Abstract
Unmarried women face a significantly lower average federal income tax rate than unmarried men, 6.3% versus 10.9%. Some of the difference arises because women have lower income on average and the tax system is progressive. Using a non-parametric decomposition analysis, we show that tax progressivity accounts for less than 60% of the gender tax rate difference, leaving the rest being explained by gender differences within income classes. This conclusion remains when the decomposition exercise uses an equivalence-scale-adjusted income and considers gender differences in nontaxable income and time use. Regression results reveal that much of the gender tax difference arises because unmarried women are more likely to live with dependents, making them more likely to claim child-related tax benefits relative to unmarried men. Our findings indicate that the current tax system places a high value of raising children beyond the consideration of the families’ larger consumption needs. Because our analysis does not consider the higher risk of economic insecurity facing single parents and the various externalities generated by women’s higher commitment to childcare, future research should focus on determining whether these additional considerations could justify the extent of the gender tax differential.
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Notes
Many countries have historically had this, although few examples remain; see Coelho et al. (2022) for examples of past and present explicit difference by gender. There was explicit gender difference in the U.S. income tax as recently as 1971. Indeed, one of the landmark sex discrimination cases was a tax case, with the unmarried male plaintiff arguing that it was unfair that he could not take a tax deduction for expenses incurred to care for his dependent mother. At the time, the early 1970s, such a deduction, for expenses relating to the care of a dependent, was limited to “a woman, widower or a husband whose wife is incapacitated or institutionalized.” In November, 1972, the Court ruled for the plaintiff in Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the first time an IRS provision had been declared unconstitutional. The deduction was amended to allow individuals, regardless of their sex, to claim it beginning after December 31, 1971; it was subsequently repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and replaced by a credit.
We purposely use the term gender “difference” rather than gender “discrimination” because we are not inquiring about whether the intent of the laws has been to generate different tax liabilities for men and women, holding tax-relevant characteristics constant. We use it instead of “bias” or “disparities” because these terms suggest that the differences are in some sense unfair, about which we render no judgment. Our goal is to present the facts, and leave to future research whether these facts can be justified.
We also have done the analysis for tax year 2017, with very little difference in the results that follow.
Gender at birth is an imperfect measure of gender identity, and in particular does not capture the full span of gender identities.
We are not able with our data to examine the implications of unmarried, cohabiting individuals.
Elzayn et al. (2023) study the racial disparity, but not the gender disparity, in individual income tax audit rates.
We use a one-percent random sample of all returns for tax year 2019. Before taking the sample, we drop 7.8 million returns that we identify as being filed solely in order to receive the Economic Impact Payment (EIP). These returns reported $1 in adjusted gross income, as instructed by the IRS for nonfilers to file a return for receiving the EIP, and did not report any sources of income or claim any credits. We also drop 10.4 million returns of people who were dependents of other filers, most of whom were under the age of 24. The filing population changes with tax law, and our analysis is based on tax filers for tax year 2019 although, as mentioned, we have also performed our analyses on data from tax year 2017, with similar results.
Lin and Tong (2012) note that, according to Census data, there were 7.6 million opposite-sex cohabiting couples in 2011, which would amount to over 10% of tax returns filed that year.
The individual tax rate is not meaningfully defined for those with nonpositive income. We further remove taxpayers with less than $1000 in income, which eliminates the extremely large negative individual tax rates that can arise.
These figures represent the person-weighted individual effective income tax rate. Each of the figures is lower than the group’s income tax rate calculated as the ratio of the group’s total income tax liability to total AGI. The tax-to-AGI ratio measures the fraction of the group’s total AGI paid in income taxes, and is equivalent to the AGI-weighted individual effective income tax rate.
In 2019, the additional standard deduction for individuals aged 65 or older was $1300 for either spouse of married taxpayers and qualifying widows/widowers, and $1650 for unmarried taxpayers.
These tax rates are slightly different from those shown in Table 2 because taxpayers with income no more than $1000 are excluded from the calculation.
These results are robust with respect to the equivalence scale used in the calculation. Two other equivalence scales, the Census Supplemental Poverty Measure and the OECD modified scale, are also commonly used.
The regressors include controls for individual age in addition to income. As explained above, age affects the gender tax difference because a larger fraction of unmarried female filers qualify for the additional standard deduction for individuals aged 65 or older.
Tabulation of the data from the 2021 American Community Survey by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. https://datacenter.aecf.org/data/tables/55-families-with-related-children-that-are-below-poverty-by-family-type?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/2-53/true/2048/994,1297,4240/346.
For tax year 2019, alimony or separate maintenance payments are deductible by the payer spouse and included in the recipient spouse’s income for divorce or separation agreements executed before 2019. Only 0.6% of unmarried women and 0.05% of unmarried men included alimony in income.
See, for example, the estimated tax rates published by the IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-tax-rate-and-income-percentile#earlyRelease.
Transfer income for low-income households is not included in this measure. In addition, note that AGI is calculated before itemized deductions, so those deductions are already in the income base in Table 3.
