1 Introduction

How does meaningfulness relate to morality? Does moral action contribute to a meaningful life? Is it even necessary for such a life? Or does meaningfulness have nothing to do with morality?

The answers to these questions are widely recognised to be controversial. A fundamental disagreement exists between subjectivist and objectivist approaches of meaningfulness. Subjectivist approaches tie meaning solely to individual attitudes and thus leave no room for objective criteria such as morality. At least they cannot make any generally valid statements about the relationship between meaning and morality. Theories with at least partially objective criteria for meaningfulness, in contrast, often tend to consider morality to be relevant to it in some way (cf. Kipke/Rüther 2019; May 2022).

However, even within the family of (at least partially) objectivist theories, not only the contribution of moral action to a meaningful life remains unclear, but the relationship between meaning and morality is also fundamentally unclear and even interpreted contradictorily by many authors. On one hand, they assert that meaningfulness is a distinct value, separate from the value of morality (in short, “distinctness claim”). On the other, the same authors claim that moral action can confer meaning on one’s life and immoral action can detract from it. In other words, they argue that meaningfulness comprehends morality, rather than being separate from it (“comprehensiveness claim”). This contradiction is widespread and unavoidable as long as both claims are held simultaneously. The contradiction is crucial because it concerns the understanding of meaningfulness at its core, insofar as it concerns its relationship to a particularly important area of value and thus the extent and status of meaningfulness.

This article aims to resolve this contradiction and redefine the relationship between meaningfulness and morality, thus taking an important step toward understanding meaning in life. The solution proposes abandoning the widely-held distinctness claim and instead viewing meaning as the comprehensive value category of which morality is only a part. This perspective not only resolves the contradiction but also offers numerous other benefits.

As clarified above, the discussion presented in this article pertains solely to objectivist theories of meaningfulness. “Objectivist theories” refer to those that at least also consider objective factors necessary for leading a meaningful life, including hybrid views that recognise both subjective and objective conditions as necessary. The focus is on the mainstream objectivist theories aligned with this definition, which consider values and self-transcendence as essential components of meaningfulness (e.g. Nozick 1981, chap. 6; Singer 1997; Cottingham 2003; Audi 2005; Wolf 2010; Vitrano 2013; Smuts 2013; Metz 2014; Landau 2017; Belshaw 2021, chap. 8). Thus, the exclusion of approaches is limited to those that consider meaningfulness solely as a large but value-neutral impact (e.g. Benatar 2017, pp. 19, 31), or those that assume meaning can be conferred on one’s life from benefiting oneself (Hooker 2008). Apart from this limitation, this paper intentionally refrains from basing its arguments on a more specific conception of meaningful life. After all, the objective here is to establish a fundamental understanding of how meaningfulness is related to morality.

This paper shall proceed as follows. Firstly, the aforementioned contradiction will be demonstrated through some prominent examples (2). Following this, I will present the proposed solution and briefly outline the understanding of morality upon which it is based (3). Subsequently, I will discuss some possible objections to the proposed solution (4) and explain its advantages (5).

2 The Problem

The following section will present some prominent theories of meaning in which the aforementioned contradiction can be found.

Susan Wolf, for example, considers meaningfulness “a distinct category of value” (2010, p. 53), “distinct from both happiness and morality” (2010, p. 32, cf. p. 3-8, 63), “a third dimension of the good life”, “in addition to happiness and morality” (2016, p. 253). On the other hand, according to her, meaningful action can serve moral goals, indeed „many if not most people get meaning from […] projects and relationships that morality should applaud: from being good and doing good in their roles as parent, daughter, lover, friend, and from furthering or trying to further social and political goals.” (2010, p. 61) However, with such a large overlap, how can meaning be a distinct value?

One could argue in response that in Wolf’s “hybrid view” meaning and morality arise from different motives and reasons and that the strict distinction therefore remains valid. According to this view, meaningful action arises from love, while in morality we act for “reasons of morality” and “speak the language of duty” (2010, p. 2). But this seemingly strict distinction overlooks the fact that we can, of course, also act morally for reasons of love (cf. Vitrano 2013, p. 88; Kauppinen 2012, p. 376 f.; May 2022, p. 270). For example, people may be involved in charities for poor children because they love children, but helping them is also possibly their moral duty. Alternatively, they may help those children because they both love them and it is their duty. Furthermore, both meaning and morality are directed towards something “what is valuable independently of one’s own interests and attitudes”, as Wolf herself acknowledges (2010, p. 61). However, if both the subjective and objective dimensions of meaningfulness show clear overlaps with morality, meaningfulness cannot be understood as a distinct dimension of value.

