Abstract
Lange (2008) has given an argument elaborating Blackburn’s (1993) dilemma for any account of modal facts. Lange’s argument aims to show that a contingent fact lacks the modal strength required to be responsible for some fact’s necessity. Recently, Wildman (2021) has argued that Lange’s argument appeals to a mistaken premise. This paper shows that Wildman’s argument fails; his case does not constitute a counterexample to that premise.
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References
Blackburn, S. 1993. Morals and modals. In Essays in quasi-realism, ed. S. Blackburn, 52–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lange, M. 2000. Natural laws in scientific practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lange, M. 2008. Why contingent facts cannot necessities make. Analysis 68: 120–128.
Lange, M. 2009. Laws and lawmakers: Science, metaphysics, and the laws of nature. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wildman, N. 2021. A note on Lange on contingent necessity-makers. Erkenntnis 86: 763–771.
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Lange, M. More on Why Contingent Facts Cannot Necessities Make: A Reply to Wildman. J Gen Philos Sci 54, 325–329 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09621-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09621-6