Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a rehabilitation of early German Romanticism in philosophy, including a renewed interest in Romantic ethics. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) is acknowledged as a key figure in this movement. While significant work has been done on some aspects of his thought, his views on ethics have been surprisingly overlooked. This essay aims to redress this shortcoming in the literature by examining the core themes of Schlegel’s ethics during the early phase of his career (1793–1801). I argue that Schlegel’s position stands out against both the dominant Kantianism of his era, as well as against some of fellow Romantics. I show how Schlegel anticipates contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell in both his criticisms of traditional moral theory and in his attempts to develop a positive position.
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Notes
Schlegel’s works are cited parenthetically in the body of the paper using the following abbreviation:
KAKritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Behler (1958).
Individual volume numbers are indicated with Roman numerals. Letters are cited according to their numbering in this edition. Individual fragments are indicated with a §.
On metaphysics, see Beiser (2002); on epistemology, see Frank (1997) and Millan-Zaibert (2007); on aesthetics, see Bowie (1996, 2003); on mythology, see Frank (1982) and G. Williams (2004); on political theory, see Beiser (1992). For an excellent overview of Schlegel’s conception of philosophy, with particular focus on his critical reception of Fichte, see Frischmann (2006).
Sockness (2003) offers the most noteworthy recent reconstruction and defense of Schleiermacher’s ethics.
Wallhauser (1989).
Eldridge (2001).
In a letter of April 7, 1797, to the publisher Cotta, Schlegel describes his plans for a “historical characteristic of the Kantian spirit,” ensuring him that he has “already studied Kantian philosophy for 8 years” (Number 192, KA XXIII, p. 356).
Schlegel tells his brother that “Kant’s theory was the first of which I understood something, and it is the only one [einzige] from which I still hope to learn a great deal. Yet I do not agree with what is nonetheless fundamental to it, intelligible freedom, the regulative use of ideas in general, pure lawfulness as the driving force of the will, etc.” (KA XXIII, pp. 140–141).
A fragment from 1797–1798 seems to echo Schlegel’s anonymous concern, expressed so clearly in the 1793 letter to August Wilhelm discussed at length above, with the search for a formal principle of practical deliberation or a decision algorithm for virtue. It begins with the comment that “Kant is a geometer, and what’s more, an algebraist in morality” (§ 398, KA XVIII, p. 59). However, the thrust of the fragment seems to be a criticism of Kant’s philosophical style, rather than of the content of his moral theory. Schlegel continues: “Even Voltaire merely affected him; he did not study [Voltaire] in the way that Fichte did Rousseau, in order to make [Roussau’s] form is own. He is missing ease—flexibility, elegance in philosophy.”
This comment interestingly anticipates Bernard Williams’ emphasis on the importance of individual projects in giving worth and significance to individuals’ lives. Williams (1973a) makes this point, and elsewhere.
In this respect, the Romantic ideal of individuality is much closer to Harry Frankfurt’s notion of “wholeheartedness,” which is clearly meant to be a sort of virtue or valuable trait of certain individuals, than to Williams’ analysis of integrity in terms of basic commitments that constitute identity. The contrast between these two accounts is presented clearly in Cox (2003). Frankfurt (1987) is the locus classicus for his view. For Williams’ account, see Williams (1973b).
These observations suggest the basis for a defense of Schlegel’s Romanticism against some well-known criticisms of it, such as that leveled by G. W. F. Hegel, to the effect that the Romantic individual is narcissistic. For two recent efforts to respond to this critique, see Norman (2000), Rush (2006).
Elsewhere Schlegel observes that “Harmony is the center of ethics” (§ 320, KA XVIII, p. 221).
In a letter of July 4, 1792, to August Wilhelm, Friedrich discusses Schiller’s “Anmut und Würde,” which he describes as an “application of Kantian philosophy to the art of poetry” according to which the “value of an artwork according to the degree to which it activates freedom, i.e., ethics [Sittlichkeit]” (Number 21, KA XXIII, p. 55).
Beiser (2004, 126ff).
This fragment reappears in a modified version in the June 1798 issue of Athenäum (§ 225, KA II, p. 201).
It is also clear from ancient authors on whom he patterns himself in developing the notion of a characteristic that Schlegel regards this genre as more than just a vehicle for literary criticism. In Athenäum, he describes Tacitus as a writer of “characteristics” (§ 166, KA II, p. 191). Tacitus’ Annals and Histories were taken as models of what eighteenth-century literati called “pragmatic history,” i.e., history that analyzes the causes of major events and the characters of the main players in them in order to derive a moral or political lesson for the present. Around this same time, Schlegel also cites Seutonius and Cicero as models (§ 601, KA XVI, p. 135; § 636, KA XVI, p. 138). Finally, he calls Aristotle’s study of different constitutions a “characteristic” (§ 683, KA XVI, p. 142). This application of the term no doubt reflects the influence of Herder’s conception of nations as historical individuals.
In a 1798 fragment, he presents a similar conception of an individual as a “microcosm” (§ 488, KA XVIII, p. 69).
Eldridge (2001, p. 17).
Eldridge (2001, p. 20).
Eldridge (2001, p. 19).
This latter turn of phrase is Eldridge’s own. Eldridge (2001, p. 18).
B. Williams (2004).
Williams (1982).
Cf. the comment from Ideen: “The highest good, and the only useful thing, is culture [Bildung]” (§ 37, KA II, p. 259).
Cavell (1988).
Cavell (1988, p. 52).
Cavell (1988, p. 58).
In a subsequent letter of October 16, 1793, Schlegel suggests that reason, “the capacity for ideals,” should not be conceived as merely “the pure part of the faculty of representation” but rather as a “basic drive [Grundtrieb]” (Number 69, KA XXIII, p. 143).
This shift can be seen most clearly in two path-breaking studies: (1) Timm (1978) and, especially, (2) Frank (1982). Manfred Frank makes his case particularly well in connection with the anonymous “Oldest System Program of German Idealism.” He argues that the discussion of religion and mythology in this text (various attributed to Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel) is not a call for restoration, but rather for a correction of the one-sided, market-oriented structure of society through an “ethics of mutual recognition that is oriented towards cultural values” (Frank 1982, pp. 168–169). Frank maintains that the early Romantics were forerunners of twentieth-century critical theorists who describe the shortcomings of a culture that privileges instrumental reason (Frank 1982, pp. 192–193).
There are also several unpublished fragments from roughly this same period in which Schlegel compares the theological systems of Leibniz and Lessing. See § 273, KA XVIII, p. 45; § 309, KA XVIII, p. 49; § 329, KA XVIII, p. 51; § 331, KA XVIII, p. 51.
There is some evidence that Schlegel is also inclined to a view closer to Schleiermacher’s, especially in the second part of his lectures on transcendental philosophy (KA XII, pp. 53–54). Here, Schlegel describes religion as a sense of identification with the organic, progressively forming totality of nature. Another suggestion of a link with Schleiermacher comes from Ideen, where Schlegel writes that “Only one who has its own religion, an original intuition of the infinite, can be an artist” (§ 13, KA II, p. 257).
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Crowe, B.D. Friedrich Schlegel and the Character of Romantic Ethics. J Ethics 14, 53–79 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9059-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9059-x