The distinctness claim is also explicitly advocated by Thaddeus Metz in his objectivist theory of meaning. For him, meaning is “a distinct value”, an “independent normative category” (2016, p. 295Footnote 1), “an evaluative category distinct from others” (2014, p. 9), “a third value beyond happiness and morality” (2016, p. 296). Accordingly, a theory about meaning in life is a “theory one of meaningfulness as opposed to one of rightness or happiness” (2014, p. 19). However, like Wolf, Metz also considers morality an essential source of meaning. This view is already reflected in his frequent mention of the triad “the good, the true, and the beautiful”, which represents the main sources of meaning (2011; 2014, p. 5, passim). “The good” refers explicitly to morality (cf. 2014, p. 6). Again, the question remains: how can meaning be a distinct value, independent of morality, if its realisation depends significantly on morality?

One possible counterargument is that the identification of “the good” with what is morally right is a misunderstanding. Instead, “the good” refers to actions that lie beyond what is morally required, i.e., supererogatory actions. This interpretation is supported by some of Metz's formulations, as when he states that “the good” includes “going beyond the call of duty to help others” (2014, p. 5). The repeated reference to heroes of supererogatory action, such as Mother Teresa or Nelson Mandela, could also support this interpretation. However, this interpretation may not be entirely convincing, as "the good" in Metz's theory is meant to be an umbrella term for a broad range of ways of acting, including not only supererogatory actions but also morally required actions such as “sustaining friendly and loving relationships” as well as “maintaining integrity in the face of temptation”, what we all have to do over and over again to fulfil our moral duties (2014, p. 5).

Even if “the good” exclusively meant supererogatory action for Metz, maintaining a sharp distinction between meaningfulness and morality would still be implausible. For if decades of supererogatory help for dying people, such as that provided by Mother Teresa, confer meaning on a person’s life, it would be reasonable to assume that occasional help for a needy neighbour and similar actions – that is, the fulfilment of positive moral duties – can also confer some degree of meaning on one’s life, even if of a lower level. This contradicts the notion of a sharp demarcation between meaningfulness and morality.

The overlap between meaningfulness and morality in Metz’s approach is also evident in his consideration of extremely immoral actions as constituting “anti-matter”. These actions not only are meaningless but constitute the opposite of meaningfulness (2014, pp. 63–64, pp. 233–236; cf. also Landau 2011, p. 317; Wolf 2010, p. 60; Louden 2013). Metz lists examples of such actions as “spreading nuclear waste; holding sexist and racist beliefs and emotions; hating others by, say, viewing them largely in terms of their weaknesses; torturing others for fun” (2014, p. 234). Other authors refer to this opposite of meaningfulness as “anti-meaning” (Campbell/Nyholm 2015) or “negative meaning” (Smuts 2013, p. 555). However, ​​if a severe lack of morality minimises or destroys meaningfulness the latter cannot be an “independent normative category” (Metz 2016, p. 295).

Aaron Smuts presents a third theory of meaning in which the contradiction is apparent. Smuts also advocates the distinctness claim on the one hand, asserting that meaningfulness “is a kind of value that is conceptually distinct from several other ways in which a life might be good. […] a certain kind of value” (2013, p. 537 f.). The opposite claim, which he also advocates, is already expressed by the name of his consequentialist theory, the “good cause account of the meaning of life”. According to this account “one’s life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good”. (2013, p. 536). Although this good is not identical to morality, Smuts explicitly mentions “moral worth” as among the good things that contribute to a meaningful life (2013, p. 548). Smuts does not specify the place of moral worth within the broader domain of the good, but his examples such as “curing cancer” (2013, p. 543), giving “a hot meal to a hungry homeless child” (2013, p. 555), caring “for his mother, his wife, and the townsfolk”, “to help the needy” (2013, p. 556), and “helping others” (2013, p. 557) largely fall within the category of moral worth. This obviously shows that, according to Smuts, the moral worth is an essential part of what confers meaning on a life.

Evidently the contradiction exists in various theories within the objectivist spectrum. Further examples can easily be provided, even if the two claims are often implicit (cf. Kauppinen 2012, p. 376 f.; Landau 2017, pp. 20, 63; May 2022, pp. 270, 273). The theories assert that meaningfulness is an independent value, clearly distinct from morality, yet they also emphasise that morality is an essential component of a meaningful life. These two positions cannot both be accurate, and astonishingly this contradiction is not more frequently identified and criticised.Footnote 2 The relationship between meaningfulness and morality is a fundamental aspect of the concept of meaning in life, and failing to clarify this aspect leaves the concept of meaningfulness murky at a crucial point.

