places of worship, however, is limited due to the insular nature of these spaces, which restricts the scope and quality of the information that is shared therein.

The findings also showed that religious institutions are in a position of power with regards to the dissemination of information. It is for this reason that one local government official explained the importance of religious leaders as such:

There is a lot of misinformation [in the West African community]. One of the reasons why it is important to have a relationship with community leaders is because in this immigrant community there is this notion that government shouldn’t be trusted because of the stuff that goes on in their own countries. So the community leader, the imam or pastor, is key for fighting that bias and sharing credible information. (Public Authority 2)

Yet some leaders do little to correct the myths that are circulating in their community. This may partly reflect the power dynamic that the leaders are incentivised to maintain: they serve the role of general arbiter in the community’s internal hierarchy and reliance on outside institutions may reduce or compromise their authority. Hence, these religious institutions are structured to retain control over information. Evidence of their power is reflected in the key role they play in the informal housing market. It is in these places of worship that many migrants learn of opportunities for house shares, spare beds and other such informal housing opportunities. For their part, the clergy act as facilitators and arbitrators. As facilitators, they are aware of the importance of members helping each other.

When someone is a member and we find they have a need, we sit down [with them] and assess it, and see how we are able to help. The need can be of different kinds. Some may be thinking about rent, some about what to eat. Some may be thinking about a job. With housing, for example, if someone has a 2-bedroom apartment and wants someone to share it with, we can help make that connection. (Religious Institution 3)

The clergy facilitate informal housing transactions by making connections using their deep knowledge of the circumstances, needs and resources of members of their congregation. Migrants, for their part, are more inclined to trust potential roommates that they meet at their church or mosque, especially when this introduction is made by the clergy. Moreover, because there are social consequences for disreputable dealings in the context of a shared community, transacting parties can trust that arrangements made through religious institutions will be honoured.

In terms of their role as arbitrators, the clergy appreciate their responsibilities in helping their congregation resolve disputes. A Ghanaian imam explained his role in intra-community disputes as such:

You don’t exploit [your] people. This happens maybe 1 out of 10 [times]. But when it does, you bring me, the Imam in. This is especially if you have rented a room from another brother and you think they are overcharging you or something. Maybe my solution will be to help you find another place. Or maybe I will help you get a refund of some kind. But the main goal for me is to bring peace to the situation. (Religious Institution 4)

The role that clergy play in resolving intra-community conflicts in the Bronx is similar to their function in the country of origin. As explained in the interviews, an elder who is respected by all parties can step in, hear all concerned, and render a verdict that is respected by all parties. It is important to note that while such reliance is illustrative of the deep trust-based bonds within this community, it is also revealing of the weaknesses or limitations of formal institutions, such as the Housing Court, to intercede or arbitrate in informal housing situations.

In summary, religious institutions are key, not only for the flourishing of the informal market but also for bolstering the enclave by deepening bonds of trust among migrants. They operate in both formal and informal housing markets. On the formal market, religious institutions can assist West African migrants with accessing entire units either through informal referral to a friendly provider or through facilitating connection with other migrants to obtain the documentation required for the formal housing application. On the informal market, the clergy mediates disputes and, since migrants share faith and worship and attend the same religious institution alongside existing tenants, it is through this religious connection that many find their housing in the first place. Hence, by facilitating connections and providing information that is useful to finding housing, religious institutions function in a gatekeeper-type capacity in both formal and informal housing markets.

Taken together, the interviews with intermediary organisations – including housing advocacies, public institutions and religious institutions – reveal that, while migrants ignored the support of formal institutions such as non-profit organisations and public authorities, they reproduced these services internally: instead of appealing to housing advocacies, social services and housing courts to protect their housing interests, migrants turned to religious institutions, acting as arbiters and facilitators of disputes, for intermediation. As a result, it becomes reasonable to speak about the informal migration industries enacted and reproduced in ethnic communities, which mirrors existing research (Poros, 2001; Ambrosini, 2017; Koh & Wissink, 2018). As such, the informal submarket is not ungoverned nor chaotic; it is simply unrecognised but still highly functional and in the position to substitute the formal regulation and services.

