Abstract
The study provides an in-depth analysis of two young adult subjects from a longitudinal study who underwent successive and significant developmental changes. Their developmental patterns, however, are only revealed by a new conception of moral stages, which is both more comprehensive and more detailed than Kohlberg’s original approach. In particular, the suggested alternative taxonomy neatly accommodates what appears as developmental anomalies in the Kohlbergian frame of reference. What is more, apart from merely matching with the observed data, the new theory also explains why the subjects developed the way they did, since it reveals the inherent cognitive conflicts at each stage and how these are resolved at the following one. Although the theory stands against the Kohlberg theory as it is, it may be understood as an extension and further development of the latter, in the sense that Kohlbergian stages are differentiated, supplemented, and theoretically substantiated within the new framework.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Meanwhile the approach has been extended, and the logical aspect especially has been further elaborated (see Minnameier, in press).
Note that Piaget also believes that in general intellectual development that same triadic sequence of stages obtains, in particular he reconstructs development from pre-operational thinking (intra) via concrete-operational (inter) towards formal-operational thinking (trans) in this way (see Piaget and Garcia 1989, pp. 173–174). And in an even broader view the contention is “(t)hat this dialectical triad can be found in all domains and at all levels of development” (ibid., p. 28).
Piaget and Garcia speak of “transformation”, because objects can be transformed into each other. What is crucial here is a common denominator, which enables such a transformation. I prefer the term (reciprocal) “relation”, because especially in the context of moral thinking, individual perspectives are not literally transformed into each other, but only balanced in a certain way.
However, as far as the assignment of operations to stage-types is concerned, my interpretation diverges slightly from Piaget and Garcia. They think that both “inversion” and “reciprocity” come in at the inter-stage (but are as yet unrelated there), which are then integrated at the trans-stage. As for the latter there is no dissent, but I would hold against Piaget and Garcia that inversion is characteristic of the intra-stage, whilst reciprocity is constitutive for the inter-type of reasoning. But still, the interpretation offered here is not really opposed to Piaget’s and Garcia’s line of thinking, as they themselves only say that the establishment of reciprocal relations presupposes negation (see Piaget and Garcia 1989, p. 177). For a discussion, why negation should be the proper operation for the intra-type of thinking see Minnameier (2000a), pp. 75–82.
Main Level III, as a whole, relates to developments in philosophical ethics from—roughly—the beginning of modern times up to now, whereas Main Level II can just about be equaled with different forms of ancient Greek philosophizing in ethics.
The study started in 1994, with new classes (cohorts) being included each year (from 1995 to 1998). 174 apprentices were examined altogether; only a few, however, passed through all six assessments which took place at yearly intervals.
There are indications that he might have advanced to Stage II3a. However, the respective interview passages are not entirely unambiguous, so that they might also be interpreted in terms of Stage II2c. As the possible move onto Stage II3a is not central for the claims made in the discussion (see below), John’s fifth interview is left out in the present paper.
The respective conflict is explained above: Peter, fourth interview.
Colby and Kohlberg (1987a, p. 74) also cite a study in which subjects are reported to have regressed from Stage 5 to Stage 4/5 and add that “it might indicate some remaining unresolved inadequacy in the differentiation of Stage 5 from transitional level 4/5. Given that Stage-II1b-reasoning would have to be scored as Kohlberg Stage 4, it might well be that Stage II1c was (mis)taken as Kohlberg Stage 5, in which case the subsequent movement to Kohlberg’s 4/5, i.e. Stage II2a, would come as no surprise at all. See also Colby and Kohlberg (ibid, pp. 38–39) for similar systematic problems of accommodating empirical developmental sequences that might be due to a lack of differentiation in Kohlberg’s stage hierarchy.
References
Beck, K., Dransfeld, A., Minnameier, G., & Wuttke, E. (2002). Autonomy in heterogeneity? Development of moral judgement behaviour during business education. In K. Beck (Ed.), Teaching-learning processes in vocational education—Foundations of modern training programmes (pp. 87–119). Frankfurt/Main: Lang.
Beck, K., Heinrichs, K., Minnameier, G., & Parche-Kawik, K. (1999). Homogeneity of moral judgement?—Apprentices solving business conflicts. Journal of Moral Education, 28, 429–443.
Berkowitz, M. W. (1998). Finding common ground to study and implement character education: Integrating structure and content in moral education. Journal of Research in Education, 8, 3–8.
Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: Contemporary lives of moral commitment. New York: The Free Press.
Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987a). The measurement of moral judgment. Vol. I: Theoretical foundations and research validation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987b). The measurement of moral judgment. Vol. II: Standard issue scoring manual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Damon, W., & Colby, A. (1996). Education and moral commitment. Journal of Moral Education, 25, 31–38.
Gibbs, J. C., & Widaman, K. F. (1982). Social intelligence—Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–833.
Keller, M. (1990). Zur Entwicklung moralischer Reflexion: Eine Kritik und Rekonzeptualisierung der Stufen des präkonventionellen moralischen Urteils in der Theorie von L. Kohlberg. In M. Knopf & W. Schneider (Eds.), Entwicklung: Allgemeine Verläufe–Individuelle Unterschiede–Pädagogische Konsequenzen (pp. 19–44). Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Kohlberg, L. (1973). Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology (pp. 179–204). New York: Academic Press.
Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (1984). The current formulation of the theory. In L. Kohlberg (Ed.), Essays on moral development. Vol. II. The psychology of moral development. The nature and validity of moral stages (pp. 207–319). San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Lapsley, D., & Lasky, B. (2001). Prototypic moral character. Identity, 1, 345–363.
Lempert, W. (1994). Moral development in the biographies of skilled industrial workers. Journal of Moral Education, 23, 451–468.
Minnameier, G. (2000a). Strukturgenese moralischen Denkens: Eine Rekonstruktion der Piagetschen Entwicklungslogik und ihre moraltheoretischen Folgen. Münster: Waxmann.
Minnameier, G. (2000b). Entwicklung und Lernen: Grundlagen einer Theorie der Genese komplexer kognitiver Strukturen. Münster: Waxmann.
Minnameier, G. (2001). A new “stairway to moral heaven”? A systematic reconstruction of stages of moral thinking based on a Piagetian “logic” of cognitive development. Journal of Moral Education, 30, 317–337.
Minnameier, G. (2004). Peirce-suit of truth: Why inference to the best explanation and abduction ought not to be confused. Erkenntnis, 60, 75–105.
Minnameier, G. (2005). Developmental progress in ancient Greek ethics. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2, 71–99.
Narvaez, D., & Bock, T. (2002). Moral schemas and tacit judgement or how the defining issues test is supported by cognitive science. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 297–314.
Nunner-Winkler, G. (1998). Development of moral understanding and moral motivation. In F. E. Weinert & W. Schneider (Eds.), Individual development from 3 to 12. Findings from the Munich longitudinal study (pp. 253–290). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Piaget, J., & Garcia, R. (1989). Psychogenesis and the history of science. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. J., & Thoma, S. J. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Turiel, E. (1974). Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development. Child Development, 45, 14–29.
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
Walker, L. J. (1999). The perceived personality of moral exemplars. Journal of Moral Education, 28, 145–162.
Walker, L. J., & Pitts, R. C. (1998). Naturalistic conceptions or moral maturity. Developmental Psychology, 34, 403–419.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Minnameier, G. Measuring Moral Progress. J Adult Dev 16, 131–143 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-009-9058-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-009-9058-y