Or is it only seemingly a contradiction? Could distinctness be understood as not precluding a close relationship between meaning and morality? Christopher Woodard appears to be convinced of the latter:

“the distinctness claim is compatible with believing that meaning in life is interestingly related to other kinds of final value. It could be, for example, that meaning in life contributes to well-being. The distinctness claim denies that meaning is reducible to other values, but not that it is related to other values.” (Woodard 2017, p. 68)

The meaning of “related to” and “contribute” is crucial here. Is it a causal contribution that morality can possibly have to meaning in life? The fact that two things are distinct does indeed not exclude the existence of a causal relationship between them. Even very distinct things can have a causal effect on each other. However, it is hard to understand how values, regardless of their ontological status, can have direct causal effects on each other, like billiard balls. Rather, it might be a non-causal contribution, just as equality (according to many people) significantly contributes to social justice. However, this is possible only if equality is a part of social justice. A value that is not part of social justice — let us say, friendship — cannot contribute directly to it. At most, friendship can indirectly contribute to social justice if a society that values friendship is more likely to preserve just institutions. That would be an indirect influence. The comprehensiveness claim, however, asserts a direct contribution of morality to meaningfulness. The claim is not just that a moral life can contribute to a meaningful life under certain circumstances via many intermediate steps but rather that meaningfulness arises, in part, from morality.

Another option is to understand “distinctness” conceptually. Metz explicitly brings up this option:

“The question of what (if anything) makes a person’s life meaningful is conceptually distinct from the questions of what makes a life happy or moral, although it could turn out that the best answer to the former question appeals to an answer to one of the latter questions“ (Metz 2022, cf. Smuts 2013, p. 537)

Indeed, even conceptual distinctness does not preclude the overlap of the things thus designated. For example, “England” and the “United Kingdom” are certainly different concepts, but one of the entities is part of the other. However, those who hold the distinctness claim go beyond this and suggest that the two concepts have their own distinct extension. They view meaningfulness and morality as independent values, as different value dimensions. This view is not compatible with the comprehensiveness claim, just as one cannot say on one hand that England is part of the United Kingdom and on the other that they are distinct, independent geographical or political entities.

The contradiction therefore remains. Only one of the two claims can be correct, the other must be abandoned. However, even those who do not recognise the contradiction might consider a clarification of the relationship between meaningfulness and morality as worthwhile.

3 The Solution

The suggestion is to abandon the distinctness claim and instead elaborate on the comprehensiveness claim. According to this new understanding, meaningfulness is not a value distinct from morality. Instead, morality is a part of meaningfulness. Additionally, meaningfulness encompasses other values. So meaning is the overarching, comprehensive dimension of value regarding human life.Footnote 3

If we abandon the distinctness claim, another option theoretically remains: the notion that morality is not a part of meaningfulness, but rather identical to it. According to this view, a meaningful life and a moral life are one and the same (cf. Kipke/Rüther 2019, 230 f.). However, this position is obviously implausible as it clashes with the widely held conviction that meaningfulness can stem from various sources. This belief is deeply ingrained in both philosophical and everyday thinking, as evidenced by the pluralistic reference to “the good, the true, and the beautiful” and the wide range of examples of meaningful lives. It is clear that the terms “meaningfulness” and “morality” do not have the same semantic content and do not refer to the same field of phenomena. The identity claim is unconvincing. Therefore, I will not delve further into this position and focus on the comprehensiveness claim instead.

Widespread intuitions speak in favour of this claim, particularly when it comes to positive action, such as helping, supporting, showing kindness, and loving. Not considering such acts as meaning-conferring would be highly counterintuitive. Benefactors, philanthropists, supporters, liberators, saviours, and lovers are perceived as examples of individuals living meaningful lives. Moreover, for most people, a meaningful life would hardly be a real option if it did not include morally good and required actions. After all, who achieves anything of any significance in the fields of the beautiful and the true? Very few people. Only a small number of individuals are scholarly or artistically active or even talented in those areas. However, nearly every human being faces the challenge of shaping their relationships with their fellow human beings and society in a morally correct manner (cf. Kauppinen 2012, p. 377; Singer 1997, p. 259), and human beings fundamentally have the ability to meet this challenge. If meaningfulness is to be not just a theoretical option but a real opportunity for people, morality must be an integral part of it. Otherwise, very few people would have the chance to live a meaningful life if the comprehensiveness claim were false. Pursuing a meaningful life would then be an elitist project from the outset.Footnote 4

Similarly, the assumption that significant immorality would have no impact on meaningfulness would be counterintuitive. Without this assumption, Hitler’s life would be as meaningful as Sisyphus’. Both have done nothing meaningful. Most people, however, would likely argue that the meaningfulness of these two lives is vastly different, but this can be claimed only if the comprehensiveness claim is upheld. Therefore, the conclusion is that abandoning the comprehensiveness claim would require significant and counterintuitive revisions to our understanding of meaning in life.

To defend the claim, it must be shown that not only the comprehensiveness claim is correct but the distinctness claim is also wrong. So, what could be argued in its favour? In section 4, some stronger arguments in favour of it will be discussed and refuted. For now, I will only mention two relatively weak points.

To support the distinctness claim, one could argue for the existence of other, non-moral sources of meaningfulness, such as aesthetic values or scientific achievements. This pluralistic view is widely accepted within the philosophical debate (e.g. Audi 2005; Wolf 2010; Smuts 2013; Metz 2014; Landau 2017). However, the argument does not prove what it is supposed to. The argument only establishes that meaningfulness is not identical to morality, but nobody claims that it is. As clarified above, the serious competitor to the distinctness claim is not the identity claim but rather the claim that morality is a component of meaningfulness. This claim does not ignore but rather explicitly acknowledges the existence of other, non-moral sources of meaning besides morality.

