Abstract
This research examines capital income taxation for a prospect theory investor under some acceptable in the literature reference levels relative to which are the changes in the level of wealth valued. Depending on the reference level, some results indicate that it is possible for a capital income tax increase not to stimulate risk taking even if the tax code provides attractive full loss offset provisions. However, risk taking can be stimulated when investors compare their reference level with others. Risk taking can increase also if the investor interprets part of the tax as a loss instead as a reduced gain. Then the investor becomes risk seeking and moves away from the discomfort zone of relative losses. This later response to taxation causes private risk taking to increase.
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Notes
See Domar and Musgrave (1944), Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969), Sandmo (1985), Ahsan (1974, 1989). However, Ahsan and Tsigaris (2009) demonstrated that discouragement of risky asset investment will occur even under full loss offset provisions if the government is no more efficient in handling risk than the private sector.
As an illustration, consider a one period model with one risky asset and money. Final wealth is W 2=(1+α 1 x 2)W 1, where W 1 is initial wealth and α 1 is the initial proportion of wealth allocated to the risky investment with a rate of return x 2. If the investor chooses \(\alpha=\frac{\alpha_{1}}{(1-\tau)}\), when there is a proportional tax, τ, on the risky return, then the pretax final wealth is equal to the posttax value. Thus, the investor faces the same risky distribution after and pretax without loss of any utility.
A sufficiently loss averse investor is the one whose degree of loss aversion is high enough to guarantee not to undertake infinite leverage to invest or short sell the risky asset.
On p. 286, they state: “Although this is probably true for most choice problems, there are situations in which gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo. For example, an unexpected tax withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experienced as a loss, not as a reduced gain.”
Note that the empirical studies were done under a differential tax treatment of assets and with tax advantages on capital gains.
There are many other explanations as to why many households do not own stocks (i.e., liquidity constraints).
Empirical evidence indicate that λ is statistically significantly greater than unity (Booij and van de Kuilen 2009).
Some research has used different curvature parameter, γ, in the domain of gains than in losses (γ 1>γ 2). See, for example, Hwang and Satchell (2010). However, empirical estimates indicate that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of nondifference in the value of γ in the domain of gains and losses (Booij and van de Kuilen 2009). In addition, such preferences (γ 1>γ 2) cause the risky asset to be an inferior good which is not empirically or theoretically supported.
Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) find the γ parameter to be (statistically) significantly less than unity.
The boundaries are easily obtained from requiring that W 2i −Γ 2≥0.
It is possible for the investor to become aggressive toward investing in the risky asset if λ<1/K γ or alternatively to aggressively short sell the risky asset when λ<K γ . By aggressive we mean demanding infinite leverage (see He and Zhou 2011 or Hlouskova and Tsigaris 2012). As stated by He and Zhou (2011), this is an ill-posed problem as the investor will demand to buy or short sell an infinite amount of the risky asset. In this paper, we do not examine the ill-posed problems as they would require arbitrary limits to borrowing or risk aversion in the domain of losses.
The optimal solution could also occur in the short selling side provided the investor is sufficiently loss averse and \({\mathbb{E}}(x_{2}-r)<0\).
See footnote 13 for the conditions required to undertake risky investment. Future research should explore this area of investment for a not sufficiently loss averse investor and the effects of taxation.
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Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the thoughtful comments of Ines Fortin and Derek Pyne. We want to thank also the two anonymous referees and the editor for their valuable feedback.
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An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 67th annual congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, August 8–11, 2011.
Appendices
Appendix 1: When Ω≥0
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us assume at first that Ω>0. Based on this and the domain of α, there are three cases that can occur
- (P1)::
-
W 2b ≥Γ 2b , W 2g ≥Γ 2g for \(-\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\leq\alpha\leq\frac{\varOmega }{(1-\tau )W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}\)
- (P2)::
-
W 2b <Γ 2b , W 2g ≥Γ 2g for \(\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}<\alpha\leq+\infty\)
- (P3)::
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W 2b ≥Γ 2b , W 2g <Γ 2g for \(-\infty \leq\alpha<-\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\)
The corresponding problems are
The idea of the proof is to show that (P1) is a concave programming problem with the global maximum being α ∗ as defined by (5) which is such that \(-\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\leq \alpha ^{\ast}\leq\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}\), the utility of (P2) is decreasing for λ>1/K γ and the utility of (P3) is increasing for λ>K γ . First-order conditions (FOC) for (P1) are
it can be shown easily that the second-order conditions are satisfied which implies that (P1) is a concave problem. Finally, it can be seen that
satisfies the FOC and that \(-\frac{\varOmega}{W_{1}(1-\tau )(x_{2g}-r)}\leq \alpha^{\ast}\leq\frac{\varOmega}{W_{1}(1-\tau)(r-x_{2b})}\). As \({\mathbb{E}}(x_{2}-r)>0\) implies K 0<1 then α ∗>0.