McElroy (1990) notes that “extra-environmental factors” also can matter, such as aspects of divorce law or workplace gender discrimination.
What makes someone the secondary worker is often not precisely defined so the statement that women are often secondary is also not precisely defined. If it means lower-earning, that is still true on average, although not as true as it once was.
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E.L and J.S. wrote the main text and reviewed the manuscript. J.S. developed the non-parametric decomposition methodology. E.L had access to tax data and conducted the related quantitative analysis.
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We thank Adam Cole, Bill Gale, Erik Hurst, Laura Kawano, Ana Reynoso, and Andrew Samwick as well as participants in workshops at Georgetown Law Center, the Oxford Center for Business Taxation, UCLA, and the University of Kentucky for helpful comments. We also thank Tammy Lee and Yiman Ren for outstanding research assistance. The research was conducted while one of the authors was employed at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official positions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Any taxpayer data used in this research was kept in a secured Treasury or IRS data repository, and all results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.
Appendix
Appendix
This Appendix first explores how to generalize the decomposition approach from Slemrod (2022) under two income classes to a multiple income class case, and then provides the data used to calculate the 20-group decomposition exercises discussed in the text. The main purpose of decomposition exercise is to understand how much of the gender difference in the average tax rate can be explained by gender difference in income distribution and thereby tax progressivity, and by group tax rate difference within same income classes, horizontal group equity.
As background, we first reproduce the two-class decomposition from Slemrod (2022). In this case, the Group Average Tax Rate Differential (GATRD) is equal to:
where the two groups are A or B and two income classes L or H. Denote the number of people in group G and income class Y as \({n}_{GY}\) whereas \({n}_{Y}\) and \({n}_{G}\) are the number of people in income class Y and group G, respectively. The ratio \({(n}_{GY}/{n}_{G})\) is thus the fraction of people of group G in the income class Y. The term \(AP\) is average progressivity and \(HGE\) is horizontal group equity, defined as
where \({t}_{Y}\) is the average tax rate for all members in the income class Y whereas \({t}_{GY}\) is the average tax rate for members in income class Y and group G. These equations show that GATRD can be decomposed into the effect of tax progressivity interacted with gender differences in the income distribution and a set of income-class-specific measures of horizontal group differences.
The multiple income class analogue is as follows:
where i and j are the indexes of N income classes and \({AP}_{j}\) is the difference in the average tax rate between income class j and class j-1. Specifically,
Plugging \({AP}_{j}\)= \({(t}_{j}-{t}_{j-1})\) and \({HGE}_{i}\)= (\({t}_{Ai}-{t}_{Bi}\)) into GATRD yields
Again, the first term is the effect of tax progressivity interacted with gender differences in the income distribution and the second term is the effect of income-class-specific measures of horizontal group differences.
In the next four tables, we present the information needed to perform the decomposition exercises discussed in the text, for each of four cases listed in Table 3, following the GATRD equation. In each table, columns (1) and (3) display the sizes of \({n}_{Ai}\) and \({n}_{Bi}\), which are the taxpayer counts in Tables 7 and 9 for person-weighted average tax rates and the amounts of taxpayer income in Tables 8 and 10 for income-weighted average tax rates. Note that, in all four tables, each income bin contains roughly the same number of taxpayers, but the weights, \(\frac{{n}_{Ai}}{{n}_{A}}\) and\(\frac{{n}_{Bi}}{{n}_{B}}\), are the fraction of the total in terms of either taxpayer counts or taxpayer income, depending on the measure of the average tax rate. Columns (2) and (4) show the average tax rates by gender and income group, \({t}_{Ai}\) and\({t}_{Bi}\). These are the tax rates depicted in Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4, corresponding to those from Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10. Column (5) shows the average tax rate for each income class, \({t}_{i}.\) Like the group average tax rates, the tax rates for each income class, including\({t}_{Ai}\),\({t}_{Bi}\), and\({t}_{i}\), are either person-weighted or income-weighted within the income class.
With these fractions and tax rates, we compute the magnitudes of the various GATRD components. For each income class, column (6) shows the magnitude of (\(\frac{{n}_{Ai}}{{n}_{A}}-\frac{{n}_{Bi}}{{n}_{B}}){t}_{i}\), column (7) shows the within-income tax rate difference or \({HGE}_{i}\), i.e., (\({t}_{Ai}-{t}_{Bi}\)), and column (8) shows the magnitude of \(\left(\frac{{n}_{Ai}}{{n}_{A}}\times \frac{{n}_{Bi}}{{n}_{i}}+\frac{{n}_{Bi}}{{n}_{B}}\times \frac{{n}_{Ai}}{{n}_{i}}\right)*\left({t}_{Ai}-{t}_{Bi}\right)\). The sum of column (6) and column (8) across all income classes corresponds to the share of GATRD explained by tax progressivity interacted with gender income difference and by horizontal group differences, respectively. These shares vary little with the number of income bins specified once the number of bins reaches 20.
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Lin, E.Y., Slemrod, J. Gender tax difference in the U.S. income tax. Int Tax Public Finance (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-024-09834-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-024-09834-z