The distinctness claim has been mostly advocated by authors who are interested in establishing or defending meaning in life as a new and significant topic, that deserves serious philosophical research. Thus, dealing with meaningfulness seems (especially) justified if it is clearly distinct from other topics. However, this alone is not a substantive reason to affirm the distinctness claim, but merely a strategy to justify the scholarly consideration of the topic. Thereby, the correctness of the distinctness claim is presupposed. While this strategy of justification may be useful within a research environment traditionally sceptical about the question of meaning of/in life, it is not a valid reason to hold the distinctness claim as correct. It is not even a necessary strategy, as a research topic can be important even if it overlaps with established research topics.

At this point, there is clearly more support for the comprehensiveness claim than for the distinctness claim. As I argue for the comprehensiveness claim by rejecting the distinctness claim, and not just to make the claim but also to provide a well-founded and nuanced perspective, I will now refer to it as the “comprehensive value approach”.

Before discussing possible objections to the comprehensive value approach, the understanding of “morality” presupposed here will be outlined to ensure conceptual clarity. On one hand, this understanding should be as clear as possible, and on the other, it should align with the views of the authors previously mentioned. If the second condition were not fulfilled, that is, if the concept of morality in this article were completely different, it would be unclear to what extent the proposed interpretation of the relationship between meaning and morality responds to their interpretations.

Morality, at its core, comprises satisfying the requirements of impartial moral rules, i.e. what we all owe to each other. These requirements typically include both negative and positive duties. Moral virtues can facilitate or ensure the fulfilment of these duties, but they are not the decisive measure for determining what constitutes morality. My clarification of the relationship between meaning and morality primarily focuses on morality in terms of this normative standard understanding. However, in theories of meaning in life, the concept of morality is often less precisely defined and oscillates between this normative core and certain border areas of morality. Therefore, considering these border areas is advisable as well.

Among the border areas of morality are the so-called special duties that we have only towards those close to us. Even if this does not belong to the realm of what is required for everyone, acting accordingly is part of what is called morally right. We do morally blame someone who neglects their friends or family members. Actions that can be considered as the fulfilment of special duties indeed play a role in the aforementioned theories of meaning in life, such as Wolf’s sewing the Halloween costume for her daughter (Wolf 2010, p. 4).

Part of the periphery of morality is also supererogatory action. By definition, supererogatory actions do not belong to what is morally required, yet they do not represent something entirely different but still fall within the realm of the morally good. Supererogatory action plays an important role in theories of meaning in life, particularly when discussing “great meaning” (Metz 2011; 2014, p. 4, and passim) and referring to heroes of good action as unquestionable examples of meaningful life (e.g. Wolf 2010, p. 11; Metz 2011, p. 390; Metz 2014, pp. 2, 96, 135; Kauppinen 2013, p. 164; Hammerton 2023, p. 10). However, whether the cases described illustrate supererogatory action or the fulfilment of positive moral duties is often unclear (cf. Smuts 2013, p. 545). Apparently, this distinction is not that important, at least for some authors, which again suggests that supererogatory and morally required action are closely related.

Thus, I employ a standard concept of morality as the foundation of this study but also pay attention to its border areas. This approach seems to align with what many authors use as a basis when writing about the relationship between meaningfulness and morality. However, it is not necessary to include these border areas of morality to accept the proposal presented here on the relationship between meaning and morality. The standard concept of morality suffices for this purpose.

Back to my approach for determining the relationship between meaningfulness and morality. It is likely to encounter objections that will be discussed now. This discussion will further clarify the approach.

4 The Objections

In this section, I will discuss five potential objections to the comprehensive value approach.

A first possible objection concerns the shift of status that morality and meaningfulness experience as a result of the comprehensive value approach. This objection argues that the approach is implausible because it suggests that morality, the primary focus of practical philosophy, becomes a mere subtopic, while meaningfulness, a relatively minor topic that has not been discussed for a long time, becomes the overarching issue.

To what extent can this objection be considered more than just an expression of astonishment and a genuine challenge to the approach? Only if one assumes that philosophical debates are, apart from all errors in content, always correct in their thematic design, which is a bold assumption. Some debates in medieval philosophy, for instance, seem strange and misguided to us today. Future generations may view our current debates in a similar way. Nevertheless, there are good reasons why morality as a part of meaningfulness has been and continues to be a more prominent subject of philosophical reflection than other aspects of meaningfulness. The question of what is morally right is practically more urgent, whereas other questions of meaningful life, such as the pursuit of beauty, may enrich our lives but do not impact our social life similarly. Without adherence to basic moral principles, our social life cannot function, and the (violent) conflicts arising as a result prevent us from finding other ways of conferring meaning on our lives.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in past ethical debates, the concept of meaning was not entirely ignored; rather, it was only implicit rather than explicit. Insofar as morality is a component of meaningfulness, the latter has always been a topic of discussion. Similarly, questions of aesthetics, concerned with the concept of the “beautiful”, have already touched questions of meaningful life. Thus, the shift is not as drastic as it may initially seem. In contrast to what the objection suggests, it is not uncommon for debates to adopt new, higher-level concepts whose content was implicitly present in previous debates. For example, the idea of human dignity has only recently become a focus of philosophical reflection, although parts of its content were present before under different labels.

