Abstract
The anti-metaphysical argument against scientific realism (AMA) is the following: (1) Knowledge of unobservable entities implies metaphysical knowledge; (2) There is no metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, there is no knowledge of unobservable entities. This argument has strangely received little attention in the profuse literature on scientific realism. This paper claims that the AMA is logically more fundamental than both the pessimistic meta-induction and the underdetermination argument. The second and main claim of this paper is that the instrumentalists’ use of AMA is incoherent. The gist of my argument is that experimental knowledge requires minimally metaphysical knowledge, and that minimally metaphysical knowledge—when associated with empirical knowledge—suffices to yield a minimal knowledge of the unobservable. I then examine and reject two possible responses: minimally metaphysical instrumentalism and algebraic instrumentalism.
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Notes
In this technical sense, not all propositions in a theory are ‘theoretical’.
The explanation of experimental laws requires knowledge of the unobservable mechanisms underlying them. Therefore, the claim that such explanation should be the goal of science is a realist position.
In a sentence not translated in the English version of the book, Duhem also writes: ‘Il est clair qu'en mettant la physique théorique sous la dépendance de la Métaphysique, on ne contribue point à lui assurer le bénéfice du consentement universel’ (Duhem 1905, 17). ‘It is clear that making physics dependent on Metaphysics does not contribute to securing for it the benefit of universal consent.’ (my translation).
There is a vast literature on the definition of indispensability arguments in philosophy of mathematics and mathematics. However, it is not necessary here to enter into these discussions: ‘indispensability’ does not refer to an argument, but to a proposition stating that metaphysical knowledge is a necessary condition of theoretical knowledge. I am indebted to the anonymous referee who has helped me to clarify this point.
In order to take into account Gettier’s counterexamples, I take these conditions to be necessary not jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge. I take these conditions as necessary since (at least prima facie) a reliabilist analysis of theoretical knowledge is not a very promising option.
See Hacking (1983) for a more precise analysis of the use of microscopes.
For a more thorough demonstration of this point, see Carnap (1995).
The central text concerning skepticism towards metaphysics is obviously Kant (1781). The recent development of meta-metaphysics has given rise to a finer argument than the one presented here but whose subtleties are not relevant to our present purpose. For a contemporary and technical discussion of meta-metaphysical skepticism, see Wasserman (2009), Hirsch (2009), Chakravartty (2017).
If one proposition can be deduced from another provided that all the truthmakers of the first one are included in all the truthmakers of the second, then metaphysical propositions, describing sets of facts that include all the other facts, cannot be deduced from anything.
For a distinction between an epistemological and a metaphysical reading of Hacking’s view, see Morrison (1990).
The experience of measuring is first of all that of space, and the effort to travel in it: we compare the efforts that would be required to travel between two distances by asking ourselves how many steps separate them.
On all these points, there is no difference between scientific realists and instrumentalists, except that the realists accept the possibility that theoretical models can serve as a guide for experimentation: theories can be constructed prior to experimentation.
There is nothing inconsistent about scientific instrumentalists being metaphysical realists. First, they may very well consider that only the observable world is a mind-independent reality. Second, because even if they accepted the existence of unobservable realities, it would not follow that they would have to accept the possibility of knowledge of these unobservable realities. Instrumentalists do not necessarily deny that the unobservable realities exist, or even the possibility of forming true representations of these realities. They deny that we can epistemically justify these representations, and, therefore, that we can know that these unobservable exist, and what they are.
See Chakravartty (2017) for a similar position.
For example, the existence of objective causal relationships can be explained both by assuming the existence of laws of nature associated with categorical properties and by assuming the existence of dispositional properties (Bird 2007).
There are several possible ways to articulate more precisely the opposition between maximally and minimally metaphysical principles. One could use the Kantian distinction between transcendental and transcendental metaphysics (Kant 1781; Friedman 2001), or Chakravartty’s model of levels of metaphysical ‘epistemic risk’ (Chakravartty 2017). But for the purpose of the present paper, this distinction suffices.
See also Miranda Vilchis (2018).
I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees who has suggested this option to me.
Moreover, it could be argued that the metaphysical principles Duhem has in mind when he writes The Physical Theory. Its aim, its structure, are the negative principles, since each theoretical school rejects a property that the other accepts (Duhem 1906, 10-18).
One might object that according to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, the uncertainty concerning the measurement of the velocity of particles is inversely proportional to the uncertainty of the measurement of their positions. We would answer that 1. the Heisenberg principle applies to the level of elementary particles, and that the unobservable world is not reduced to this level. 2. The Heisenberg principle does not concern observations, but the manipulation of phenomena. It formulates the relationship between the particle and the manipulation and measuring instruments. 3. This objection is only valid if scientific realism is true. 4. There are several interpretations of quantum mechanics.
This argument is an experimentalist reworking of Smart's (1963) argument of cosmic coincidence.
I am very grateful to to anonymous referee that has pointed to me that the underdertermination arguments are not ‘totally’ (to use her/his word) undermined, and that I should therefore qualify my claim.
I want to express my gratitude to the three referees of this paper for their thorough and thought-provoking critiques of previous versions of this paper: they tremendously helped me to improve it.
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Künstler, R. The Anti-Metaphysical Argument Against Scientific Realism: A Minimally Metaphysical Response. J Gen Philos Sci 52, 577–595 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09566-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09566-2