Regarding problem (P2), note that
Thus, based on (9) and λ>1/K γ it follows that
and consequently
implying that the utility of (P2) is a decreasing function in α. The property of the utility of (P3) being an increasing function in α for λ>K γ can be shown in a similar way.
Note that for Ω=0 the set of feasible solutions of (P1) consists only from α=0. As the rest is the same, i.e., utility increases for α<0 and decreases for α≥0, then the maximum is reached at α ∗=0. This concludes the proof. □
Appendix 2: When Ω<0
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
- (P4)::
-
W 2b <Γ 2b , W 2g <Γ 2g for \(\frac {\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}<\alpha<\frac{-\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\)
- (P5)::
-
W 2b <Γ 2b , W 2g ≥Γ 2g for \(\alpha \ge \frac{-\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\)
- (P6)::
-
W 2b ≥Γ 2b , W 2g <Γ 2g for \(\alpha <\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}\)
Thus, the corresponding problems are
Problem (P4) is a convex programming problem (in α), and thus its maximum will be reached at one of the end points. First-order conditions for (P5) are
and it can be easily verified that α ∗,+ given by (7) satisfies them. The second-order conditions for (P5) indicate that if λ>1/K γ then (P5) is concave for \(\alpha<\hat{\alpha}_{U}\) and convex for \(\alpha>\hat{\alpha}_{U}\), where
It can be easily seen from (7) that \(\alpha^{*,+}>\frac {-\varOmega}{(1-\tau)W_{1}(x_{2g}-r)}\) and also that \(\alpha^{*,+}< \hat{\alpha }_{U}\) as λ>1/K γ and \(\lim_{\alpha\rightarrow+\infty}{\mathbb {E}}(U_{LA}(W_{2}-\varGamma_{2}))=-\infty\) as λ>1/K γ , and thus the maximum is reached at α ∗,+. In can be also shown that (P5) is concave when
As \(\lambda>\frac{1}{K_{\gamma}}\) then
First-order conditions for (P6) are
and it can be easily verified that α ∗,− given by (8) satisfies them. The second-order conditions for (P3) indicates that if λ>K γ then (P6) is concave for \(\alpha>\hat{\alpha}_{L}\) and convex for \(\alpha<\hat{\alpha}_{L}\), where
(8) implies that \(\alpha^{*,-}<\frac{\varOmega}{(1-\tau )W_{1}(r-x_{2b})}\) and also that \(\alpha^{*,-}>\hat{\alpha}_{L}\) as λ>K γ and \(\lim_{\alpha\rightarrow-\infty}{\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(W_{2}-\varGamma_{2}))=-\infty\) when λ>K γ . Thus, the maximum is reached at α ∗,− which concludes the proof. □
Proposition 4
Let λ>max{K γ ,1/K γ }. Then the following holds:
-
(i)
\({\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast ,+}))>{\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,-}))\) if K γ <1,
-
(ii)
\({\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,+}))<{\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,-}))\) if K γ >1, and
-
(iii)
\({\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast ,+}))={\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,-}))\) if K γ =1.
Proof
Case (i). It can be shown that
and
Thus, showing \({\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,+}))>{\mathbb{E}}(U_{LA}(\alpha^{\ast,-}))\), in case (i), boils down to proving
which follows from the fact that
where the last inequality is implied by K γ <1. Cases (ii) and (iii) directly follow. This concludes the proof. □
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Hlouskova, J., Tsigaris, P. Capital income taxation and risk taking under prospect theory. Int Tax Public Finance 19, 554–573 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9224-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9224-1