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Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason

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Abstract

I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsic value and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third.

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Notes

  1. This view is suggested by Brentano 1969, p. 18; Broad 1930, p. 283; Ross 1939, pp. 275–276; Ewing 1948, p. 152; Chisholm 1986, p. 52; Lemos 1994, pp. 12, 15; Scanlon 1998, p. 96 and Zimmerman 2001, Sect. 3.6, 2007, p. 346; forthcoming Sect. 2.

  2. Pinning down the relevant favoring attitudes promises to unearth a host of difficulties for IV1 as Bykvist (2009) discusses in his engaging paper.

  3. An instructive paper on, among other things, pro tanto reasons is Broome 2004.

  4. As Zimmerman (2006, pp. 595, 602; 2008, pp. 90–91, 149–50) cautions, the following qualification is important. One is indirectly obligated regarding something just in case one is obligated regarding it by way of being obligated regarding something else; one is directly obligated regarding something just in case one is obligated regarding it but not indirectly so. Direct obligations are restricted to those intentional actions that one can perform; not so with indirect obligations as Ted’s case confirms.

  5. Feldman 1986, p. 38. Zimmerman constructs and defends an analysis similar to Feldman’s in his 1996, Chapter 2. In his recent book (2008), Zimmerman advances a different analysis but one which still validates the “wrong” implies “can” thesis.

  6. I thank Michael Zimmerman for these observations.

  7. See note 4. One has indirect (responsibility-relevant or obligation-relevant) control over something just in case one has control over it by way of having control over something else. One has direct control over something just in case one has control over it that is not indirect. Similarly, one is indirectly responsible for something just in case one is responsible for it by way of being responsible for something else; one is directly responsible for something just in case one is responsible for it but not indirectly so.

  8. A more cautious view which, I believe, would suffice for the purposes of this third consideration, is that some intentional omissions cannot be accomplished without intentionally bringing about some “positive” action.

  9. This principle requires qualification in order to avoid Good-Samaritan-type paradoxes. The following qualification seems adequate: if one cannot do p without doing q (perhaps because q is a logical consequence of p), and if one can refrain from doing q, then if one ought to do p, one ought also to do q. This principle is discussed, among other places, in Zimmerman 1996, Sect. 2.3 and in Feldman 1990.

  10. Development and defense of this sort of view is to be found in Feldman 1986. See, also, Zimmerman (1996). Zimmerman (2008) has renounced this view in favor of an alternative: roughly, on the alternative, you ought to do perform the option that is prospectively best, where an option is prospectively best if it is supported by relevant evidence.

  11. On basic intrinsic value and the computation of intrinsic value, see e.g., Harman 1967; Feldman 2000, 2004 and Zimmerman 2001.

  12. Feldman (2004, p. 176). Also see, Harman (1967) and Feldman (2000).

  13. Feldman 2004, p. 66.

  14. Zimmerman (forthcoming, Sect. III, Subsect. 12), recommends this very formulation to develop an engrossing response to a thorny problem concerning intrinsic value and partiality. For comments on this proposed solution, see Bykvist (2009).

  15. On recent compatibilist accounts of “can,” see, for example, Smith (2003) and Vihvelin (2004).

  16. On semi-compatibilism regarding moral responsibility, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 52–53) and Fischer (2006, pp. 76–78; 2007, p. 56).

  17. I develop an alternative argument for the conclusion that determinism imperils moral obligation in Haji (2002).

  18. I thank Ryan Tanner, Michael Zimmerman, and anonymous referees for the Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper was completed during my tenure of a 2008–2011 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Grant. I am most grateful to this granting agency for its support.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, N.W., Calgary, AB, T2N 1N4, Canada

    Ishtiyaque Haji

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Haji, I. Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason. J Ethics 14, 149–171 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9075-x

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