Abstract
Can we render death harmless to us by perfecting life, as the ancient Epicureans and Stoics seemed to think? It might seem so, for after we perfect life—assuming we can—persisting would not make life any better. Dying earlier rather than later would shorten life, but a longer perfect life is no better than a shorter perfect life, so dying would take nothing of value from us. However, after sketching what perfecting life might entail, I will argue that it is not a desirable approach to invulnerability after all.
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Notes
Here is Seneca (1966, p. 120): “That which is evil does harm; that which does harm makes a man worse. But pain and poverty do not make a man worse; therefore, they are not evils.”
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Acknowledgments
I thank Jens Johansson for constructive comments on a previous draft.
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Luper, S. Exhausting Life. J Ethics 17, 99–119 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9138-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9138-2