According to a second objection the approach cannot be correct because there are many moral duties whose fulfilment does not confer any meaning on one’s life. For instance, refraining from killing one’s neighbour or from abusing children is morally right, but does not make one’s life more meaningful. Therefore, morality appears to be an evaluative category in its own right, at least in part, rather than being solely a component of meaningfulness.

The description of the phenomenon is correct, but the conclusion is not. Furthermore, the description applies only to negative duties. In fact, fulfilling negative duties does not confer any meaning on a person’s life. The fact that it is all about negative duties is the first indication that the reason why fulfilling these moral duties confers no meaning on one’s life is not that morality is a distinct evaluative category compared to meaning. Instead, it must have to do with the specific characteristics of negative duties. These characteristics are easy to find: we do not have to do anything to fulfil negative duties. Not killing one’s neighbours or abusing one’s children means abstaining from certain actions, in other words, doing nothing in this respect. Yet, we cannot confer meaning on our lives by doing nothing, at least according to any reasonable objectivist theory of meaningfulness. Some kind of activity or personal effort is needed to confer meaning on one’s life. Therefore, we cannot confer any meaning on our lives by fulfilling negative duties. However, the reason for this is that nothing has to be done for these duties and not that morality is beyond the realm of meaning.

In positive duties, the case is different. The objection does not apply to them because we have to do something, such as helping a neighbour in need, caring for children, and participating positively in communities. By fulfilling these duties, a person can confer meaning on their life. Many examples of meaningful action and living cited in philosophical literature fall into this category (see section 2). As positive duties are often indeterminate, their realisation has a scope, and the degree of meaningfulness depends not only on which duties we fulfil, but also how we fulfil them, what we exactly do, and how much.

Nevertheless, this does not dispel the objection. It can be argued that what has been shown so far is that only one part of morality, namely the fulfilment of positive duties, falls within the realm of meaningfulness, but not that this also applies to the fulfilment of negative duties. The objection could therefore be reformulated restrictively: morality is only to some extent part of meaningfulness. While positive moral action is part of it, fulfilling negative duties is not.

However, even this theory of overlap is unsatisfactory, which becomes clear by examining the violation of negative duties rather than their fulfilment. Although the fulfilment of negative duties does not confer any meaning on one’s life, their violation certainly diminishes or even negates meaningfulness, particularly in the case of fundamental duties such as respect for life and bodily integrity. Without acknowledging this, one could argue that a brutal dictator who maintains a loving relationship with his partner leads a meaningful life. In contrast, many authors argue that while immoral behaviour may not always diminish the meaning of one’s life, highly immoral behaviour certainly does. For instance, Iddo Landau discusses the factors contributing to a meaningful life:

“Yes, we should always be moral in the sense that we should never be highly immoral, but no, we do not always have to be moral in the sense of trying to achieve moral excellence. And it is also all right, in some restricted cases, to be slightly immoral.” (Landau 2015, p. 169; cf. Louden 2013; Smuts 2013, p. 555; Metz 2014, pp. 63–64, 233–236; Campbell/Nyholm 2015; Landau 2011, p. 317).Footnote 5

The distinction between negative and positive duties primarily makes this view clear. Highly immoral behaviour consists mostly of violating fundamental negative duties, while positive duties have a wide range of possible fulfilment, and their violation or insufficient fulfilment is in most cases not considered highly immoral behaviour.Footnote 6

The second objection is, therefore, unfounded. All forms of morality pertain to the realm of meaning. However, they contribute to meaningfulness differently: fulfilling negative duties is a necessary condition for a meaningful life but not sufficient. In contrast, fulfilling positive duties is a sufficient condition but mostly not necessary. The philosophical discourse on the relationship between meaningfulness and morality has suffered from an undifferentiated notion of morality. Only by distinguishing between negative and positive moral duties we can properly determine the contribution of morality to meaningfulness and do justice to the diverse intuitions within the debate (cf. Kipke/Rüther 2019 for an overview of these intuitions).

A third objection might look like this: the claim that morality as a whole is a component of meaningfulness and that they are not distinct values cannot be correct because morality and meaning differ in terms of their binding force. In the domain of morality, we speak about binding duties and what we ought to do, but in relation to meaningfulness we do not. Moral norms are binding, whereas the value of meaningfulness is not (cf. May 2022, p. 273).

