Abstract
The cultural atmosphere in a society is accumulated over time through the consumption of cultural services and is diminished through depreciation. Using cultural capital (e.g., cultural heritage, paintings, music scores), cultural services are provided by the cultural-services industry (e.g., museums, opera houses); cultural capital is enlarged by new cultural goods created by individuals. Individuals’ utilities are positively affected by the cultural services they consume, by the cultural goods they create and by the cultural atmosphere and the cultural capital accumulated in society. In a laissez-faire economy, individuals tend to ignore the positive external effects of their cultural-services consumption and creation of cultural goods on other individuals via accumulating cultural atmosphere and cultural capital. Consequently, suboptimally little cultural atmosphere and cultural capital will be accumulated. The efficient intertemporal allocation can be restored by introducing an appropriate subsidy that not only stimulates consumers’ demand for cultural services and the creation of new cultural goods but also enhances the accumulation of cultural atmosphere and cultural capital.
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Notes
For empirical investigations see, e.g., UNESCO (1998), Part one.
The notion of “artist” is used here as a synonym for “creator of new cultural goods”.
The cultural and technical skills of an individual can be interpreted as creativity in the sense of Throsby (2001, ch. 6).
For convenience of referring to each term of (16) in text, the second line in (16) repeats the first line by assigning [1] = \({\dot{\mu}_g /\left({\delta +\alpha _g} \right)U_r Y_r}\), [2] = (n c U g /U y Y r )/(δ + α g ), etc. This procedure will also be applied in the subsequent equations.
It would also be important, in the first place, to secure the existence of such an equilibrium. We conjecture that an equilibrium can be shown to exist, but a rigorous existence proof is beyond the scope of the present paper.
One may cast into doubt the realism of the remaining Lindahl markets. Yet we defend our procedure on the grounds that in order not to blur the analysis by trying to deal with too many complex allocation problems simultaneously, we have to reduce complexity.
τ k > 0 is a sales subsidy and τ sK < 0 [τ sK > 0] is a subsidy [tax] on the purchase of cultural services.
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Acknowledgements
Helpful comments by Rüdiger Pethig and three anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (14)
The FOCs of Eq. (14) are as follows
Appendix B
Derivation of Eq. (15)
Taking (A.5): λ v = λ r /V r , (A.6): λ r = λ y Y r , (A.10): λ y = λ c and (A.11): λ c = U y into account, (A.9): U v + μ g −λ v = 0 can be rearranged to μ g = (U y Y r )/V r −U v , or, equivalently as (15): μ g /(U y Y r ) = 1/V r −U v /(U y Y r ).
Derivation of Eq. (16)
Setting (A.9): μ g = (U y Y r )/V r −U v , (A.1): λ gc = U g_c , (A.2): λ gs = λ s S g , (A.4) and (A.6): λ s = U y Y r /S r into (A.12): \({\dot {\mu}_g =\left({\delta +\alpha _g}\right)\mu _g -n_c \lambda _{gc}-n_s\lambda_{gs}}\), after some rearrangements in terms to get
or, equivalently, Eq. (16).
Appendix C: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (25)
Appendix D: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (27)
Appendix E: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (29)
Appendix F: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (31)
Appendix G: Derivation of the marginal conditions of Eq. (33)
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Cheng, SW. Cultural goods creation, cultural capital formation, provision of cultural services and cultural atmosphere accumulation. J Cult Econ 30, 263–286 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-006-9023-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-006-9023-6