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Reasoning on the Basis of Fantasy Content: Two Studies with High-Functioning Autistic Adolescents

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Abstract

Reasoning about problems with empirically false content can be hard, as the inferences that people draw are heavily influenced by their background knowledge. However, presenting empirically false premises in a fantasy context helps children and adolescents to disregard their beliefs, and to reason on the basis of the premises. The aim of the present experiments was to see if high-functioning adolescents with autism are able to utilize fantasy context to the same extent as typically developing adolescents when they reason about empirically false premises. The results indicate that problems with engaging in pretence in autism persist into adolescence, and this hinders the ability of autistic individuals to disregard their beliefs when empirical knowledge is irrelevant.

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Notes

  1. Here we would like to note that our study included contrary-to-fact materials, rather than counterfactual materials, which is an important distinction. Whereas contrary-to-fact materials refer to empirically false fantasy content (e.g., flying pigs), counterfactual materials refer to alternatives to past events which, although they are not true, could be true (e.g., in the Sally-Anne task, the marble could be in the basket, rather than in the box). Although some classic studies in the literature (most notably, studies by Dias and Harris, and Scott and colleagues) used the two terms interchangeably, a growing body of evidence from recent studies suggests that the developmental trajectories of the two abilities differ (e.g., Beck et al. 2006; Beck and Guthrie 2011).

  2. Given that the proportion of males and females was unequal in the two groups, we have compared our male and female participants in each sample across all the measures that we used In order to check if this could affect our results regarding differences between the autistic and control groups. We have found no significant gender differences across any of the tasks (ts < 1.25, ps > .22).

  3. The availability of each participant was determined by external circumstances, and it did not reflect their individual characteristics.

  4. Given that the proportion of males and females was unequal in the two groups (similarly to Experiment 1), we have compared our male and female participants in each sample across all the measures that we used. We have found no significant gender differences across any of the tasks (ts < 1.36, ps > .18).

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Acknowledgments

We thank Jonathan S.B.T. Evans for helpful discussions, and Becky McKenzie for her help with recruiting participants, and collecting data. The authors would also like to thank all the schools which participated in the study: Ridgeway School, Plymstock School, Tamarside Community College, Tavistock College and Callington Community College. This research was conducted as part of the first author’s PhD research at the University of Plymouth (PhD supervisors: Simon J. Handley and Jonathan S.B.T. Evans). The writing of this paper was supported by an ESRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship (ES/1038071/1) to K.M.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK

    Simon J. Handley

  2. Centre for Neuroscience in Education, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UK

    Kinga Morsanyi

Authors
  1. Kinga Morsanyi
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  2. Simon J. Handley
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kinga Morsanyi.

Appendix

Appendix

Syllogisms used in Experiment 1 (correct responses are marked with *)

  • 1. All nurses are sabs.

  • All sabs are caring.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all nurses are caring.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 2. All politicians are mids.

  • All mids are shy.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all politicians are shy.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 3. All hals are firemen.

  • All brave people are hals.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all firemen are brave.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 4. All eagles are fals.

  • All fals are predators.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all eagles are predators.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 5. All ice creams are vons.

  • All vons are hot.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all ice creams are hot.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 6. All heavy animals are dufs.

  • All dufs are elephants.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all elephants are heavy.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 7. All gofs are slow.

  • All cheetahs are gofs.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all cheetahs are slow.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 8. All funny people are bocs.

  • All bocs are comedians.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all comedians are funny.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 9. All puds are foolish.

  • All doctors are puds.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all doctors are foolish.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 10. All raks are clever.

  • All police dogs are raks.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all police dogs are clever.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily

  • 11. All vums are glasses.

  • All unbreakable things are vums.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all glasses are unbreakable.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 12. All baks are healthy.

  • All aerobics instructors are baks.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all aerobics instructors are healthy.

  • Yes* No, not necessarily.

  • 13. All quiet people are curs.

  • All curs are salesmen.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all salesmen are quiet.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 14. All black plants are mibs.

  • All mibs are flowers.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all flowers are black.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 15. All jops are aeroplane pilots.

  • All drinkers are jops.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all aeroplane pilots are drinkers.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

  • 16. All embs are aeroplanes.

  • All fast vehicles are embs.

  • Therefore, in this village

  • all aeroplanes are fast.

  • Yes No, not necessarily*

Syllogisms used in Experiment 2 (correct responses are marked with *)

  • 1. On this planet

  • all furry animals have long ears.

  • Rabbits are furry animals.

  • On this planet rabbits have long ears.

  • Yes* No Not certain

  • 2. On this planet

  • fruits need water to grow.

  • Vegetables need water to grow.

  • On this planet vegetables are fruits.

  • Yes No Not certain*

  • 3. On this planet

  • trees have red trunks.

  • Oaks do not have red trunks.

  • On this planet oaks are not trees.

  • Yes* No Not certain

  • 4. On this planet fish eat nuts.

  • Squirrels do not eat nuts.

  • On this planet squirrels are not fish.

  • Yes* No Not certain

  • 5. On this planet turtles live in little ponds in the mountains.

  • Sharks are not turtles.

  • On this planet sharks don’t live in little ponds in the mountains.

  • Yes No Not certain*

  • 6. On this planet

  • robins have two legs.

  • Doves are not robins.

  • On this planet doves do not have two legs.

  • Yes No Not certain*

  • 7. On this planet

  • flowers have thorns on them.

  • Daffodils are flowers.

  • On this planet daffodils have thorns on them.

  • Yes* No Not certain

  • 8. On this planet all poisonous animals live in the jungle.

  • Cobras live in the jungle.

  • On this planet cobras are poisonous animals.

  • Yes No Not certain*

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Morsanyi, K., Handley, S.J. Reasoning on the Basis of Fantasy Content: Two Studies with High-Functioning Autistic Adolescents. J Autism Dev Disord 42, 2297–2311 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-012-1477-0

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