To some extent, the objection is correct as an observation of our everyday language use. In fact, people often speak this way. It seems unusual to claim that there are “duties of meaning”, whereas the claim of duties is completely normal concerning moral rules. However, our language use is not as clear and well-defined as it appears at first sight. At least when it comes to meaningful relationships with family members or friends, we definitely use the language of duty (let us assume for the moment that these are not moral duties). Susan Wolf mentions cases such as “when I visit my brother in the hospital, or help my friend move, or stay up all night sewing my daughter a Halloween costume” as examples of meaningful acts. And she claims: “[I do not ] believe myself duty-bound to perform these acts” (2010, p. 4). In the context of her reflections, “duty” here means “moral duty”. It may be – to take the last example – that Mother Wolf has no moral duty to sew the Halloween dress at night, but does she not have a duty to do so (if she missed it during the day)? If she insists that she does not believe herself duty-bound, I would reply that she perhaps did not feel duty-bound, but of course, a duty can be assumed here. Let us assume that the next day, all the other children appear in awesome Halloween costumes, except for the little Wolf girl because her mother did not feel like it. Then there would be no surprise if the other parents said to her: “You should have sewn a dress for your daughter! You really should have!” Ultimately, this means: “It would have been your duty!”

In other fields, too, it does not seem strange to assume duties of meaning. If someone has great literary talent but decides to stop writing books after achieving one bestseller and just care for the goldfishes in her pond, it could reasonably be said: “It’s a shame you’re wasting your talent, you have to use your talent!” And this claim would not necessarily be made for the writer’s happiness (maybe writing does not make her happy) but for the meaningfulness of what she is capable of doing.

In philosophical discourse, the idea of (non-moral) duties of meaning is quite unusual, but it does exist. One example is presented by Viktor Frankl. Even if Frankl certainly does not meet today’s methodological standards, he offers some insightful reflections on meaningful life. Frankl asserts that we have a responsibility to live our lives meaningfully. He understands this responsibility not only in the sense that everyone is the architect of their fortune, meaning that whoever wants to live meaningfully bears the responsibility for it, but rather in the sense that we ought to act and live meaningfully. As he puts it, we have a “responsibility for the actualization of values” (1972, p. 105). This actualization of values, which means living a meaningful life, is the task that life gives us. In this sense, Frankl speaks of “the task quality of life” (1972, pp. 54, 58). Coming from a very different starting point, Ronald Dworkin argues similarly “that we each have a sovereign ethical responsibility to make something of value of our own lives” (2011, p. 13).

If we look at this issue properly, it seems odd not to include the notion of duties when thinking about meaningfulness. For if we assume that meaning arises from a positive connection with something objectively valuable beyond oneself, as most objectivist theories in one way or another suggest, then meaningfulness is valuable not only for the acting person but also directly or indirectly for other persons. It seems improbable that such actions would fall entirely within the realm of the supererogatory.

Todd May argues that “the ought is out of place” when it comes to meaningfulness because the latter is about the “relationship to myself” (2022, p. 273). However, that is not true, at least for almost all objectivist accounts, because they assume that meaningfulness is characterised by self-transcendence. Meaningfulness exceeds the individual; it is never only relevant for oneself. It would be contradictory to claim, on one hand, that certain things beyond the agent are objectively valuable and, on the other, that what happens in relation to them is solely a matter of the personal interests of the agent.

One reason why duties of meaning have so far hardly been considered in the philosophical debate could be that we usually do not do what confers meaning on our lives out of duty, but maybe out of love, passion or interest. According to Wolf, love is a necessary condition for meaningfulness (2010, pp. 3-9). Even if one does not consider this subjective moment of love as necessary, one can easily admit that love is often involved in meaningful action. It is therefore not easy to realise that it is also a duty.

Therefore, the third objection cannot disprove the comprehensive value approach either. On the contrary, excluding the concept of duty completely from the field of meaning seems inadequate, even when it is not about moral duties. It might be time to start speaking about non-moral duties of meaning.

Nevertheless, the objection raises an important point about the varying degrees of bindingness of different types of duties. Rather than simply assuming a binary distinction between moral bindingness and meaning-related non-bindingness, recognizing a spectrum of very different degrees of bindingness within the realm of meaningfulness may be more appropriate. Even within the domain of morality, we encounter different degrees of bindingness. Negative moral duties are generally seen as more binding than positive duties are, which are in most cases open-ended and depend on our own interpretation and resources. Special duties, specific to certain individuals or relationships, are even less binding and, at least according to widespread opinion, often depend on the quality of the relationship (e.g. Scheffler 1997; Keller 2006). Even less binding are those weak duties of meaningfulness that lie entirely outside the realm of moral rules, such as the duty of the writer not to waste her talent.

