Abstract
In this paper some reflections are developed on the relation between the organization of markets and innovative activities. The IO (Industrial Organization) predictions often depend crucially on the structural and behavioral characteristics of markets (or industries). To some extent this is also the case for the relation between innovation and competition. But a synthesis of existing work provides nevertheless some robust tendencies, including the predictions that in many cases the aggregate R&D activity is positively or inverted-U related with competition intensity. Clearly this tendency may be useful for positive analysis and policy.
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Notes
However, remark that Schumpeter also realizes that the threat of new future competition may also positively affect innovative activities.
A monopolist gains less from innovating than a competitive firm as the former is replacing itself as a monopolist.
For an overview of their own work, see Chapter 4 of Kamien and Schwartz (1982).
The attractiveness of the innovation depends on the ease of innovation and the value of the patent. The latter is determined by the initial market size, the growth rate and the strength of the patent.
The formal reasoning of Kamien and Schwartz (1976) implicitly employs assumptions on continuity of first and second derivatives and they offer no examples to illustrate their claims. Fortunately one can use today mathematical software to lift the analysis. Figures A1 and A2 in appendix provide an illustration of their predictions.
In a symmetric patent race, firms decide simultaneously on their R&D investments while asymmetric patent races deal with sequential moves.
In a winner-takes-all patent race, it is assumed that the patent provides perfect protection for the innovator (the winner of the race). When there is no winner-takes-all or reward sharing, the losers can also reap some of the fruits of the innovation due to imperfect patent protection for the innovator.
Reinganum (1985) shows that this tendency is robust for the introduction of sequential R&D decisions (asymmetric patent races).
The introduction of reward sharing by Stewart (1983) also allows to model the impact of increased competition in the market stage on R&D investments. In the winner-takes-all patent race models, competition is only introduced in the R&D stage as the market stage is characterized by a monopoly. Hence, it is impossible to analyze the impact of increased market competition on R&D investments. Without winner-takes-all, the reward sharing parameter can be interpreted as an indication of the imitation possibilities and thus as a degree of competition intensity. Stewart (1983) concludes that, given a reasonable stability condition, R&D investments are larger the less rewards are shared and are thus maximal when there is winner-takes-all.
Remark that Tishler and Milstein (2009) introduce a stochastic R&D production function. However, this has no impact on the qualitative nature of the results compared to a deterministic R&D production function.
Hinloopen (2000b) looks at the impact of R&D cooperation in a general setting, with n firms, differentiated products and Cournot or Bertrand competition.
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Appendix
Appendix
In the KS model, the optimal introduction date T * is given by (see Eq. 20 in Kamien and Schwartz (1976)):
with
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\( z{\left( {m\left( {r + h} \right)} \right)^{1 - a}} < 1\,,\)
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\( m = a/\left( {1 - a} \right), \)
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\( z = A{\left[ {r/\left( {P\left( {1 - {e^{-rL}}} \right)} \right)} \right]^a}, \)
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\( A = \int_0^T {{y^a}dt} \) representing the cumulative effort to complete the project,
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0 < a < 1,
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P representing the rewards of the innovation
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L the patent life, and
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r the interest rate.
Now, assume the following parameter values:
P = 1,000, L = 20, r = 0.05, a = 0.25 and A = 100.
Then, the optimal introduction time T* is an increasing function of the all possible values of the degree of rivalry h. Consequently, optimal R&D efforts, which are inversely related with the introduction time, are always decreasing in the hazard rate h, see Fig. 1
.
Assume the following parameter values:
P = 1,000, L = 20, r = 0.05, a = 0.4 and A = 10.
Then, the optimal introduction time T* is a U shaped related with the degree of rivalry h. Hence, the optimal R&D investments are inverted U function of the hazard rate h, see Fig. 2
.
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De Bondt, R., Vandekerckhove, J. Reflections on the Relation Between Competition and Innovation. J Ind Compet Trade 12, 7–19 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-010-0084-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-010-0084-z