Indeed, the paper has highlighted the effectiveness of the processes in the informal migration industry that operate to stimulate informal housing arrangements, as well as to gain informal access to the formal housing system. A growing strand of studies on urban informality in the US emphasises the binding nature between informality and existing formal regulations (Mukhija & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014; Durst & Wegmann, 2017; Devlin, 2019). In particular, as this paper demonstrates, informal housing in the US is predominantly hidden and entwined with formal market practices.

Furthermore, Durst and Wegmann (2017, p.285) articulate the role of the state that is ‘consciously withdrawn from the coordinated regulation of certain activities’ and such informality-as-deregulation occurs when formal state actors fail to regulate. However, the system does not remain unregulated as informal actors enact coordination by themselves. The literature recognizes that informal economic activities are organized (Portes et al., 1989; Mukhija & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014), however, less is known about how they are organised and what actors are involved, and the current study contributes to building insight around such interdependence of formal and informal systems. The case of West African migrants in the Bronx shows that the information between the informal actors is circulated well and there are regulatory functions in place (such as arbiters and mediators), which are provided and enforced by the religious institutions and its leaders. This informal system of intermediation developed in the Bronx for low-income migrant tenants exemplifies how the limitations of migrants’ access to the housing markets (cf. Aigner, 2019) can be overcome.

6 Conclusion

This paper has explored the tenant selection process with regards to West African migrants in the Bronx housing market and examined the roles of housing providers and intermediaries as gatekeepers. Firstly, the findings show that the main gatekeepers to housing tend to be housing providers themselves. Although there is a unified formal application process that potential tenants have to adhere to, some providers bypass it by relying on informal referrals. Secondly, the analysis of different intermediaries’ involvement in housing allocation has uncovered that official intermediaries (e.g., social services, housing advocacy, housing courts) tend to play a minimal role in housing allocation for West African migrants in the Bronx. Although they formed to represent ‘second tier’ resource holders in the migration industry categories (Boissevain, 1974), and these non-profits and public authorities offer a range of resources available to tenants in the housing market, West Africans are generally not among those who take advantage of them. This partly reflects the fact that intermediaries do not successfully engage this migrant community. However, the community itself is circumspect toward seeking institutional support because of the precarious immigration status of migrants and their unfamiliarity with the function of these bureaucracies.

Instead, migrants turn to community networks for help, support and access to resources. Indeed, unofficial intermediaries, such as members of the established West African migrant community and religious institutions, perform gatekeeping functions. Importantly, the findings demonstrate a thriving informal migration industry – and the suspension of formal procedures and institutional intermediation in practice (cf. Groutsis et al., 2015). The emergence of an informal processing system reveals that private providers do not apply the formal tenant selection process universally: at times, they make pathways for economically viable tenants who cannot use direct (formal) procedures. This is usually supported through informal intermediation: either by assurance from existing tenants or referrals through other members of the ethnic community, including intermediaries like religious institutions.

Informal actors, and religious institutions in particular, offer an important window into how intracommunity resources operate. These institutions give migrants the space for trust-based connections where they can share information on employment and housing opportunities, as well as obtain informal dispute resolution. Hence, the advantage of these institutions and their clergy is that they engender mutually beneficial transactions within the community which are an integral part of the migration industry (Cranston et al., 2018). The disadvantage, however, is that reliance on this tight circle may inhibit knowledge of outside resources, such as those offered by government agencies and non-profits, and, from a long-term perspective, reproduce exposure to housing inequality (cf. Smith, 2015).

The paper contributes to expanding understandings of the relationship between formal and informal practices in the Global North (Durst & Wegmann, 2017; Devlin, 2019) and how informal housing allocation is organised. The study demonstrates the interdependency of formal and informal systems of tenant selection in the Bronx housing market. In terms of future research, further investigation could examine how unique is the experience of West African migrants in accessing housing in the Bronx though informal intermediation and whether housing providers allow informal referrals from other immigrant communities and tenants of other backgrounds. Notably, working towards a better understanding of how West African migrants navigate the formal and informal aspects of housing allocation systems within New York could usefully feed into efforts by a range of housing providers to better support them in their migration trajectories.