A fourth objection goes in a similar direction. One could argue that morality cannot be part of meaningfulness because the two value areas are fundamentally different in their relation to the person. While moral reasons are impartial, reasons of meaning are partial. Kazuki Watanabe forwards this argument. Referring to Bernard Williams, he argues that moral reasons cannot be the subject of “categorical desires”, which can be reasons for an individual person to live: “one’s reason to stay alive is personal, while morality is impartial.” (2022, p. 107)

The objection presupposes that universal reasons cannot be reasons to stay alive. However, this premise seems questionable. It is true that a person must adopt reasons in order for them to be reasons for that person to continue to live. They must become part of the person’s identity. However, the fact that a person has to adopt reasons as his or her own reasons does not mean that these reasons have to be partial from the outset. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with adopting universally valid reasons as one’s own. The crucial difference is, again, between negative and positive duties, or between reasons for omission and reasons for action. Both, as moral reasons, are universal. However, only reasons for omission are unable to serve as categorical desires, not because they are moral in nature, but because they speak only for omission. For pursuing the project of not doing something can hardly be a “ground project”, as Williams calls the pursuit of the categorical desires (1982, pp. 12 f.). On the other hand, reasons for positive action can of course function as categorical desires. They are likewise impartial but have positive content. They aim at something good and not only at the negation of something bad.

Moreover, the level of the individuality of the different types of moral reasons or their realisation also varies. While negative duties are in fact highly impersonal, i.e. they demand the same from everyone, positive duties mostly offer much more room for individual forms of implementation. On the other hand, even non-moral reasons of meaning are not always highly personal but can also have a validity extending far beyond the respective person. For example, the reasons that justify a scientific project are hardly related to the scientist whose life gains meaning from this project. These are precisely the kind of generally valid reasons that reviewers assess when approving or rejecting applications for research funding.

The fourth objection thus includes the same mistake as the previous one: it sees a simple contrast (here: between partiality and impartiality) where in fact a wide spectrum exists (here: of different degrees of closeness to the person). The realm of meaning is not monolithic, but neither is it just somehow pluralistic; rather, it has different layers in a certain way. Like an onion, it has an inner, indispensable area (mainly the fulfilment of negative duties), around which other layers are laid.

A fifth objection might be that morality cannot be a component of meaningfulness because the two values differ regarding their graduality. This view can be found in Metz: “Apparently unlike moral rightness, meaningfulness comes in degrees.” (2014, p. 186)

Unlike what Metz thinks, that is not apparent. On the contrary, the missing graduality applies, again, only to the fulfilment of negative duties. For example, one can either follow the prohibition of killing a person or not. There is no more or less killing of a person. On the other hand, as already seen, positive duties can be fulfilled to varying degrees. One can bring one’s sick neighbour soup once, or can make her food every day, or can also drive her to the doctor and mow her lawn.

Even if this distinction between negative and positive duties did not exist and if the fulfilment of positive duties was not a matter of graduality, this would not be a valid objection to the notion that morality is part of meaningfulness. For we can speak about a lack of graduality only in relation to single acts. Meaningfulness, however, is about the whole life or longer periods of life, and here even actions whose (im)morality has no grade make a gradual difference, depending on how many actions of this or that kind occur in a life. For example, the moral duty of not to lie does not allow for gradation, but a person can lie to very different extents in their life. One lie in life is as good as nothing, while constant lying may well diminish the meaning of one’s life.

5 The Advantages

The discussion of the objections has indirectly revealed some of the strengths of the comprehensive value approach. In the following section, the advantages will be addressed directly.

1. The first advantage of the comprehensive value approach is the one for which I proposed it: by abandoning the distinctness claim and understanding meaning as a comprehensive value, we can gain a clear and non-contradictory conception of the relationship between meaningfulness and morality. There is no longer any contradiction between the exclusion and inclusion of morality. Morality is clearly a part of meaningfulness, besides which there are other values from which meaning can arise.

2. The approach is thereby capable of integrating different, seemingly contradictory beliefs regarding the relationship between morality and meaningfulness: the belief that morality contributes to the meaning of one’s life, as well as the belief that it does not. What appears to be mutually exclusive actually complements each other, as these beliefs can be linked to different areas of morality, namely negative and positive duties. The same applies to the belief that morality is sufficient and the belief that morality is necessary. These two beliefs can also be related to negative and positive duties by and large. The usual lack of distinction between these different areas of morality has so far hindered the discussion of the relationship between meaningfulness and morality. The comprehensive value approach effectively overcomes this obstacle.

3. By providing a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between meaningfulness and morality, the comprehensive value approach can more accurately assess conflicts that may arise between morality and non-moral sources of meaning. These conflicts have been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature, such as conflicts between morality and artistic achievement, as exemplified by the case of Gauguin (cf. Williams 1982; Cottingham 2003, p. 25; Metz 2011, pp. 190 f.). Many scholars argue that a little immoral behaviour does not diminish one`s overall meaning, but that a high degree of immorality does (cf. Cottingham 2003, pp. 26-29; Landau 2011; Louden 2013; Smuts 2013, p. 555; Metz 2014, pp. 63–64, 233–236; Campbell/Nyholm 2015; Landau 2015, p. 169). This is true, but without precise clarification of the relationship between meaningfulness and morality such statements may appear not only imprecise but also arbitrary.

According to the comprehensive value approach, such conflicts are not between meaningfulness and a value beyond meaningfulness but rather internal conflicts within the sphere of meaningfulness. A decision in favour of non-moral meaningfulness therefore does not necessarily compromise the meaningfulness of one’s life, as the overarching challenge is not to live morally but to live meaningfully. However, there are certain moral prerequisites for achieving this, such as fulfilling (basic) negative moral duties. Thus, the comprehensive value approach can provide decision-making support for the rational resolution of conflicts between moral claims and non-moral options or duties of meaningfulness.

4. The comprehensive value approach also explains why meaning is a prerequisite for attaching importance to morality at all. That is at least what Bernard Williams famously believed. According to him, our meaningful projects (the “ground projects”) are the prerequisites to having an interest in life and thus also in the demands of impartial morality (1982). – That is true, but it would not be fully understandable if morality were an independent value category and not part of meaningfulness. After all, why is meaning supposed to be the reason for following the demands of morality? It would also be conceivable to have the attitude: “I have a ground project that promises me meaning, that’s all that I want, why should I care about morality, too?” The comprehensive value approach answers this by stating that it is a prerequisite for what you want: a meaningful life.

5. This shows that the comprehensive value approach also answers the age-old question “Why be moral?”. The answer is that we need to be moral to live a meaningful life. Landau has already worked out this connection:

“If we want to have a meaningful life we must be moral in the sense of avoiding immorality, since this would undermine meaningfulness, and we may be moral in the sense of excelling morally, since this is one way of increasing meaningfulness.” (Landau 2015, p. 167)

Admittedly, due to the “if” clause, this is still a rather conditional answer to the question “Why be moral?” The assertion could be strengthened and freed from its conditionality if it could be demonstrated that we can hardly do otherwise than wish to lead a meaningful life. There are clear empirical indications for this (cf. Schnell 2021). However, elaborating on this idea is beyond the scope of this article.

6. The comprehensive value approach, furthermore, has the potential to better understand and justify the content of moral duties. For if meaning is the overriding value, it would be strange if this were not reflected in what morality demands of us. A similar idea can be found in Dworkin. Referring less to the notion of a meaningful life and more to the notion of living well, for which we have an “ethical responsibility”, he suggests that “we might treat the content of morality as fixed at least in part by the independent character of ethical responsibility” (2011, p. 202). Admittedly, the fact that the content of at least some moral duties is related to meaning does not presuppose that morality is part of meaningfulness. However, with this presupposition, the meaning-relatedness of moral duties can probably be recognised more easily and systematically.

This is also an idea I can only touch upon briefly here: gravely immoral actions can impair victims’ ability to live a meaningful life, e.g., bodily harm or extreme poverty that limits an adequate range of opportunities for a meaningful life. If it is assumed that actively engaging in valuable activities aligned with our values and desires is necessary, rather than being passive objects, restrictions on freedom that hinder people from living according to their ideas of meaningfulness (so long as they are compatible with those of others) are morally problematic, including occupational bans, marriage bans, and restrictions on religious freedom. Additionally, certain immoral acts, such as torture, rape, and extreme humiliation, also manifest a disregard for the victims as beings who can and want to live meaningful lives, regardless of whether or not these acts limit their ability to do so.

7. The comprehensive value approach aligns much more with the common understanding of meaningfulness, according to which meaning in life or, traditionally speaking, meaning of life is the summum bonum, the overarching value, the great challenge of our life. At the same time, this approach recognises the widely held belief in value pluralism with regard to meaningfulness. In other words, it does not revert to a traditional value monism, according to which the meaning of life is determined by one single value. In contrast, the distinctness claim, according to which meaningfulness and morality are different, equally important values in a human life, seems odd when compared to the common understanding. Of course, this is not a strong argument for the comprehensive value approach as the common understanding could be wrong. However, the burden of proof lies with the revisionary distinctness claim.

8. Finally, the comprehensive value approach also provides some explanatory power for the history of philosophy. If meaningfulness were truly a distinct dimension of value, alongside morality and well-being, it would be strange if this dimension had been overlooked for decades.Footnote 7 Instead, according to the comprehensive value approach, aspects of meaningfulness have always been a topic of philosophical discussion, even if not explicitly labelled as such. For whenever philosophy has addressed morality, it has implicitly touched upon the concept of meaningfulness. As Metz notes, meaning in life was for a long time the “black sheep of the normative family” (2016, p. 294Footnote 8). While this may be true in terms of explicit discussions of the topic, the concept of meaning has always been present as an invisible sheep.

In retrospect, it appears that the distinctness claim was an attempt to establish the concept of meaning in life as a philosophical subject in its own right and secure its place in the field. While this is understandable and may have been strategically helpful, it is factually incorrect because it is too narrow. Now is the time to develop a more comprehensive understanding of meaning in life.